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Abstract 
 
In recent years the EU’s strategy towards promoting human rights in Russia has been the 
focus of considerable internal and external attention, much of it critical. Despite longstanding 
programmes for funding human rights projects in Russia and the launch of biannual EU-
Russia human rights consultations in 2005, the subject of human rights remains contentious 
within EU-Russia relations. One striking aspect of the EU’s policy towards Russia is its focus 
on issues such as prison reform, freedom of speech and prevention of torture which can 
broadly be characterized as civil and political rights issues. The purpose of this thesis is to 
explore an area of human rights theory and practice which tends to receive far less attention, 
namely economic and social rights issues such as the right to housing, health, access to social 
security and workers’ rights. Utilising data gathered from interviews with EU and Member 
State officials and Russian NGOs and a discourse analysis of EU policy documents on human 
rights, the thesis examines how EU institutions, Member States and Russian civil society 
actors conceptualise the meaning and significance of economic and social rights in both a 
general and specifically Russian context.   
The study situates these understandings of economic and social rights and the State’s role in 
guaranteeing them in Russia in the historical context of the Soviet legacy of emphasizing 
such rights over civil and political rights. It also highlights enduring public expectations of 
what the State should provide and the policy of the various presidential administrations since 
2005 of reasserting the State’s role in relation to the apparent realisation of economic and 
social rights through social service provision. It explores the differing approaches taken by 
human rights and more socially-oriented NGOs to engagement with various State structures 
and State-affiliated structures such as the regional human rights ombudsmen, and the 
privileged position Russian human rights NGOs appear to enjoy in terms of their relationship 
with the EU.  
The thesis argues that the EU’s closeness to this very specific type of civil society 
organisation and its apparent lack of internal and external consensus on the importance of 
economic and social rights issues hinders its ability to raise issues relating to these rights in 
its interactions with Russia. At the same time, the fact that economic and social rights 
continue to enjoy a relatively high degree of visibility and importance in Russia make 
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cooperation on economic and social rights issues an area where more fruitful engagement on 
human rights could take place between the EU and Russia. 
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Introduction 
 
On 17th May 2013, the European Union (EU) and the Russian Federation held their 
seventeenth round of human rights consultations since 2005 in Brussels. The number of 
consultations held indicates that the issue of human rights continues to be a complex, 
challenging and contested one where relations between Russia and the EU are concerned. 
Both sides consistently trade accusations about the failure of the other to uphold the rights 
obligations to which each party is committed to by way of internal and international 
legislation. The fractiousness of this relationship became particularly heightened in the 
aftermath of major public protests in several major Russian cities in December 2011 and 
March 2012 following parliamentary and presidential elections which were widely perceived 
to be fraudulent. The prosecution by government authorities of some of the most prominent 
protest organisers, in addition to a perceived crackdown on a number of Russian NGOs 
which received funding from sources outside of Russia, has led to increased criticism from 
the EU of Russia’s record on upholding and promoting human rights.  The focus of this 
criticism has predominantly been on a specific set of ‘human rights,’ namely those commonly 
perceived to be civil and political rights such as the right to free and fair elections, freedom of 
speech and assembly, and, in the context of the on-going violence in Russia’s North Caucasus 
region, the right to life and freedom from torture and inhumane treatment.  
 
This focus on civil and political rights is found not only within the formal and informal 
discussions between the EU and Russia on human rights, but is also reflected in the allocation 
of funding by the EU for civil society projects in Russia which promote human rights.  It is 
also widely evident in the scholarly literature which analyses human rights within EU-Russia 
relations (Saari 2006; Forsberg and Herd 2005; Smith 2005; Haukkala 2009). However, the 
dominance of this discourse only serves to highlight the striking lack of attention given by 
politicians, practitioners and scholars to another set of ‘human rights’ matters – namely, 
economic and social rights relating to health, work, education, housing and social security. 
The absence of economic and social rights within the EU-Russia discourse on human rights is 
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significant because it reflects a wider discourse on the contested nature of human rights and 
types of rights. This reinforces the idea that, on a certain level, there is a hierarchy of 
importance and that not all rights are equal or valued to the same extent as others. This has 
real implications for how we understand and engage with human rights in general, but more 
specifically, has the potential to prevent a balanced human rights culture from being achieved 
in Russia. 
The purpose of this thesis is to address the following research questions: 
• How are economic and social rights and the role of the state in guaranteeing such 
rights conceptualised by Russian civil society organisations, the Russian authorities and the 
various EU institutions including the European Commission, the European Parliament and 
the European External Action Service? 
• What influence do these understandings exert on the interaction between these three 
sets of actors? 
• What implications do these understandings have for the EU’s promotion of a balanced 
human rights dialogue in its relations with Russia and ultimately on promoting an effective 
and balanced human rights culture in Russia? 
This thesis will address the existing gaps in the literature on human rights more generally and 
within EU-Russia relations more specifically by placing economic and social rights at the 
heart of its analysis. It seeks to explore why these rights remain so contested and engagement 
with them in contemporary political discourse within the EU and Russian contexts so 
problematic. This has been the case even as the rise of neoliberal ideologies, the aftermath of 
the global financial crisis and the introduction of austerity policies in a number of EU 
Member States have threatened, and arguably continue to threaten, the full realisation of 
economic and social rights. These rights are of particular importance in the Russian context 
given the status and emphasis they were historically accorded within the various Soviet 
constitutions, the extensive system of Soviet-era state-sponsored welfare provision and 
subsequent high public expectations of the state’s role in guaranteeing such rights. This 
public expectation has continued to a considerable extent in the post-Soviet period even as 
liberalising social welfare reforms during the Yeltsin and Putin presidencies have led to the 
full or partial rollback of many of the previous rights entitlements in this sphere.  
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This thesis argues that there is continued Russian public support for upholding and promoting 
economic and social rights, which, even in the period following the 2011-2012 election 
protests, contrasts with a relative lack of public interest in the type of civil and political rights 
campaigns carried out by those domestic human rights NGO with the closest links to 
international organisations such as the EU. This suggests that engaging with issues relating to 
economic and social rights concerns could prove to be an area of fruitful interaction with the 
Russian authorities and Russian civil society organisations working in the social sphere 
because it could potentially garner greater public recognition and respect for those 
international organisations interested in human rights in Russia. This in turn might allow such 
organisations to have a greater impact on Russia’s social and political development than 
simply lecturing the Russian authorities on their failings in relation to human rights. This 
thesis also, however, contends that this potential engagement is hindered by a lack of 
consensus on the meaning and importance of economic and social rights within the EU’s 
internal policies. This influences its external approach towards these rights and has come 
about as a result of neoliberal contestations of economic and social rights entitlements and the 
role the state should play in relation to such rights claims. This allows for the promotion of 
what are, from the perspective of some within the EU, less contentious human rights issues 
relating to civil and political rights, even if on a day to day basis they may not be the chief 
concern for the majority of the Russian population.  
The empirical fieldwork for this thesis was conducted during early 2011, when the large-scale 
political protests which took place later that year could not have seemed less likely. 
Nevertheless, its findings remain relevant given that it is unclear whether this protest 
movement, which has garnered so much international attention in the past 18 months, will be 
able to capitalise on the initial burst of public support it received or to extend its reach 
beyond the country’s major urban centres. In addition, support for the movement and its 
actions remains limited: a survey conducted in 45 of Russia’s regions in January 2013 
indicated that only 13% of those polled ‘definitely supported’ the protests, with 26% ‘likely’ 
to support them. 38% claimed that the protests ‘had had no major effect on life in Russia.’  In 
contrast, this thesis contends that economic and social issues have consistently been and 
continue to be of deep concern to a larger proportion of the Russian public. 
Thesis structure 
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The thesis is divided into two main sections. The first part provides for the conceptual and 
methodological framing of the study. The initial chapter of the thesis discusses the contested 
nature of economic and social rights, particularly against the backdrop of neoliberal policies 
and the recent period of recession and austerity in Europe, and the way in which these rights 
were and are understood in the Soviet and Russian contexts.  It also explores the complex 
relationship between the state and economic and social rights guarantees and some of the 
ways in which the political discourse surrounding these rights and the role of the state in 
relation to them has come to emphasise individual responsibility and behaviour.  
This is followed by Chapter 2 which examines the nature of the different actors involved in 
this study, namely the various EU institutions, the Russian state and Russian civil society 
organisations. It asks whether the EU is capable of acting as a ‘normative power’ where the 
promotion of human rights is concerned, and explores the EU’s rhetoric on economic and 
social rights in its internal and external affairs and the extent to which this translates into 
policy reality. It also discusses the nature of the relationship between the Russian state and 
domestic civil society organisations, setting the scene for the subsequent analysis of this 
relationship in Chapter 5.  
Chapter 3 then provides a full and reflexive account of the methodology used to address the 
research questions mentioned above. It provides detailed information on the research 
locations selected, the different groups of respondents who were identified and the process of 
conducting the interviews and discourse analysis used as part of this study. It also considers 
some of the ethical implications of the research conducted. 
The second section of the thesis comprises four chapters which analyse and put into context 
the original data generated by the research. Chapter 4 provides a brief overview of the 
relevant institutions in relation to the promotion and protection of human rights in Russia 
before going on to explore understandings of economic and social rights in the Soviet and 
contemporary Russian contexts and the views on the meaning and importance of these rights 
expressed by various Russian civil society representatives interviewed as part of this study. It 
highlights the seeming divide between ‘abstract’ human rights issues relating more to civil 
and political rights issues, and more ‘everyday’ rights concerns linked to the economic and 
the social, a distinction which was raised by a number of the Russian respondents interviewed 
and which has also been highlighted in other research on human rights in Russia (e.g. Turbine 
2007; 2012). It also explores the lack of consensus which appears to exist amongst Russian 
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human rights NGOs regarding the value and importance of economic and social rights, and 
the extent to which choosing to focus on civil and political rights campaigns may isolate 
these organisations from the mainstream of public opinion and from other non-governmental 
organisations.  
Chapter 5 then looks at how the different groups of respondents involved in this study 
conceptualised expectations of the state in relation to economic and social rights. These 
expectations are situated within the context of the Russian authorities’ increasing rhetorical 
emphasis on social welfare and the state’s role in its provision which contrasts with a 
practical approach to social policy which includes strong elements of neoliberalism in that in 
practice, the individual is responsible for securing these rights (Hemment 2009). The chapter 
then goes on to examine how different civil society actors in Russia such as human rights 
NGOs and those with a more socially-oriented slant negotiate their relationships with the 
Russian state and with international donors such as the EU.  
Chapter 6 explores this relationship from the alternative perspective of the EU by analysing 
how economic and social rights are constructed in the Union’s internal and external relations 
and the lack of consensus that appears to exist within the EU institutions and amongst some 
of the individual Member States on the importance and significance of these rights. It also 
examines how the EU’s structure can influence the development of policy approaches in the 
area of human rights by exploring the role of institutions such as the European Parliament 
and the impact of Member States’ agendas on the EU’s strategy on promoting human rights. 
Chapter 7 explores the practical policy impact of the EU’s apparent lack of consensus on the 
meaning and significance of economic and social rights on its strategy on promoting human 
rights in Russia specifically by looking at its relationship with different types of NGO in 
Russia to which it provides funding. It discusses the closeness of the relationship between the 
EU and Russian human rights NGOs and argues that this is a factor which perpetuates the 
impression that the EU advocates a somewhat narrow definition of ‘human rights’ which 
privileges civil and political rights.  
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by tying the different strands together and foregrounding the 
conceptual contribution the thesis makes to the understanding of economic and social rights 
within the wider concept of ‘human rights.’ It demonstrates the original contributions the 
thesis makes to the better understanding of the relationship between the Russian authorities 
17 
 
and domestic civil society organisations, as well as understanding the EU-Russia relationship 
where human rights are concerned in practice. Finally, it raises and assesses some of the 
problems inherent within the EU’s structure and policy promotion in relation to human rights. 
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Chapter One 
Theorising Economic and Social Rights 
 
1.1   Introduction 
Defining the meaning and explaining the significance of human rights is an extensive and 
complex challenge which is the subject of debate amongst both the scholarly and practitioner 
communities. The purpose of this study is to focus on one aspect of human rights, namely 
economic and social rights. It will look at the status, significance and potential 
implementation of these particular rights, which have long been one of the most contentious 
issues within the wider debates on what human rights mean (Beetham 1995). This chapter 
aims to set out the first part of  the theoretical framework for this thesis by exploring some of 
the debates surrounding this particular subset of ‘human rights’ which demonstrate how 
economic and social rights have emerged as a specific set of rights claims. Prior to engaging 
with these debates, it will first provide some brief context to the overall concept of human 
rights; the historical development of the European human rights system which is of greatest 
relevance to the aims and objectives of this study; and the way in which economic and social 
rights are usually defined, as distinct from civil and political rights. It will then briefly 
examine some of the differences between Soviet, contemporary Russian, and ‘Western’ 
understandings of human rights, a theme which will be expanded upon in Chapter 4; and the 
issue of cultural relativism as a potential way of explaining some of these differences. 
Finally, it will explore the key role that the State is perceived to play in guaranteeing 
economic and social rights  and some of the changes in the discourse on these rights which 
have taken place in a contemporary Western European context and which have arguably 
influenced the way in which the EU formulates its discursive approach to such rights.  
The chapter aims to demonstrate that, while the status of economic and social rights remains 
contested, it is perhaps this contested nature that makes such rights worthy of analysis. 
Debates over whether or not they constitute ‘real’ human rights point to wider debates about 
the nature of rights claims, obligations on the part of the State and the individual right-holder, 
and the extent to which the behaviour of an individual should influence their ability to claim 
certain rights. All of these debates have become more heightened in the context of the global 
economic crisis and what Farnsworth and Irving (2012) describe as the ‘new age of austerity’ 
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currently influencing policy discourse in a number of the EU’s Member States. As will be 
further elaborated upon in Chapters 2, 4, 5 and 6, there are significant differences but also at 
times a degree of overlap in the approach taken towards economic and social rights and the 
role of the State in relation to them by the various EU institutions which constitute some of 
the subjects of this research project, the Russian State and certain sectors of Russian civil 
society whose representatives took part in this study. 
1.2    A brief overview of the development of ‘human rights’ 
Attempting to define the concept of ‘human rights’ presents a number of challenges given its 
inherent flexibility and the very different types of claim it is seen to cover: as Bunch 
(1990:487) points out, this concept is ‘not static or the property of any one group; rather, its 
meaning expands as people reconceive of their needs and hopes in relation to it.’ 
Nevertheless, most commentators appear to agree that the concept of human rights as 
reflected in key instruments of international human rights law such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR)1 has its origins in 17th and 18th century concepts of natural law, which arose in 
response to the development of the nation-state in Europe and its increasing and often 
arbitrary power over its citizens. According to Mutua (2007:550), ‘the rise of the modern 
nation-state in Europe and its monopoly over violence and the instruments of coercion gave 
birth to a culture of individual rights to contain the abusive state.’ The idea of natural law 
implied certain natural rights pertaining to humans by the very nature of their being human, 
and was perhaps most extensively elaborated by John Locke in his Two Treatises on 
Government of 1689, in which he outlined his theory of a ‘social contract’ in which the right 
to life, liberty and property are perceived as natural rights and, upon entering into a civil 
society, humans surrender to the state only the right to enforce these rights, rather than the 
rights themselves (Weston 2008: 21). According to this liberal social contract theory, such 
rights are dependent on the non-interference of the state in the lives and liberties of its 
citizens and are often classified as ‘first-generation’ civil and political rights (Vasak 1977:29; 
Yokota 2008: 8).   
1.3   Categorising Human Rights 
                                                          
1 See Appendix 4 for the text of the UDHR and Appendix 5 for the ECHR 
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While the natural law concept emphasises individual rights and advocates limiting the role of 
the state in its citizens’ lives, the rise of Marxist and other left-wing ideologies in the late 19th 
and early to mid-20th centuries led to a greater focus on rights which were seen as belonging 
to the collective rather than the individual. These included economic rights such as the right 
to work, including just conditions of work, and trade union rights; and social or ‘welfare’ 
rights which include the right to social security; the right to adequate food and housing; the 
right to health and education; and the right to an adequate standard of living, all of which 
would require the positive intervention of the state to guarantee them (Dean 2007; Weston 
2008: 27; van Boven 1982). According to T H Marshall (1992: 8), the idea of social rights 
should go even further to encompass ‘the whole range from the right to a modicum of 
economic welfare and security, to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to 
live a civilised life according to the standards prevailing in society.’ Where the more recently 
developed area of children’s rights is concerned, the categorisation is somewhat different 
since children depend on others (adults and the State) for the protection and realisation of 
their rights (Jackson 1999). As a result, the two main categories into which children’s rights 
can be divided are ‘positive’ or ‘welfare’ rights which are concerned with the child’s well-
being and encompass economic and social rights such as the right to freedom from poverty 
and to adequate healthcare and housing; and ‘negative’ rights to protection from inadequate 
care which largely covers rights claims on the State to protect children from harm caused by 
adults, particularly their parents (Wald 1979).  
 
The idea of dividing human rights into different ‘generations’  or sectors is, however, heavily 
contested since certain rights encompass elements of more than one category. As van Boven 
(1982) points out, trade union rights are concerned with economic and social interests such as 
the right to work and to enjoy decent conditions of work, but also involve elements of civil 
and political rights such as the right to freedom of assembly and association in terms of, for 
example, the ability to strike. The right to health is most commonly categorised as an 
economic and social right, yet accessing healthcare and implementing adequate health 
protection encompass elements of human dignity, justice and participation which tend to be 
seen as relating more to civil and political aspects of human rights, making this another right 
which cuts across the supposed ‘generations’ (Leary 1994; Toebes 2001). According to 
Yokota (2008), classifying different rights into ‘generations’ has been done more for the sake 
of convenience rather than being based on any distinctive characteristics of these rights, while 
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Gearty (2011:17) argues that such classifications are a relic of Cold War geopolitics and 
suggest ‘a foundational distinction between rights where none exists.’  
 
The assumption that economic and social rights only emerged as a concept from the 19th 
century onwards and in relation to the rise of the labour movement is another argument which 
is not universally accepted. Thomas Paine (1996), for example, advocated the provision of 
social security for poor families and pensions for the elderly in The Rights of Man in 1792, 
while the second French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1793 also made 
reference to certain social rights (Moyn 2010). This study does not seek to imply that one set 
of rights should be considered to be of greater value or significance than the other. It 
recognises the degree of interdependence that exists between civil, political, economic and 
social rights (Gavison 2003) and supports the contention that the true realisation of economic 
and social rights relies on the fulfilment of civil and political rights such as freedom of 
expression and political representation (Beetham 1995). It also follows Gearty’s (2011) 
argument that a true commitment to ensuring human dignity encompasses rights including the 
prohibition on torture and slavery and freedom of expression, but, equally, the range of social 
rights outlined in various key documents such as the UDHR and the European Social Charter 
(ESC).2  
 
For the purposes of this study, however, the focus will be on the broad category of economic 
and social rights, including those of children, and, to a much lesser extent, civil and political 
rights since, as will be detailed below, the leading European institutions in the field have 
tended to divide universal human rights norms into these two sets of rights. In addition, these 
groups of rights form the basis of Western European and Russian understandings of what 
constitutes human rights and thus underpin the relationship between the EU and Russia where 
the observation and promotion of human rights is concerned. There are key differences but 
also at times some overlap in the degree of importance which the two parties have accorded 
to economic and social rights in particular and it is these nuances and contestations which this 
thesis aims to tease out. 
 
1.4    Defining economic and social rights 
                                                          
2 For the text of the Charter see ‘The European Social Charter (revised),’ CETS No.163, Council of Europe, 
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=163&CM=8&CL=ENG  
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The focus of this thesis is on the role played by economic and social rights within the 
European human rights system operating under the aegis of the Council of Europe3 which 
applies to all the countries of the European Union, who are also members of the Council of 
Europe, and to Russia as a fellow Council member since 1996 (Jordan 2003); and the position 
these rights occupy within the Soviet and contemporary Russian contexts. Nevertheless, the 
role of the UN as the leading international institution in terms of human rights protection and 
promotion must also be given due consideration since the drafting of the UDHR and its 
subsequent Covenants in the late 1940s and 1960s was the first formal attempt to codify these 
rights on an international level alongside civil and political rights and to outline states’ 
obligations to observe these rights. 
 
In addition, the Council of Europe’s drafting of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) in 1950, the instrument which is now the key frame of reference for human rights 
violations and attempts at redress in Europe and is enforced by the European Court of Human 
Rights,4 was aimed at securing the recognition of the UDHR’s provisions within a 
specifically Western European context (Clancy 1999). Scholars such as Renteln (1990) and 
Cassese (1990) have argued that the UDHR was biased in favour of civil and political rights 
at the behest of Western nations acting on ideological grounds and that the few economic and 
social rights it does refer to were only included as the result of lobbying by the Soviet bloc 
and Third World countries to place greater emphasis on economic and social rights. The fact 
that the majority of the treaty’s articles refer to civil and political rights and that the original 
treaty was divided into two separate conventions (the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) in 
1966 appears to add some weight to this argument. The UDHR devotes twenty four of its 
thirty articles to outlining rights such as the right to life, liberty and security of the person 
(Article 3) and the prohibition of torture (Article 5), while economic, social and cultural 
rights such as the right to work and equal pay (Article 23) and the right to an adequate 
standard of living (Article 25) are mentioned only towards the end of the document.5 The 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), in contrast, makes no mention of economic 
and social rights.  
 
                                                          
3 For further details see ‘Council of Europe,’ http://hub.coe.int/  
4 For further details see ‘The European Court of Human Rights,’ http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/homepage_EN  
5 See Appendix Four for the text of the UDHR 
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Given the Cold War context to the Convention’s establishment, it was only following the 
collapse of Communism that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Former 
Soviet Union became party to it by joining the Council of Europe in the 1990s, with Russia 
itself initiating membership proceedings in 1996 (Jordan 2003). As a result, as Madsen 
(2007:140) points out, the establishment of the European human rights system took place 
within ‘a club of Western European countries that...were like-minded when it came to the 
protection of liberal European democracy.’ This is not to say that the European human rights 
system has ignored economic and social rights entirely: the 1961 European Social Charter 
was aimed specifically at codifying such rights. Unlike the ECHR, however, the European 
Social Charter is not legally binding for those who ratify it and the European Committee of 
Social Rights which monitors its implementation can only make recommendations to states in 
terms of legislative changes.6 As a result, broadly speaking the rights emphasised by human 
rights treaties, Western governments and most Western- based human rights NGOs both 
domestically and internationally tend to be ‘liberal’ civil and political rights (Yokota 2008: 
11) such as freedom of expression and assembly or freedom from torture. Indeed, according 
to Mutua (2007`: 622), ‘civil and political rights enjoy a normative superiority that is the 
envy of the advocates of economic and social rights,’ while Brown (1999: 105) claims that 
‘the contemporary human rights regime is...simply a contemporary, internationalised and 
institutionalised version of the liberal position on rights.’  
 
According to Donnelly (2007a), at the time when the two Covenants were being drafted in 
the 1960s, civil and political rights were treated as individual rights claims which could be 
pursued through legal channels and should therefore be incorporated into international law, 
whereas economic and social rights were seen more as statements of desirable policy goals 
which would be realised progressively over time based on the resources available to a 
particular state. This approach corresponds to what Hertel and Minkler (2007: 9) see as a 
tendency on the part of both states and international organisations to see civil and political 
rights as ‘negative’ rights, in that they merely require a state to refrain from interfering with 
an individual’s liberty, whereas economic and social rights are seen as ‘positive’ since they 
‘obligate government and others to actually provide something to an individual.’ It could thus 
be argued that civil and political rights are seen as less costly to the state in terms of both the 
                                                          
6 ‘The Social Charter at a glance,’ Council of Europe, available at 
http://www.coe.int/T/DGHL/Monitoring/SocialCharter/Presentation/CharterGlance/English.pdf [accessed 16th 
January 2013 
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effort and resources required and are therefore more likely to be implemented, even if, as 
Hertel and Minkler (2007) point out, the protection of civil and political rights such as the 
right to a fair trial which depends on the maintenance of a judicial system are also dependent 
on the resources available to a given country.  
 
In addition, some commentators argue that certain political and economic theories dominant 
in Western thinking see economic and social rights either as being beyond the remit and 
control of the state, or even as compromising the freedoms inherent in civil and political 
rights. According to Gavison (2003: 24), ‘many Western theories of political justice and 
liberalism make civil and political rights a necessary component of the liberal, democratic 
state, but do not include social and economic benefits in the order of rights...some such 
theories present the taxation required for efforts of redistribution seeking to address social 
and economic concerns as a violation of civil and political rights, specifically the right to 
liberty and property.’ As a result, economic and social rights appear to be in greater danger of 
becoming politicized through their association with certain political ideologies, namely those 
of the Left, than with the apparently more widely accepted and perhaps less controversial 
concepts of civil and political rights and freedoms. In many respects, however, this seems 
somewhat unjust given that the discourse of civil and political rights and indeed ‘human 
rights’ as a general concept is surely equally influenced by politics and the doctrine of 
liberalism. Mutua (1996: 607) points out that the contemporary human rights movement 
cannot be considered ‘post-ideological,’ despite attempts by its advocates to portray it as 
‘both impartial and the quintessence of human goodness.’ Yet the controversy surrounding 
economic and social rights may help to explain a problem which Alston (1997: 188) 
highlights, namely the failure until relatively recently of leading international human rights 
organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International to address economic 
and social rights issues in their work, with Amnesty not extending its mandate to include such 
rights until 2001 (Goering 2006). According to Alston, their neglect of this area ‘cannot do 
anything but reinforce, rather dramatically, the more general view that economic and social 
rights are not ‘real’ human rights.’  
 
This ‘politicisation’ or controversy surrounding economic and social rights is not, however, 
necessarily a feature of approaches to human rights taken outside the ‘Western’ system of 
human rights monitoring. Chan (2002), for example, points out that China, like many 
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developing countries, tends to emphasise positive rights related to basic human needs such as 
healthcare, education, food, housing and employment, and group over individual rights. 
Where the Islamic approach to human rights is concerned, the state is expected to work 
towards the achievement of social justice and the public good, while the Quran prescribes the 
redistribution of funds from the wealthy to those less fortunate (Said 1979). It may therefore 
only be within the ‘Western’ concept of human rights that economic and social rights are 
sometimes seen as problematic or in some way not ‘real’ human rights. In addition, the 
argument put forward by scholars such as Cranston (1983) that the realisation of economic 
and social rights would require a state to provide unrealistic and extremely costly levels of 
resources to its citizens is in fact a misunderstanding of what the original architects of the key 
instruments relating to these rights such as the UDHR intended. Such rights were in fact 
intended to provide individuals with a certain minimum level of resources such as land, 
productive capital or labour which thereafter they would be responsible for using in order to 
improve their situation (Hertel and Minkler 2007). Writing in the late 1940s when the process 
of drafting the UDHR was ongoing, Wilfred Jenks (1946: 42) clarified this still further: 
where the right to work was concerned, he noted that it must be understood as ‘the right to 
suitable and useful work affording scope for the capacities of the individual. Mere relief work 
which has no positive social value cannot be regarded as an adequate fulfilment of this right.’ 
This therefore challenges the argument that fulfilling ‘positive’ economic and social rights is 
a simple one-way process of expensive resource allocation from the State to the individual. 
 
Nevertheless, the fact that economic and social rights have come to be seen by some as 
second-tier human rights or in some cases not even rights at all (Nozick 1974) is perhaps not 
surprising given that the main UN and European human rights instruments were created and 
have been implemented against the backdrop of the continuance or rise of liberal democracies 
in the United States and Western Europe in the post-war period.  This has been accompanied 
by a growth in popularity of a neoliberal ideology7 which, as will be further discussed below, 
tends to conceive of human rights as being the civil and political rights of the individual, with 
little space for economic, social or cultural rights (Falk 2008). According to Pollis (2008: 
280), ‘...philosophically the Western doctrine of individual human rights excludes economic 
and social rights. These rights are not viewed as fundamental, but derivative, stemming from 
                                                          
7 Although a general definition of neoliberalism is used here, it is worth noting that neoliberalism is not a 
homogenous ideology but remains contested and capable of adapting according to local particularities to form 
what Birch and Mykhnenko (2009:355) call ‘varieties of neoliberalism’ across Europe. 
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the exercise of civil and political rights.’ In addition, the rise of free-market capitalism in the 
US and Western Europe has to some extent hindered attempts to guarantee economic and 
social rights as the result of policies which have cut welfare provision and increased 
deregulation of the market (Weston 2008; Beetham 1995).  
 
Some have argued, however, that the UDHR’s alleged bias in favour of civil and political 
rights has been overstated since the Declaration contains several articles on fundamental 
economic and social rights including the right to an adequate standard of living, the right to 
education (also considered a cultural right), the right to join trade unions, and the right to 
social security (Hertel and Minkler 2007). According to Donnelly (2007a: 40), far from 
opposing the inclusion of such rights in the Declaration, Western governments of the time 
played a key role in ensuring that they were included: ‘Not a single Western state pressed for 
a Declaration without economic and social rights...almost all insisted that economic and 
social rights were an essential element of the Declaration.  
 
The Universal Declaration was drafted precisely at the time of the flowering of the Western 
welfare state and was seen by most Western states as part of the process of consolidating an 
understanding of human rights that prominently features economic and social rights.’ In 
addition, certain regional human rights regimes have developed their own instruments to 
ensure the observation and protection of economic and social rights. Where the European 
human rights system is concerned, although the initial key document was the ECHR of 1950, 
the European Social Charter (ESC) of 1961 outlined the fundamental economic and social 
rights which the citizens of states party to the Charter would be entitled to. Donnelly (2007a: 
45) sees this as evidence of the commitment of European governments of the time to 
promoting economic and social rights, arguing that the ESC provides ‘a substantively more 
demanding list of rights and a significantly stronger review process than the ICESCR or any 
other regional system. This is the best evidence of the attitude of Western states...toward 
economic and social rights.’  
 
Nevertheless, as previously mentioned this system is not legally binding in the way that the 
ECHR is, making it what Alston (1997:188) calls the ‘poor stepchild’ of the ECHR. Overall 
it remains hard to argue with Hertel and Minkler’s (2007: 1) assertion that economic and 
social rights remain ‘less well articulated conceptually than civil and political rights, less 
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accurately measured, and less consistently implemented in public policy.’ Treaty 
commitments to observing such rights may be all very well on paper, but it is in policy and 
practice that this approach often falls short, as will be examined in greater detail in Chapter 7.  
 
In addition, the previously mentioned perception that the state must take concrete political 
and financial steps to ensure the realisation of economic and social rights creates makes 
economic and social rights somewhat vulnerable to the political vagaries of each individual 
state and the ideological commitments of its government of the time. As Eide and Rosas 
(2001:5) point out, ‘taking economic, social and cultural rights seriously implies at the same 
time a commitment to social integration, solidarity and equality, including tackling the 
question of income distribution.’ Where this commitment is lacking, the ‘progressive 
realization’ of economic and social rights which the ICESCR envisages is likely to suffer.  
 
1.5   Economic and social rights in the Russian context 
 One of the key aims of this study is to explore the discourse on economic and social rights 
and the role of the State employed by Russian state and civil society actors, and to compare 
and contrast them with the discourse on these issues utilised by the various EU institutions. In 
order to do so it is important to explore the legacy of the Soviet regime’s emphasis on 
economic and social rights and to discuss the impact this legacy continues to have on 
contemporary Russian understandings of what these rights signify, something which will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. Scholars such as Renteln (1990) and Cassese (1990) 
have attributed great importance to the role of the Soviet Union in lobbying for the inclusion 
of social and economic rights in the original text of the UDHR in 1948. In terms of domestic 
legislation, the Soviet Constitution of 1936 guaranteed a large number of economic and social 
rights for its citizens including the right to employment, leisure, and material security in old 
age and in illness, although many of these provisions were only guaranteed for those 
classified as ‘workers’ (Nathans 2011:171).  
 
The priority given to this particular group of rights is also evident in the Soviet Constitution 
of 1977, which outlined the right to work, rest and leisure, health protection, care in old age, 
sickness or disability, housing and education while placing certain limits on civil and political 
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rights.8 It is worth noting that, despite this rhetorical commitment to guaranteeing such rights, 
in practice various social services were indeed delivered by the Soviet state but, as Sajo 
(1996: 141) points out, ‘...they were not provided in terms of rights [but]...were administered 
on a more or less reliable and egalitarian basis as in-kind additional compensation to one’s 
salary. The state had no duties in this respect; it provided its services on a discretionary basis 
and in exchange for loyalty in everyday life.’ In addition, rights were not awarded in and of 
themselves but were heavily contingent on duties: therefore labour became both a right and a 
duty (Donnelly 1982), with the provision of many services such as free housing and access to 
leisure facilities contingent on the acceptance of a job provided by the authorities (Sajo 
1996).  
 
Nevertheless, the fact that economic and social rights were so clearly outlined and promoted 
on an official level indicates that a clear understanding of ‘human rights’ existed in the Soviet 
Union, and that there was an extensive culture of rights which emphasised the social and 
economic over the civil and the political. Nathans (2011:1670) argues that this legal ‘rhetoric 
of rights’ influenced the way in which Soviet citizens understood what their rights and 
entitlements were: ‘...far from functioning as an ideological diversion, officially proclaimed 
rights may have promoted and/or reflected rights-based thinking among significant portions 
of the Soviet population.’ One key aspect of this particular conception of human rights is the 
degree of emphasis it places on the role of the state in guaranteeing rights, particularly social 
and economic rights. The right to access state social service provision was dependent upon 
one’s ability to work, with this work being obligatory and provided by the state. The fact that 
citizens needed to fulfil certain duties in order to access economic and social rights means 
that this approach is not entirely dissimilar to the ‘rights and responsibilities’ approach to 
welfare provision outlined in Section 1.8. In addition, it is the state which provides these 
rights and can withdraw them if the required duties are not fulfilled (Berman 1996). As a 
result, the state becomes the key actor defining rights and bestowing them on its citizens: as 
Lane (1984: 358) points out, ‘rights have been defined in post-1917 Russia by the 
government, not as claims on the government.’  
 
                                                          
8 See Appendix 6 for the text of Chapter 6 of the 1977 Constitution on ‘Citizenship of the USSR/Equality of 
Citizens’ Rights’ 
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Given this official emphasis placed on the pre-eminence of economic and social rights and 
the state’s role in upholding them, it is perhaps hardly surprising that there has been a high 
level of continuity in the post-Soviet period in terms of the position such rights are seen to 
occupy, and the degree of attachment to the idea that the state is responsible for providing 
social services and entitlements (Cook 2007b). Following the collapse of the Soviet system, 
the Russian Constitution of 1993 remedied the earlier constraints on civil and political rights 
and freedoms but continued to commit the government to ‘the protection of people’s labour 
and health, a guaranteed minimum wage, state support of the family, invalids and senior 
citizens’ (Juviler 1998: 157).  
 
Despite the new political freedoms which emerged during this reform period, the public’s 
emphasis on economic and social rights over civil and political rights such as freedom of 
expression and assembly and freedom from torture advocated then and now by prominent 
Russian human rights groups such as the Moscow Helsinki Group 9 appears to have remained 
largely unchanged. Polling data from 2010 (the most recent available) indicates that, when 
asked to rank human rights in order of importance, 69% of respondents cited the right to free 
education, medical assistance and social security in sickness and old age, while 57% pointed 
to the right to life as the most important. The right to well-paid work in one’s discipline 
(50%) and the right to a state-guaranteed minimum level of subsistence (36%) came ahead of 
freedom of speech (34%) and freedom of information (22%).10 An even starker overview is 
provided by more recent polling data from February 2013 which indicates that, despite the 
much-publicised political protests in Russia in late 2011 and early 2012, only 4% of those 
surveyed expressed concern over restrictions on civil rights and democratic freedoms, while 
68% saw rising prices as the main threat to the country and 52% cited the impoverishment of 
large sections of society.11  
 
As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, there is also some evidence of individual 
citizens using the courts to make (frequently successful) claims regarding the protection of 
                                                          
9 See for example ‘Projects’ (English Language Page), Moscow Helsinki Group, 
http://www.mhg.ru/english/1B304A3 [accessed 12 January 2011] 
10 ‘Which human rights are, in your opinion, the most important?’ [in Russian], Levada Center, 8 September 
2011, available at http://www.levada.ru/archive/prava-cheloveka/kakie-iz-prav-cheloveka-po-vashemu-
mneniyu-naibolee-vazhny-otvety-ranzhirova  
11 ‘Russians’ greatest worry is corruption; only 4% worried about rights – poll,’ Interfax, 21st March 2013, 
available at http://russialist.org/russians-greatest-worry-is-corruption-only-4-percent-worried-about-rights-poll  
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their constitutional social rights in response to government reforms in the area of social 
welfare (Chandler 2013). Such an understanding of the ‘hierarchy’ of rights can partly be 
explained by the legacy of the Soviet concept of human rights. Yet another major factor has 
been the economic liberalisation policies pursued during the 1990s which led to the 
dismantling of many aspects of the old system of welfare provisions, and the fact that Putin’s 
first presidential term from 2000 to 2005 saw wide-ranging, market-oriented reforms in the 
areas of pensions, housing, health and education which have only partially been reversed 
(Cook 2007b; Hemment 2009), an issue which Chapter 5 returns to. This public focus on 
social and economic rights also appears to be reflected on a political level: the State Duma, 
for example, voted overwhelmingly in favour of adopting a law ratifying the European Social 
Charter in 2003 and subsequently put pressure on the government to adopt a plan of action 
for its ratification (Valenti 2010). This apparent desire to make Russia subject to the Council 
of Europe’s monitoring and reporting system for economic and social rights provides an 
interesting contrast with the Duma’s failure until January 2010 to vote in favour of ratifying 
Protocol 14 to the European Convention on Human Rights.  This protocol envisaged 
reforming and speeding up the procedures of the European Court of Human Rights, a body 
which frequently rules against Russia in cases concerning violations of civil and political 
rights.12 The Duma had previously voted against the Protocol’s ratification in 2006 due to 
concerns on the part of some deputies that the Court’s rulings against Russia were politically 
motivated.13 It thus seems clear that economic and social rights are issues which resonate on 
a public and political level in Russia, and Chapters 4 and 5 will further explore Russian 
understandings of these rights and the discourse on such rights employed by representatives 
of the state. 
 
1.6     Explaining differences between European and Russian conceptions of social 
and economic human rights: cultural relativism and its critics 
In terms of attempts to explain the apparent differences in the approach to human rights taken 
during and after the Cold War by Western European and North American states on the one 
                                                          
12 Russia currently accounts for the largest number of pending cases against a respondent state at the European 
Court of Human Rights, making up 22.3% of all cases followed by Turkey with 13.2% as of December 2012. 
See ‘Annual Report 2012,’ Registry of the European Court of Human Rights, available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/header/reports+and+statistics/reports/annual+reports  
13 See for example ‘Russia Ratifies Protocol 14 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms,’ Human Rights Center Memorial, 18 January 2010, available at 
http://www.memo.ru/eng/news/2010/01/19/1901103.htm [accessed 12 January 2011] 
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hand and the Soviet Union/Russian Federation on the other, the idea that different societies or 
cultures may have different concepts of human rights is one which has received considerable 
attention from commentators from the early 1990s onwards. This has particularly been the 
case since the emergence of the concept of ‘Asian values’ in the early to mid-1990s – the idea 
that Asian societies have cultural values such as obedience to authority, group allegiance and 
a collective rather than an individual identity which differ from those of ‘the West’ 
(Englehart 2000).  
 
As a result, civil and political rights are seen as ‘not universally valid but peculiar to Western 
political culture and alien to Asian culture’ (Inoue 2003: 125). This debate was often seen as 
representing a clash between ‘Western’ values of liberal democracy and ‘Eastern’ values of 
conservatism and tradition (Mauzy 1997). Some observers have applied this concept to other 
cultures in addition to Asian societies: Pollis (2008: 280), a leading exponent of this concept 
of cultural relativism, claims that ‘...in many societies – Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe 
(including Russia), and the Middle East – the liberal doctrine of human rights does not speak 
to the people’s world view...Belief systems, values, and basic concepts...were and remain 
markedly different from those in the West.’ The fact that fundamental instruments of 
international human rights law such as the UDHR were formulated by a relatively small 
group of mostly European nations has been used by some advocates of Asian values to 
support their claims that the civil and political rights outlined in these documents are not 
relevant to their own societies, which have different political and cultural traditions. Inoue 
(2003: 125), for example, claims that such advocates ‘...reject the idea that the West should 
play the role of moral teacher for Asia in the liberalization and democratization of Asian 
politics.’  
 
The perception that an alien human rights ideology is being foisted onto unwilling but 
politically or economically weaker non-Western nations can lead to the risk of rejection of 
the concept of universal civil and political rights by both political leaders and parts of the 
general population. Chugrov (2000: 153), for example, points out that, in the aftermath of the 
collapse of Communism, rapid economic reform and the subsequent dramatic decline in the 
standard of living led to liberal rights becoming ‘a synonym for disorder’ in the eyes of much 
of the Russian population. In addition, the idea that Russia has its own ‘Eurasian values’ that 
distinguish it from European countries has a long history in Russian political culture: Tolz 
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(1998: 997), for example, points to the Slavophile, Pan-Slavist and Eurasianist movements of 
the 19th and early 20th century, which have found echoes in both Soviet and more 
contemporary Russian political discourse on national identity.  
 
According to Tolz, ‘Pan-Slavists...and Eurasianists regarded the West as an anti-model for 
Russia; they thought Russians could create a community, unknown and superior to European-
type nations.’ Chugrov (2000: 149) sees Russia as having a combination of Westernizing and 
Slavophile cultural traditions, with the Westernizing tradition, which embraces universal 
rights, always weaker than the Slavophile one, which emphasizes ‘cultural relativism and 
national particularism.’ In the contemporary period Okara (2007: 3) points to what he sees as 
the existence of a third school of ‘conservative/preservationist’ thought which believes in 
‘order, stability, steadiness and a controllable political system, continuity of power , state 
paternalism…[and] patriotism’ and which appears to have broadly held sway during Vladimir 
Putin and Dmitriy Medvedev’s  presidencies.  
 
In addition, Saari (2010: 2) points to the development of the ideology of ‘sovereign 
democracy’ by Vladimir Putin’s administration in 2005-6 as an attempted strategy to 
undermine what were seen as Western attempts to promote democracy and human rights in 
Former Soviet countries undergoing ‘colour revolutions’ such as Georgia and Ukraine. 
Despite the fact that Russia has joined the Council of Europe, ratified the major UN and 
European human rights treaties and established domestic human rights bodies, some argue 
that this does not necessarily demonstrate that the notion of individual rights have been 
internalized (Pollis 2008: 280). As Chugrov (2000: 155) points out, ‘Russian society remains 
a distinctive hybrid system: it endorses widely recognised liberal rights, while at the same 
time it is constantly looking back to its traditions of authoritarian rule.’  
 
Yet the idea of cultural relativism and the corresponding rejection of the concept of universal 
human rights have come under sustained criticism from a number of observers who maintain 
that human rights may be articulated differently by different cultures but that their universal 
nature remains unchallenged. According to Donnelly (2007b: 281), ‘...universal human 
rights, properly understood, leave considerable space for national, regional, and cultural 
particularity and other forms of diversity and relativity,’ while Inoue (2003: 1160) points out 
that the ‘Asian values’ concept has been promoted by Asian leaders seeking to justify their 
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own violations of civil and political rights by claiming that advocacy of such rights is part of 
Western ‘cultural imperialism’ which seeks to impose incompatible human rights concepts on 
Asia. Even Pollis (2008: 282; 284) acknowledges that ‘the cultural diversity argument often 
plays into the hands of the state and is used to rationalize the arbitrary use of power’ and that 
‘the state, a modern construction, can exploit traditional values as a device and a 
rationalization by which to maintain power and repress.’ Sen (2008: 399) challenges the 
notion that civil and political rights are inherently and exclusively ‘Western’ by pointing to 
the existence of theorizing about tolerance and freedom within the Asian tradition and 
highlighting the fact that ‘contemporary ideas of political and personal liberty and rights have 
taken their present form relatively recently, and it is hard to see them as ‘traditional’ 
commitments of Western cultures.’  
 
The idea that a society’s political culture is a static entity has also been challenged by several 
commentators: Donnelly (2007b: 291), for example, points out that ‘whatever their past 
practice, nothing in indigenous African, Asian or American cultures prevents them from 
endorsing human rights now. Cultures are immensely malleable.’ In addition, where Russia is 
concerned, Chugrov (2000: 149) claims that, despite the fact that the Westernizing tradition 
has always been weaker than the Slavophile one, ‘this does not mean that the seeds of liberal 
freedoms were eradicated from the national political culture; they were always there and 
remain so today. Rather, they are emerging from their suppression.’ Nethercott (2007) 
reaffirms this, pointing to a reformist legal tradition in Russia dating back to the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries which was galvanised by opposition to the death penalty and emphasised 
individual rights and freedoms and the rule of law.  
 
In terms of the approach taken by this study towards the concept of cultural relativism, it 
recognises the impact of culture on the development of understandings of human rights and 
the dangers of assuming that ‘human rights’ are a Western construct or system of values that 
can or should be exported to other cultures (Bielefeldt 2000). Yet rather than subscribing to 
the idea that different cultures, be they ‘Asian,’ ‘Western,’ ‘Eastern,’ Eurasian,’ ‘Slavic’ or 
something else, have fundamentally different concepts of what human rights are and must 
therefore be treated as separate entities, it takes the view espoused by Donnelly (2007b) and 
others that there is and should be considerable overlap between cultural understandings of 
human rights. It also recognises the dangers inherent in taking the essentialist view that 
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‘culture’ is a fixed set of values which remain consistent over time and can be applied fairly 
sweepingly to given populations and assumed to determine how these populations interact 
with their political institutions (Englehart 2000).  
 
It is also important to note that where Russia and the EU specifically are concerned, this 
thesis contends that, rather than having understandings of human rights which are 
fundamentally different, it is a question of differing nuances and emphases. The fact that 
civil, political, economic and social rights are all aspects of the broader concept of ‘human 
rights’ tends not to be contested in the official discourse on rights which is employed by the 
various EU institutions and the Russian authorities or by many of the NGOs who took part in 
this study, as will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 4 to 7. Rather, it is on the question 
of the place that economic and social rights should occupy in the ‘hierarchy’ of human rights 
(Meron 1986) that opinions and policy differ. As Chapter 7 will explore, this has important 
implications in terms of policy implementation where the EU and Russia are concerned. 
 
1.7    The role of the State in upholding social and economic rights and entitlements 
Having explored some of the background to the formulation of international instruments of 
human rights law, the seemingly different status accorded to economic and social rights 
within the Western European and Russian contexts, and the degree to which cultural 
relativism is applicable to notions of human rights, it is important to acknowledge the role of 
the state in the recognition of economic and social rights. At this point a definition of what is 
meant by ‘the State’ in the context of this study is important for two reasons: firstly because 
the abstract notion of the State is far from being an uncontested concept; and secondly 
because at the heart of this study lie two very different ‘states,’ or state-like structures: the 
more traditional nation-state of Russia, and the supranational actor that is the EU. While the 
nature of these two specific entities will be explored in more detail in Chapter 2, the focus at 
this point is the abstract notion of the State and the manner in which it is perceived to interact 
with different types of rights.   
The very objective of attempting to define the State as some form of coherent actor 
immediately creates a number of problems:  International Relations theorists tend to define 
the State as a nation-state which conforms to geographic borders and encompasses both the 
territory and the institutions and society that exist within it (Halliday 1987). Yet, according to 
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more sociological state theory, the State tends to be seen as an autonomous unit or object 
which imposes rules of behaviour upon its citizens, using its monopoly on the threat of 
violence to enforce these rules (Halliday 1987; Migdal and Schlichte 2005; Thomson 1995). 
According to this view, society and its attendant social organisations are seen to form a 
separate autonomous entity which operates largely independently of the State and its 
institutions (Easter 2008; Migdal and Schlichte 2005). Yet this approach has been challenged 
in two ways: firstly on the grounds that to try to analyse the State in this way ignores the 
complexity of the processes and institutions that make up ‘the State,’ which is, according to 
Schmitter (1985:33), ‘an amorphous complex of agencies with ill-defined boundaries, 
performing a great variety of not very distinctive functions;’ Secondly, because the supposed 
boundary between state and society is in fact very difficult to locate given the constant 
interactions between the State, social groups and organisations, and the wider system within 
which they operate which also influence rulemaking (Mitchell 1991; Jessop 2008; Migdal 
and Schlichte 2005).  
Indeed, some have argued that the problems posed by any attempt to analyse the State as an 
object mean that there should be less focus on trying to define it as such and more on the 
State as an idea (Abrams 1977). This is supported by Mitchell (1991), who argues that the 
State is constructed in everyday cultural forms such as language, architecture and the wearing 
of military uniforms, while Foucault emphasised that within the modern state power is 
exercised through social norms, institutions and discourse rather than sovereign authority as 
such (Jessop 2008). These arguments are important for the purposes of this study because, as 
will be explored in more depth empirically in Chapter 5, it is concerned more with how 
people and institutions perceive the State and its role in relation to guaranteeing economic 
and social rights than with what actually constitutes the State. As Migdal and Schlichte 
(2005:15) argue, state and non-state actors ‘‘see’ the state in a particular way; they have a 
mental picture of it as an integral unit, a way of conceiving what it is about and in which kind 
of affairs it plays or should play a role.’ It is this ‘mental picture’ of the State in relation to 
certain rights which this study aims to engage with.  
The centrality of the State’s role in relation to human rights, whether it be its supposed 
obligation to uphold ‘negative’ civil and political rights by not interfering in the lives of 
individuals or its obligation to ensure ‘positive’ economic and social rights are upheld by 
taking an active role in economic and social provision, has already been alluded to. Yet it is 
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worth engaging more closely with the idea of expectations of the State in relation to 
guaranteeing certain economic and social rights given the level of debate that exists around 
what the State should be obliged to provide in terms of resources and service provision, 
particularly during periods of economic recession. As previously mentioned, the idea that the 
State must at some level provide financial and political resources if these rights are to be 
upheld tends to be fairly widely accepted (Eide and Rosas 2001; van Boven 1982). However, 
the degree to which the State must provide these resources and the question of whether 
economic and social rights do in fact constitute human rights or may in fact simply be some 
form of civic right or claim remains contested. Cranston (1983:15) and Wellman (1982), for 
example, argue that enforcing economic and social rights would place unrealistic and 
unachievable financial demands on most governments, and that, rather than being universal 
human rights, economic and social rights are ‘earned or acquired rights’ relating to an 
individual’s citizenship of a country which has a functioning welfare state. Indeed, Griffin 
(2000: 30) argues that many of those opposed to seeing economic and social rights as human 
rights tend to regard them as ‘an entirely optional redistributive programme trying to pass 
itself off as a non-optional matter of human rights.’ Yet removing the status of being a 
‘human right’ from economic and social rights has an important impact in terms of their 
realisation.  
1.8 The discourse of human rights, conditionality and ‘morality’ 
The recent discourse of international human rights largely tends to frame human rights 
commitments in moral terms as standards to be upheld: according to Ingram (2008:401), for 
example, during the past twenty years human rights have become ‘the lingua franca of moral 
and political claim making.’ This discourse can lend an air of moral authority to economic 
and social rights claims which makes them entitlements which a state’s citizens possess, 
rather than optional or conditional measures which depend on the ideology of the government 
in power, its attitudes to those in need, and the resources available to that government. As 
Gearty (2011:21) points out, the sense of moral entitlement which the notion of a right 
provides ‘serves the useful purpose of rendering redundant the erection of any distinction 
between the deserving and undeserving...within the field of human rights the recipients of the 
care of others do not need first to prove their worth – their entry ticket is their humanity.’ 
This is not to say, however, that such ‘moral entitlements’ are uncontested. This linkage 
between the ‘virtue’ or behaviour of a potential rights claimant and the degree to which they 
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should be afforded certain rights is reflected in terms of some of the contemporary European 
discourse on certain economic and social rights such as the right to social security which 
emphasises ‘rights versus responsibilities,’ as will be discussed below. It can also clearly be 
seen in the discourse surrounding the issue of those seeking asylum in various EU Member 
State countries such as the UK and Germany, and the extent to which they should be entitled 
to welfare provision in that country. As Bloch and Schuster (2002) and Sales (2002) point 
out, this discourse attempts to paint asylum-seekers as ‘bogus,’ undeserving recipients of 
social benefits who constitute a burden on the state to which they are seeking entry and must 
therefore be excluded from the bulk of social provision and services available to citizens of 
that country, thus forcing them to rely on voluntary organisations for subsistence.  
 
The idea of making human rights conditional on the ‘moral behaviour’ of the individual can 
also be applied to other categories of rights in addition to economic and social rights 
questions. Where the issue of prisoners’ right to vote is concerned, for example, the UK 
government, regardless of which political party has been in power, has long argued in 
defiance of rulings by the European Court of Human Rights that incarcerated prisoners do not 
deserve the right to vote.14 This in effect makes the right to free elections, which is envisaged 
as a fundamental right by both the UDHR and the ECHR15, dependent on ‘the moral 
character of the right-holder’ (Easton 2009: 228) rather than a universal entitlement.  
                                                          
14 In 2005 the European Court of Human Rights ruled in response to a case brought against the UK that a 
blanket ban on prisoner voting was illegal, although national governments could still decide to deny certain 
categories of prisoner the right to vote. In May 2012 the Court gave the British government a six-month 
deadline to outline its proposals for changing its legislation on prisoner voting, a deadline which it reluctantly 
and partially met in November 2012 by publishing a draft bill which contains the options of keeping the blanket 
ban or giving prisoners serving sentences of up to six months or four years the right to vote. For further details 
see ‘Prisoners will not get the vote, says David Cameron,’ BBC News, 24th October 2012, available at  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
politics-20053244; ‘Votes for prisoners - opening the door?,’ BBC News, 19th November 2012, available at  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-20397871 [accessed 14th January 2013] 
15 According to Article 21 of the UDHR, ‘everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, 
directly or through freely chosen representatives; Everyone has the right to equal access to public service in his 
country; and the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed 
in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote 
or by equivalent free voting procedures’ (‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,’ United Nations, 
available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a21).  
Under Article 3, Protocol 1 (1952) of the European Convention on Human Rights the states party to the 
Convention ‘undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will 
ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature’ (‘European Convention 
on Human Rights,’ European Court of Human Rights, available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-5C9014916D7A/0/Convention_ENG.pdf 
[accessed 14 January 2013]). 
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The argument against conceiving economic and social rights as human rights on a par with 
civil and political rights is perhaps unsurprising given that it has developed alongside a wider 
shift in political and economic thinking in Western Europe. This shift has broadly moved 
away from the rapid expansion of state welfare systems in the post-war era towards what is 
often seen as a neoliberal emphasis on reining in the State in order to maximize the freedom 
of the market (Mudge 2008; Gamble 2001). This shift, which began in the late 1970s, has 
posed a major challenge to the post-war view of the welfare state as something which should 
be based on ‘the principle of universal entitlement derived from citizenship’ (Cox 1998:3) 
and has led to a fundamental recasting of the State’s role in relation to meeting the needs of 
its citizens which continues in the contemporary period. Whereas previously there was broad 
political consensus on the idea that the State was responsible for ensuring the well-being of 
its citizens, this has been replaced by what Dean (2007:4) calls ‘...an enduring hostility to 
‘big’ government and scepticism towards welfare rights.’ That this shift should have an 
impact on the realisation of economic and social rights is hardly surprising: economic rights 
such as labour rights, for example, are likely to be compromised by policies which advocate 
trade liberalisation, flexible labour markets, privatisation and deregulation (Dean 2007). 
  
Where social rights are concerned, their successful realisation in terms of the fair and equal 
provision of education, housing and healthcare depends on a government’s commitment to 
tackling inequality through the issue of income distribution and protecting vulnerable groups. 
This effectively leads to financial transfers being made from rich to poor (Eide and Rosas 
2001; Griffin 2000; Klausen 1995). Yet the turn from what Walters (1997: 230) sees as a 
‘welfare society’ towards an ‘active society’ which aims to integrate every member of that 
society through the means of paid employment has led to various European governments 
employing rhetoric and policies which place the onus on individuals in need of assistance 
from the State to manage their behaviour.  It also makes the provision of various welfare 
benefits conditional on this behaviour rather than a direct and universal provision of 
resources by the State (Dean 2007; Dwyer 2004).  
 
The UK government of the late 1990s under Tony Blair was perhaps the most famous 
European exponent of this ‘Third Way’ approach to politics which focuses on maximising 
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‘opportunities’ linked to paid employment and defines those groups outside the labour market 
as ‘inactive’ (Walters 1997:221). It is worth pointing out that this strategy was still very far 
removed from the Thatcher administration’s policy during the 1980s of drastically curtailing 
universal state welfare provision and making what provision remained a partial safety net 
which Alcock (1989: 33) describes as ‘a return to the Poor Law’ of 19th century Britain. 
Nevertheless, various other EU Member States such as Germany and the Netherlands which 
had broadly social democratic governments during the same period also adopted a Third Way 
‘activation’ approach (Handler 2003:229) which has in turn influenced policy directions at 
the overall EU level, as will be explored in more detail in Chapter 6. According to Hansen 
and Schierup (2005:27), from the late 1990s onwards ‘the neo-liberal and Third Way-leaning 
message was to become ever more pronounced’ in the European Commission’s statements 
and policy recommendations on economic and social affairs. This shift has seen the 
increasing use of the language of ‘rights versus responsibilities’ where welfare provision is 
concerned which was first espoused by Giddens (1998:65) and aims to moderate the 
behaviour of a state’s citizens and to sanction those who do not comply by restricting their 
access to certain social benefits (Dwyer 2004). This has had an important and arguably 
detrimental effect on the realisation of social rights since such rights become conditional 
rather than automatically a part of citizenship: under the ‘active society’ model those who do 
not work are denied certain social rights such as the right to social security unless they take 
clear steps to join the labour market such as undertaking training (Walters 1997).  
 
Dean (1995: 574) argues that the language of social rights and entitlements is increasingly 
being jettisoned in favour of a discourse of mutual obligations on the part of the state and the 
individual: ‘Instead of granting a claimant his/her rightful benefit, the state provides an 
allowance and services on the condition that the client engages in job-search activities. 
Instead of a system of benefits for the unemployed, we have a complex of services and 
allowances for the jobseeker.’ In some respects this discourse has the effect of turning certain 
economic and social rights on their head: the right to paid work in fair conditions becomes an 
obligation on the part of the individual to seek and accept employment which is frequently 
poorly-paid or part-time or to take part in publicly-funded training schemes at risk of losing 
one’s access to social benefits (Walters 1997).  
While the concept of ‘rights versus responsibilities’ has largely developed in the very specific 
context of late 20th-century liberal democracies, interestingly there is a certain degree of 
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overlap with the Soviet approach to human rights. Although this approach strongly 
emphasised the primacy of economic and social over civil and political rights, it also treated 
rights as contingent on duties, with the right to labour under the Constitution of 1977 
constituting both a right and a duty (Donnelly 1982; Sajo 1996). Nevertheless, as will be 
explored in more detail subsequently, the frequently conditional approach to economic and 
social rights taken by various EU Member States and the EU itself varies in some respects 
from that commonly expressed in Russian social and political discourse.  
1.9      Conclusions 
This chapter has provided context to the development of the broad concept of human rights 
while engaging more specifically with the idea of economic and social rights as a certain 
category of human rights. It has sought to demonstrate that, despite the rhetorical 
commitments to the indivisibility and universality of all human rights which exist in the 
major international human rights treaties, the place which economic and social rights occupy 
in the ‘hierarchy’ of international human rights norms has long been contested. In addition, it 
has shown that understandings of such rights are heavily influenced by the political context in 
which they come to be shaped and applied.  
The chapter has also highlighted the widespread perception that the State plays or should play 
a key role in terms of guaranteeing such rights, and has briefly explored some of the ways in 
which the discourse on the application of economic and social rights has shifted towards a 
greater emphasis on the use of conditionality and the application of sanctions within the 
context of EU and EU Member State social policy. It seems clear that, on a theoretical level, 
in some political contexts economic and social rights remain contested in a way that 
individual civil and political rights appear not to be, and subsequent chapters aim to explore 
the influence of these contestations on the discourse and policy of the various EU institutions, 
the Russian authorities and various Russian civil society actors. Ultimately this chapter has 
demonstrated that exploring economic and social rights as a concept is not a straightforward 
process of separating such rights from other components of the idea of ‘human rights’ such as 
civil and political rights, but that these rights have been conceptualised in such varied and 
constantly shifting ways that they are worthy of more detailed analysis. The following 
chapter will move on to focus on the nature of the different actors which are the subject of 
this study, before returning to these themes in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
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Chapter Two  
The EU, the Russian State and Civil Society 
 
2.1    Introduction 
The previous chapter explored some of the debates concerning the significance and 
implementation of economic and social rights, and the extent to which the State is seen to 
play an important role in ensuring that such rights are upheld. The purpose of this chapter is 
to focus in more detail on the different actors who play a role in formulating discourses of 
human rights and, on a more practical level, in the promotion and protection of human rights, 
beginning with the European Union (EU). It will examine the theoretical and practical 
context to the strategy pursued by the EU in relation to economic and social rights both on an 
internal and external level and in its relations towards Russia in particular. This includes 
discussion of the debate over whether the EU is capable of acting as a ‘normative power’ in 
promoting certain values such as human rights in its relations with non-Member States such 
as Russia. This is followed by a discussion of the nature of the two other most relevant 
‘actors’ to this study – the contemporary Russian state and certain types of Russian civil 
society organisations16 – and the nature of the relationship between these two actors.  
The chapter argues that, while the EU demonstrates a seemingly impressive rhetorical 
commitment to promoting economic and social rights on an equal basis with civil and 
political rights in its internal affairs and external relations, in practical policy terms this 
commitment is frequently not realised. In relation to Russia specifically, the Union’s financial 
assistance for civil society development has a clear focus on supporting the type of NGO 
which largely promotes civil and political rights and has been in existence since at least the 
late 1980s, despite the fact that such groups have failed to garner popular support from the 
Russian population and have been largely sidelined by the authorities. Yet it seems at least 
possible that, given the importance of economic and social rights in the Russian context 
which was outlined in Chapter 1, engaging with such rights in a more explicit manner may 
prove to be a more fruitful means for interaction between Russia and the EU. 
 
                                                          
16 This study focuses on two types of Russian NGO: those explicitly identifying themselves as ‘human rights’ 
NGOs, and those engaged in more socially-oriented work with vulnerable groups. See Chapter 3 for full details 
of the organisations who took part in this study. 
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2.2   The EU as an international actor 
Before exploring the EU’s approach towards economic and social rights in its internal and 
external relations, it is important to define the EU as a specific actor in the international arena 
since the focus of this study is very much on the EU’s policy and actorness in the area of its 
external relations with Russia. One of the difficulties in defining the EU as an international 
actor is that, unlike its Member States, it does not conform to the Westphalian or Weberian 
model of a sovereign or nation-state with clearly defined authority over a fixed territory and a 
monopoly on the legitimate use of violence which is used as the main unit of analysis in 
realist and neorealist theories of international relations (Caporaso 1996; Manners 2002).  
 
At the same time, it cannot be classified as either a federal state or an international 
organisation along the lines of the United Nations because, as Kerremans (1996) points out, it 
combines elements of both entities, while Schmidt (2004:976) argues that the Union should 
be seen as a ‘regional state’ or ‘regional union of nation-states’ combining both ‘ever-
increasing regional integration and ever-continuing national differentiation.’ As a result, 
while most commentators appear to agree that the EU constitutes a polity of considerable 
significance in international affairs (Walby 2003; Zielonka 2008), there is little agreement on 
precisely what form this polity takes. An additional problem is the diversity and number of 
institutions and instruments involved in formulating and implementing the EU’s foreign 
policy and the at times conflicting interests of its Member States.  
 
Since the Treaty on European Union of 1992 a ‘pillar structure’ of three policy areas 
including the intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the 
supranational Community pillar for trade and aid policy, and the intergovernmental Justice 
and Home Affairs pillar for issues relating to international crime has governed the 
implementation of the Union’s foreign policy objectives. 17 The Treaty also gave the 
European Parliament consultative and some budgetary authority over common foreign and 
security policy (Glen and Murgo 2007). In addition, since 2010 the practical implementation 
of the CFSP, which used to be a responsibility of the European Commission, has been carried 
out by a new European External Action Service (EEAS) which functions as the Union’s 
                                                          
17‘Europa Treaties and Law,’  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html [accessed 26 
February 2010] 
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diplomatic corps and supports the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, a role also established in 2010 following the passing of the Lisbon Treaty.18  
This plethora of institutions involved in conducting the Union’s common foreign policy, the 
potential for duplication between ‘pillars’ and the tension created by the fact that individual 
Member States may still choose to pursue their own competing foreign policy interests 
(Smith 2003b) has frequently led to criticism of a perceived lack of coherence and 
consistency in the EU’s external relations policy (Duke 1999). This has particularly been the 
case where issues such as the promotion of human rights norms are concerned (Smith 2001), 
although the creation of the EEAS is clearly an attempt to try to address the lack of coherence 
in the Union’s external relations policy. The number of overlapping treaties, policy 
documents and programmes relating to human rights in fact undermine the idea that the EU’s 
approach to promoting human rights in its external relations constitutes a coherent ‘policy’ as 
such. Youngs (2004: 416) argues that this approach represents ‘...not so much a monolithic 
policy as a broad framework within which a variety of operational and policy-making 
dynamics might prevail.’ 
 
The issue of consistency, or the lack thereof, in the EU’s external affairs has become so 
established that Nuttall (2005:92) identifies three different types of consistency: ‘horizontal’ 
consistency meaning that policies pursued by different institutions within the Union and with 
differing objectives should be coherent with each other; ‘institutional’ consistency relating to 
external relations where two sets of actors apply two sets of procedures; and ‘vertical’ 
consistency when one or more Member States pursue national policies which are not in sync 
with policies agreed at EU level. One of the main areas of focus for this study, however, is 
the degree to which the EU’s discourse on economic and social rights on both an internal and 
external level is consistent with its strategy of promoting such rights in its relations with 
Russia, and the extent to which such discourse coincides or contrasts with that employed by 
Russian state and civil society actors. As a result, it aims to explore how understandings of 
economic and social rights are socially constructed by all three actors and, in so doing, takes 
a constructivist stance in contending that ‘ideas always matter’ (Wendt 1995). In contrast to 
neoliberal and neorealist theories of international relations, which see ideational factors in 
purely instrumental terms in terms of their usefulness to individual units pursuing material 
                                                          
18 For further details see ‘European External Action Service,’ available at 
http://eeas.europa.eu/background/organisation/index_en.htm, accessed 1st February 2013 
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interests (Ruggie 1998), constructivists see a state or actor’s behaviour, interests and identity 
as being shaped by ideas, values and shared norms or expectations of appropriate behaviour 
(Bjorkdahl 2002; Christiansen et al 1999; Finnemore 1996). At the same time, constructivism 
does not seek to deny the influence of material factors and interests, for example those of the 
EU’s Member States, on actors’ behaviour and preferences, but rather contends that norms 
and values must be taken into greater consideration alongside such factors (Saari 2006). As a 
result, a constructivist approach seeks to research ‘...the origin and reconstruction of 
identities, the impact of rules and norms, [and] the role of language and of political 
discourses’ (Christiansen et al 1999: 538).  
 
In order to determine the content and impact of norms and values on policy preferences, it 
therefore becomes important to examine political discourse as employed by both official 
documents and by representatives of a given institution on a particular issue, in this case 
economic and social rights in the EU’s internal and external affairs. This is due to the fact 
that, as will be further explored in Chapter 3, values and assumptions belong to particular 
discourses and are represented and shaped by them (Fairclough 2003). Where human rights 
are concerned, the EU has presented itself in its official discourse as a staunch defender and 
promoter of these rights, including economic and social rights, in both its internal and 
external affairs, and this commitment to human rights is often seen as representing an 
important facet of the Union’s identity and its desire and ability to act as a ‘normative’ power 
(Manners 2002:238).  
 
Yet, as this study’s empirical data and analysis will indicate, gaps and grey areas frequently 
emerge between the Union’s rhetorical commitment to upholding and promoting civil, 
political, economic and social rights on an equal basis in its internal affairs and external 
relations with countries such as Russia, and the practical policy implications of this professed 
commitment to indivisible human rights. As Diez (2005: 636) points out, the idea that the EU 
projects certain norms and values ‘...needs to be subjected to continuous deconstruction 
through the exposition of contradictions within this discourse, and between this discourse and 
other practices.’ 
 
2.3 Normative Power Europe 
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Ever since the European Economic Community (EEC) was transformed into the European 
Union by the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the EU’s foreign policy and the values it claims to 
promote have received increasing attention both within the Union itself and from external 
observers. The fact that the consolidation of the EU as an intergovernmental body virtually 
coincided with the end of the Cold War and the subsequent desire of the new governments in 
Central and Eastern Europe to join the EU only served to place greater emphasis on the kind 
of norms and values the EU wanted to promote in its relations with third countries. The 
subsequent policies pursued and treaties signed appear to indicate that, on a rhetorical level at 
least, the EU is committed to promoting respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of 
law both internally and externally. When coupled with the fact that the EU is perceived to 
rely more on economic and political tools than military means in conducting its external 
policies, this has led to claims that the EU as an international actor operates as a new kind of 
‘normative’ power promoting a set of common principles with far less emphasis on 
traditional realist foreign policy concerns such as state sovereignty and military power 
(Manners 2002:238). In this sense the ‘norms’ being promoted signify collective 
understandings and expectations of appropriate behaviour on the part of states and other 
actors (Bjorkdahl 2002; Schimmelfennig 2002).  
 
This concept is not, however, by any means uncontested, and by examining some of the 
arguments for and against the theory of ‘normative power Europe’ (NPE) it should be 
possible to explore the extent to which economic and social rights are incorporated within the 
EU’s identity as a promoter of human rights.  This in turn should result in a greater degree of 
insight into the extent to which the EU’s approach towards promoting economic and social 
rights as ‘human rights’ in its external relations with countries such as Russia is effective and 
the extent to which this policy overlaps with other, more instrumental, interests. In taking this 
approach this study aims to address a gap in the literature identified by Diez (2005: 616), who 
argues that much of the debate surrounding the ‘normative power Europe’ concept ‘does not 
really examine the de facto impact of EU policy (and therefore whether it has normative 
power in the relational sense), but [focuses] on whether it acts as a normative power.’  
 
Where the EU’s commitment to promoting human rights as a general concept and other 
values in both its internal and external relations is concerned, at first glance this appears 
impressive.  According to Manners (2002), a set of five core norms can be identified within 
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the EU’s numerous treaties: peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. Having been outlined as founding principles of the Union 
in the TEU, these principles were reiterated in relation to both internal and external affairs in 
the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 (Alston and Weiler 1999), while the more recent Treaty of 
Lisbon of 2009 emphasizes that these values will guide the EU in international affairs (Tocci 
2008).  
 
In addition, in 1993 the Union set out its ‘Copenhagen Criteria’, namely the conditions which 
the Central and East European states (CEECs) would be required to meet before membership 
negotiations could begin, which made explicit the need for ‘stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities,’19 while in 1995 a ‘human rights clause’ was made a requirement in all external 
cooperation agreements concluded with countries outside the EU (Smith 2001: 189). As 
recently as 2012, a new EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and 
Democracy promised that the EU would ‘step up its efforts to promote human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law across all aspects of external action’ (Council of the European 
Union 2012). According to Smith (2003b: 98), such declarations and policies reflect ‘…the 
belief, shared by Member States and EU institutions, that human rights must be promoted 
internationally for their own sake. The EU insists on the universality of human rights and 
rejects claims that their promotion is unwarranted interference in the domestic affairs of other 
states.’ In addition, respect for human rights has come to be seen as an intrinsic part of the 
Union’s identity in the international arena: Williams (2004:156) argues that ‘...the genealogy 
of rights as founding principle has become fixed both as an idea, a tradition, as a determinant 
of future action, and as an element of consistent values.’  
 
Various commentators have attributed this apparent emphasis on promoting specific norms, 
including human rights, to several factors which have influenced the development of this 
perceived ‘European identity’ including Europe’s post-World War II history and the end of 
the Cold War. Manners (2002: 43; 46) describes peace and liberty as ‘defining features’ of 
Western European political development in the immediate post-war period, but it was the end 
of the Cold War which prompted ‘a rethinking of what it meant to be a democratic, liberal 
                                                          
19 ‘Presidency Conclusions,’ Copenhagen European Council, 21-22 June 1993, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/pdf/cop_en.pdf, [accessed 26 February 2010] 
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European state,’ while Smith (2001: 187) claims that the desire of the Central and East 
European states (CEECs) to join the EU provided ‘significant impetus for using a wider range 
of policy instruments to promote human rights…human rights were no longer held hostage to 
Cold War exigencies.’ This apparent commitment to the promotion of human rights and 
democracy and the seeming success of this policy in promoting stability and good 
governance in Central and Eastern Europe in particular without reliance on military means 
have led to the development of the concept of NPE.  
 
This theory builds on Duchene’s (1972) concept of the EU as a ‘civilian’ power – namely that 
the EU is a unique kind of international actor which does not rely on realist definitions of 
territorial expansion and a balance of power based on military might but rather has ‘a distinct 
‘European’ approach to international politics that favours diplomacy, persuasion, negotiation 
and compromise’ (Hyde-Price 2006: 217). According to Tocci (2008: 1), within the NPE 
concept ‘…the EU is conceived as a post-modern actor, which unlike the modern state does 
not base its foreign policy on balance of power and zero-sum logic,’ while Diez (2005: 616) 
claims that NPE means that ‘…norms in themselves achieve what otherwise is done by 
military arsenals or economic incentives.’  
 
The EU’s apparent success in promoting its ‘European’ norms and values in its relations with 
the CEECs in the years prior to their accession in 2004 and 2007 seems in some respects to 
serve as an example of the EU’s role as a normative power and has undoubtedly had a major 
impact on the approach taken by the Union in its relations with third countries. Indeed, 
according to Panebianco (2006; 131), ‘the EU assumes that the EU model will also prove 
successful in third countries, as it did first in Western Europe and more recently in Eastern 
Europe. This is even truer in the post-Cold War era which has experienced the failure of the 
political and economic communist model of development.’ Yet in the context of its eastern 
enlargement and accompanying attempts at transferring its norms to the CEECs and the 
Balkans, the EU’s ‘normative power’ has been underscored by the significant economic 
incentives it has been able to offer in the form of prospective membership. Diez (2005: 616), 
for example, points out that ‘the EU is most likely to…have greater normative power in the 
context of EU membership candidacies, when the interest to join the EU can be assumed to 
be an important factor determining the impact of EU norms.’  
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In its relations with states such as Russia and China, where an offer of membership is not on 
the table, the Union’s ability to act as a normative power is arguably reduced, particularly 
since Russia is far less willing than perhaps it was in the immediate post-Cold War period to 
consider adopting the ‘European model’ of governance and values without question. 
According to Haukkala (2008: 1605), ‘it is only by offering a full stake in European 
institutions and identity that the Union can expect others to subscribe in full to its norms and 
values,’ while Panebianco (2006; 132) points out that ‘not all EU partners are necessarily 
ready to change their traditions and specificities to adopt EU values and principles as a result 
of external interference.’ The EU is undeniably a vital economic partner to both Russia and 
China, which accords it some ability to raise issues surrounding human rights in particular in 
its dialogue with both states, yet its ability and willingness to act as a normative power in its 
relations with these countries is simultaneously competing with, and frequently losing out to, 
other strategic interests, be they economic, political or security-based, and at times the EU 
seems willing to overlook violations of human rights norms in countries it considers to be 
‘friendly’ (Smith 2001: 193).  
 
Where Russia is concerned, the EU was highly critical of human rights violations committed 
by Russian forces during the first war in Chechnya in the mid-1990s, but by the time of the 
second war in 1999-2000, which involved further such abuses, trade and energy concerns 
appear to have assumed primacy over those of human rights (Tocci 2008).  In addition, the 
Union’s normative agenda itself has been shaped by a number of considerations, not all of 
them purely altruistic or influenced by romantic notions of a common European identity and 
value system. As Youngs (2004: 430) points out, ‘the human rights and governance agenda 
did not result primarily from a gradually accumulating normative pro-activism, but was to a 
large extent a reaction to the increasing encroachments of international crime, migration, 
instability and terrorism: a reactive search for ready-made new solutions to such post-Cold 
War problems.’ While the Union’s normative agenda may have originally been influenced by 
the need to ensure stability in its Central and East European ‘backyard,’ a number of 
commentators have pointed to the increasing emphasis on security concerns in its wider 
foreign policy objectives and human rights policy in particular in the wake of the terrorist 
attacks of 11 September 2001. Smith (2003b: 119) claims that ‘…criticism of Russia’s human 
rights record has been muted in favour of building close links to counter terrorism…the trend 
now appears to be that of putting aside human rights considerations in the fight against 
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terrorism,’ while according to Youngs (2004: 421), ‘…the way in which certain norms have 
been conceived and incorporated into external policy reveals a certain security-predicated 
rationalism.’  
 
It is perhaps hardly surprising that the EU’s attempts to act as a normative power operate in 
conjunction with its other strategic interests and those of its individual Member States. 
Indeed, Diez (2005: 625) points out that ‘…the assumption of a normative sphere without 
interests is in itself nonsensical.’ Yet the very notion that the Union acts as a normative 
power projecting its internal values of democracy and respect for human rights has come in 
for significant criticism, with some commentators pointing out that the concept can be 
perceived as being all too close to the image of the Union that the EU itself wants to project. 
According to Sjursen (2006: 170), ‘the conception of the EU as a ‘normative,’ ‘ethical’ and 
particularly a ‘civilizing’ power is contested – not least because this conception is very 
similar to that used by EU officials when describing the EU’s international role…often, 
[NPE] seems to rest simply on the rather vague notion that the EU is ‘doing good’ in the 
international system.’ Aggestam (2008: 7) argues that the EU’s ambitions as a ‘normative’ or 
‘ethical’ power can rest on an assumption that ‘European’ values as defined by the EU are 
superior to others and points out that ‘...without greater self-reflexivity, this conception may 
easily lead to an ‘us’ and ‘them’ identity discourse and could be perceived as incipient 
cultural imperialism.’ Others (Tocci 2008; Lerch and Schwellnus 2006) have argued that 
other international organisations such as the Council of Europe, the UN and NATO have had 
a major impact on the types of norms that the EU now promotes as ‘European’ or Union 
values. Ultimately, the real test of whether the EU acts as a normative power, rather than 
simply claiming that it does, is the extent to which it achieves an actual normative impact 
through its foreign policy towards a third country in the form of identifiable institutional or 
policy changes (Tocci 2008). Otherwise, as Diez (2005: 636) points out, there is a danger that 
NPE could become ‘…a self-righteous, messianistic project that claims to know what Europe 
is and what others should be like.’  
 
In addition, there is an inherent contradiction in the approach taken by the EU when it tries to 
portray itself as some form of ‘moral’ authority on human rights in external countries such as 
Russia when a significant number of EU Member States have been criticized regularly and 
continue to be so by international bodies, including the Council of Europe, for their own 
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violations of human rights in regard to a diverse range of groups such as the Roma and child 
refugees in many Western and Eastern European states and the Russophone minorities in the 
Baltic states.20 Somewhat inevitably this situation has left the EU open to accusations of 
‘double standards’ and hypocrisy from external partners including Russia who have been 
subjected to criticism of their own human rights standards by the Union. It also undermines 
the EU’s own claim that ‘within their own frontiers, the EU and its Member States are 
committed to be exemplary in ensuring respect for human rights’ (Council of the European 
Union 2012).   
 
At the biannual EU-Russia human rights talks in April 2010 Russia responded to criticism of 
human rights abuses in Russian prisons and the North Caucasus by accusing EU Members 
States including Belgium, France, Germany, the Baltic states and the UK of human rights 
violations in regard to press freedom, the Roma and the banning of the burqa (Rettman 2010). 
In December 2012 the Russian authorities again used these talks to respond to EU criticism 
of the treatment of NGOs in Russia by expressing concern over the rise of racism and 
xenophobia in the EU.21 This points to a problem with the normative power thesis, namely 
that it cannot be assumed to simply be a one-way process of norm transference which is 
accepted unquestioningly by the intended ‘recipients.’ Diez (2005:633) argues that the power 
of NPE is in fact ‘...multifaceted, and cannot be easily controlled. It empowers EU actors, but 
it also empowers other actors to remind EU politicians of their words.’  
 
Where human rights are concerned, the NPE concept has much in common with the theory 
that countries can be ‘socialized’ into upholding certain norms such as international human 
                                                          
20 See for example ‘PACE President expresses concern over the situation of Roma in Europe,’ Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, 20 August 2010 
https://wcd.coe.int//ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=PR606%282010%29&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&BackColorInte
rnet=F5CA75&BackColorIntranet=F5CA75&BackColorLogged=A9BACE; ‘Refugee children should have a 
genuine chance to seek asylum,’ Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights, 24 August 2010 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=PR607%282010%29&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&Site=DC&Back
ColorInternet=F5CA75&BackColorIntranet=F5CA75&BackColorLogged=A9BACE; ‘Council of Europe Committee 
of Ministers Resolution ResCMN(2006)1 on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities by Estonia,’ 15 February 2006, available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/3_FCNMdocs/PDF_2nd_CM_Res_Estonia_en.pdf [accessed 
31 August 2010] 
21 For further details see ‘The European Union – Russian Federation human rights 
Consultations,’ European External Action Service, 10th December 2012, available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/foraff/134146.pdf  
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rights standards by a combination of actions taken by various parties including other states, 
international organisations and advocacy networks, and domestic civil society movements 
which make up a community, resulting in these norms becoming established as part of the 
domestic practice of a particular state (Checkel 2005; Saari 2006).  According to the 
influential work on the socialization of human rights norms by Risse and Sikkink (1999: 11), 
there are three phases of the socialization process: adaptation and strategic bargaining; moral 
consciousness-raising, argumentation and persuasion; and institutionalization and 
habituation.  
 
Yet one criticism made of this theory which, as already discussed, has also been levelled at 
the argument that the EU is capable of acting as a normative power, is that it is not reflexive 
enough in addressing the question of whether norms such as those of human rights which are 
frequently touted as ‘universal’ by the EU are valid and can in fact be transferred to another 
social or cultural setting in such a linear fashion. Marsh and Payne (2007: 670) argue that the 
Risse and Sikkink model assumes that ‘...the inevitable outcome of the argumentation and 
persuasion process is that societies will buy into the universality of human rights as originally 
conceived by the West. Thus, there is no room for other societies to articulate their own 
conceptions of human rights or to help readjust Western conceptions.’ The problem that this 
poses for the EU’s policy vis-a-vis Russia is that, while not articulating a different conception 
of human rights as such, as mentioned in Chapter 1 the discourse on rights employed by the 
Russian authorities and some Russian civil society actors tends to accord a higher status to 
economic and social rights than that traditionally pursued by the EU in both its internal and 
external relations. It is to the place that such rights occupy within the internal and external 
discourse and practice of the EU that the discussion now turns.  
 
2.4   Economic and social rights in the EU’s internal and external affairs 
As mentioned previously, the development of an EU strategy on human rights is a relatively 
recent phenomenon: it was the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in 1992 which, while 
transforming the European Community into the European Union, first affirmed the new 
Union’s commitment to human rights and fundamental freedoms alongside peace, liberty, 
democracy and the rule of law as its founding principles in Article 6. These principles were 
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reiterated in relation to both internal and external relations in the subsequent Treaty of 
Amsterdam of 1997 and the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 (Alston and Weiler 1999; Tocci 2007).  
While the concept of ‘human rights’ is used in the treaties in a broad and generally undefined 
sense, economic and social rights have not simply been ignored: in the Preamble to the Treaty 
of Amsterdam, for example, the Union’s Member States affirm their ‘attachment to 
fundamental rights as defined in the European Social Charter…and in the 1989 Community 
Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers’ (de Witte 2001: 158). In addition, in 
2000 the European Council adopted a Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU which, 
according to Szysczak (2001: 497), recognizes ‘a wide range of individual and collective 
social rights across a broad range of chapters relating to freedoms, equality, solidarity, dignity 
and justice.’ Although the Charter was initially non-legally binding, the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty in December 2009 made it so, with the result that, while four of the Charter’s 
six chapters focus on civil and political rights grouped under dignity, freedoms, citizen’s 
rights and justice, two chapters cover certain economic and social rights relating to 
employment, access to medical care and social security, and non-discrimination under the 
headings of equality and solidarity.22 
 
Overall, at least in terms of its internal statutes the EU appears to demonstrate a certain level 
of commitment to human rights in general and economic and social rights more particularly, 
with Wind (2008: 246) arguing that ‘rights talk’ has become ‘an integral part of the 
Community policy-making process over the years.’ Yet where economic and social rights are 
concerned, the position taken by the EU in defining such rights is not as consistent as it may 
first appear, and is influenced by factors other than a purely idealistic desire to uphold the 
‘indivisibility’ of all human rights. Fredman (2006:43) describes the EU’s coverage of 
economic and social rights as ‘haphazard and incomplete,’ with its ability to regulate such 
rights concentrated in the areas of discrimination and consultation rights, with more 
substantive rights such as the right to bargain collectively and strike falling within the 
competence of national governments.  
 
                                                          
22 ‘Charter of Fundamental Rights,’ EUROPA Summaries of EU Legislation (Justice, Freedom and Security), 
available at 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/combating_discrimination/l33501_en.htm 
[accessed 12 January 2011] 
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In addition, Chapter 1 made brief reference to the influence of neoliberal ideologies and 
approaches to welfare provision and employment on the EU’s gradual development of a 
‘Third Way’ approach towards the rights and responsibilities of welfare recipients such as the 
unemployed and increasing emphasis on the ‘activation’ of those out of work. Daly 
(2006:466) argues that that this ‘activation’ concept has become the ‘underlying philosophy’ 
of EU social policy, while Soysal (2012:4) maintains that the EU’s policy orientation ‘draws 
a close link between work, economic productivity, and social justice; the social argument is 
located in the value of productive individuals and employment.’ As a result, there appears to 
be something of a gap between the rhetoric of the indivisibility and interdependence of all 
human rights, and the more conditional practical implementation of some social rights which 
is quite different to the approach taken at EU level to civil and political rights within its own 
borders.  
 
The question is whether this approach translates into a similar commitment in the Union’s 
external affairs. In 1991 the then-EC adopted a Regulation which laid out for the first time its 
policy on development, democracy and human rights in its external relations policy (Gatto 
2005: 339). A number of instruments were subsequently developed within the framework of 
this policy. These included a human rights clause which allowed for the application of certain 
sanctions such as severing the EU’s relations with a rights-violating state and was made a 
compulsory element of all trade and cooperation agreements with non-Member States in 1995 
(Rosas 2001); and a number of region-specific policy instruments including Poland and 
Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies (PHARE), which came to be applied 
to ten countries in Central and Eastern Europe then aspiring to join the EU.  Those most 
relevant for the purposes of this paper are the Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (TACIS) programme of 1991-2006, which aimed to promote the 
transition to a market economy, democracy and the rule of law in the countries of the Former 
Soviet Union, and the European Initiative (Instrument from 2007) for Democracy and Human 
Rights (EIDHR) of 2000. This instrument focused on working with NGOs to promote 
democratization, the rule of law, civil society development and human rights issues such as 
the abolition of the death penalty in various non-Member State countries around the world 
including Russia (Gatto 2005).  
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In theory, social and economic rights occupy an equal role to that of civil and political rights 
in these policy documents since, where the human rights clauses are concerned, the principles 
of the indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights are emphasised repeatedly (Gatto 
2001) and the statutes of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are used as their terms 
of reference. Where TACIS is concerned, its amending Regulation of 1999 pledged ‘support 
in addressing the social consequences of transition’ which it outlined as reform of the health, 
pension, social protection and insurance systems; assistance to alleviate the social impact of 
industrial restructuring; assistance for social reconstruction; and development of employment 
services, including re-training.23 The EIDHR also makes explicit reference to the 
indivisibility of all human rights and to the ‘promotion and protection of economic, social 
and cultural rights.’24 As Chapter 6 will discuss in more detail, other policy documents and 
working papers produced by the European Parliament and EEAS which refer to human rights 
also emphasise the ‘universality, indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights’ 
(High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 2011) and the 
importance of upholding ‘fundamental’ economic and social rights. 
 
Once again, a picture emerges of a clearly stated commitment on the part of the EU to the 
inclusion of economic and social rights within its programmes to promote universal human 
rights standards in its relations with third countries. Yet there is an obvious gap between the 
rhetoric of the Union’s policy instruments and the type of human rights projects it funds in 
practice, with the overwhelming majority of funding available going to projects which focus 
explicitly on civil and political rights issues (Gatto 2001). Chapter 7 will explore how the vast 
majority of EIDHR funding over the years has been for projects addressing civil and political 
rights concerns such as torture, freedom of expression, developing civil society and human 
rights education and culture, the position of human rights defenders, and the treatment of 
army conscripts.  
 
                                                          
23 ‘COUNCIL REGULATION (EC, EURATOM) No 99/2000 of 29 December 1999 concerning the provision 
of assistance to the partner States in Eastern Europe and Central Asia,’ Official Journal of the European 
Communities, 2000, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2000:012:0001:0009:EN:PDF [accessed 12 January 2011] 
24 ‘Council Regulation (EC) No 975/1999 of 29 April 1999,’ EUR-Lex Access to European Law. 1999, 
available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber&lg=en&type_doc=Regulation&an_d
oc=1999&nu_doc=975 [accessed 12 January 2011] 
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At the same time, the EU in fact funded a number of projects which related to the realisation 
of economic and social rights by promoting access to healthcare and other social services and 
children’s rights under its separate Institution Building Partnership Programme: Support to 
Civil Society and Local Initiatives programme which ran in Russia until 2011 (Delegation of 
the European Commission to the Russian Federation 2009). Yet the apparent reluctance to 
employ the language of economic and social rights in relation to such projects is significant 
since, in contrast to the projects funded by the EIDHR, it gives the impression that projects 
focused on issues surrounding health, education, children and social services are either 
charitable endeavours or part of an attempt to promote good governance rather than rights 
entitlements. Several commentators argue that this approach is part of a more general trend 
within the EU’s regional human rights instruments. Rosas (2001: 490) points out that many 
of these programmes fund projects relating to economic, social and cultural rights but ‘such 
projects receive a rather small portion of the overall budget and are generally not focused on 
a ‘rights’ approach but are seen more in the context of economic and social development in 
general.’ While Gatto (2005: 361) highlights the fact that a number of ‘cross-cutting’ issues 
such as women’s rights and the fight against poverty are included as objectives of all EU 
development policy, she also points out that these issues are not included in the priority areas 
which the European Commission sets for its regional assistance programmes which reflects 
‘…the reluctance by the EU to recognize the relevance of social rights in development 
cooperation.’  
 
This approach and the use of the UDHR and its Covenants rather than the ECHR and 
European Social Charter as the key terms of reference for the EU’s external strategy on 
human rights in relation to countries such as Russia is also significant since the PHARE 
programme for the Central and East European accession countries did make reference to the 
European Social Charter. The Copenhagen Criteria of 1993 for those countries wishing to 
begin the EU accession process also required the fulfilment of certain economic and social 
rights conditions (Gatto 2001). This implies a gap between the internal standards on 
economic and social rights which the Union sets for its own members and the looser 
commitments it is willing to countenance in its external human rights policy.  
 
Where Russia is concerned, the Union runs a serious risk of ceding influence in this policy 
area to the Council of Europe, of which Russia is a member, since in 2009 Russia ratified the 
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European Social Charter and is now subject to its monitoring and reporting mechanisms.25 In 
addition, the Union’s decision to fund human rights projects relating almost exclusively to 
civil and political rights in Russia via domestic human rights NGOs is also problematic, as 
Chapter 6 will explore further. Many of these NGOs may espouse values and principles in 
line with the EU’s own conception of human rights and its emphasis on civil and political 
rights but have largely failed to engage with public interests and sympathies (Klitsounova 
2008) or to reflect the Russian public’s greater emphasis on economic and social rights 
(Komen 2009).  
 
2.5   The Russian State 
Having provided some brief context to the nature of the EU as an international actor and the 
status of economic and social rights within its internal and external relations, it is important to 
give due attention to the other key ‘actors’ which are the focus of this study and which 
interact in varying ways with the EU’s institutions, namely the Russian state and Russian 
civil society organisations involved in the promotion of human rights and in more socially-
oriented activities.  
 
Easter (2008:201) argues that, rather than conforming to the model of an ‘ideal liberal state’ 
in which state and society are autonomous entities and the state is composed of politically 
neutral institutions, in post-Soviet Russia society’s institutions have been ‘an extension of 
state power.’ Certainly one striking feature of the period from 2000 onwards when Putin was 
elected president for the first time has been the extent to which he has reasserted and 
recentralized the power of the state. The recentralisation that has occurred in relation to 
society, business and the relationship between the federal centre and the country’s many 
regions has been framed partly as a remedy to the incoherent and frequently chaotic Yeltsin 
era (Sakwa 2008; Makarychev 2008). At the same time Putin has appealed to various 
‘traditional’ shared values such as patriotism, social solidarity and the idea of a strong state to 
justify this process of recentralisation (Sakwa 2008). Lukin (2009: 66) argues that, by the end 
of Putin’s second term as president in 2008, a regime had been established in which there 
                                                          
25 ‘Member States of the Council of Europe and the European Social Charter,’ Council of Europe, 30 March 2010, available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Presentation/Overview_en.asp [accessed 12 January 2011] 
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were elements of pluralism and democratic procedure such as a constitution and elections but 
in which there was also a high degree of executive control over the parliament, legal system, 
media and regional authorities – what Hale (2010: 34) describes as a ‘hybrid regime’ which is 
neither fully democratic nor fully authoritarian.  
 
This reassertion of the state’s authority has had important implications for civil society 
activity and for the ways in which social and economic human rights are realised. The state’s 
role in relation to social policy has been promoted in official discourse and Chapter 5 will 
explore this further. In particular, there are differences between Putin’s first term from 2000-
2005, which was characterised by market-driven reforms to Russia’s crumbling but still-
extensive state welfare system which introduced liberalization and privatisation to the system 
(Cook 2007a), a move which Yeltsin had been keen to make himself but was unable to do so 
due to his political weakness (Henry 2009). From 2005, however, a new strategy of 
recentralization and increased rhetoric emphasising the role of the state in providing social 
services was in evidence (Cook 2011), with a series of ‘national projects’ launched by the 
authorities to improve standards in healthcare, housing, education and agriculture.26  
 
This shift can partly be explained by the public furore surrounding attempts by the 
government in early 2005 to reform the system of ‘in-kind’ state subsidies for certain 
categories of citizen such as war veterans and the disabled which had existed since the Soviet 
period (Buckley and Ostrovsky 2005). Chebankova (2010) sees this public protest as part of a 
social shift away from prioritising individual and private material concerns and consequently 
decreased political engagement during Putin’s first term, which allowed him to consolidate 
state power virtually without obstacle, towards public disappointment with the results of his 
administration’s policies which had set in by 2006. It is worth noting that policy measures 
such as the introduction of the national projects and the rhetoric emphasising the importance 
of the state’s role in welfare provision have not necessarily led to increased investment in the 
welfare infrastructure, indeed quite the opposite.  
 
Henry (2009:52) points out that during the second Putin administration and subsequent 
Medvedev administration efforts were made to continue the partial dismantling and further 
                                                          
26 ‘Kak rozhdalis’ ideya natsionalnikh proektov?,’ Presidential Council on Implementing National Priority 
Projects and Demographic Policy, 16 March 2006, available at http://www.rost.ru/main/what/01/01.shtml 
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liberalization of the state welfare system. Yet members of both these administrations 
deliberately ‘…raised public expectations about the welfare system. They repeatedly have 
proclaimed the state’s technocratic competence in and responsibility for improving the 
quality and delivery of social services in order to solve problems such as Russia’s 
demographic crisis.’ While the official emphasis on the role of the state in meeting social 
rights entitlements such as welfare may, therefore, simply be a political ploy, such rhetoric 
nevertheless attempts to tap into a depth of public feeling concerning the importance of 
economic and social rights.27  
 
2.6   State-civil society relations in Russia 
The reassertion of the state’s authority has had an enormous impact on the multitude of civil 
society organisations in Russia. During the post-Soviet period under then-President Yeltsin 
NGOs in Russia proliferated, partly due to the Yeltsin administration’s policy of neither 
helping nor hindering the development of domestic civil society (Henderson 2011). Certain 
groups such as those promoting feminist, environmentalist and civil and political human 
rights causes largely became reliant on funding from external donors due to Russia’s 
precarious economic circumstances, the relative unfamiliarity of the causes they were 
espousing, and the level of third-sector expertise Western foundations and donor agencies 
claimed to be able to offer (Evans 2006; Henderson 2002).  
 
Many commentators have argued, however, that one consequence of NGOs’ dependence on 
foreign assistance for survival and growth is that a relationship is created between donor and 
recipient in which the recipient organisation’s aims and agenda come to reflect those of the 
donor, rather than what might be relevant or effective domestically (Henderson 2002; 
Hemment 2004). In this sense McIntosh-Sundstrom (2005:420) argues that transnational 
actors who fund NGO activity thus become ‘moral financiers’ who provide funding for 
projects on various social and political issues selected and approved by them. The problem 
this creates for the NGOs themselves is that the NGO sector becomes dominated by an elite 
made up of those organisations with ties to international donors but few to the population 
they claim to represent (Carothers and Barndt 2000; Henderson 2002; Hemment 2004). As 
Chapters 4 and 7 will explore further, this has particularly been the case for those Russian 
                                                          
27 See Chapter 4 (Section 4.3) for survey data on public ranking of human rights in Russia 
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NGOs which specifically promote human rights such as the Moscow Helsinki Group28and 
Memorial,29 which have been active since the late Soviet period and tend to be headed by 
activists who were previously well-known Soviet dissidents. While enjoying excellent links 
with international donors including the EU and having become ‘integrated into the EU 
milieu’ (Klitsounova 2008:3), the data generated in a number of interviews conducted for this 
study with various NGO representatives highlighted what they saw as the elitist and isolated 
nature of some of the human rights organisations, and their lack of interest in appealing to a 
broader constituency.30  
 
This situation is perpetuated by the EU and other international donors who prefer to work 
with and fund those groups with which they are already familiar and which have staff with 
the necessary English language skills (McIntosh-Sundstrom and Beznosova 2009). Indeed, 
Klitsounova (2008) notes that ‘...the idea of promoting human rights in Russia through 
Russian human rights NGOs has become embedded in EU policy discourses...at the rhetorical 
level, support for Russian human rights organisations has become an integral part of the 
working agenda by which Brussels has set out to transfer European norms and values to 
Russia.’ At the same time, while reflecting the types of values that the EU claims to uphold, 
these NGOs have largely failed to articulate their concerns and campaigns in ways that 
resonate with the wider Russian public (Paneyakh 2010; Evans 2006). As Chapters 5 and 7 
will detail, this position contrasts with that taken by those NGOs engaged in more socially-
oriented work such as working with children, the elderly and the disabled. While such groups 
may not always have the same experience of working with international donors that the long-
standing human rights NGOs enjoy, they appear to have little trouble attracting volunteers 
and have also developed cooperative relationships with local authorities which they see as 
key in helping them to achieve their aims.  
 
This seeming divide between different types of NGO in Russia has arguably been exploited 
by Putin during his second and third terms as president, with his administration’s policy of 
reasserting the primacy of the state having major consequences for civil society development 
in Russia. According to Hale (2002:309), this ‘statist’ approach to civil society contrasts with 
the liberal view of social organisations operating independently of the state in seeing the state 
                                                          
28 For further details see the organisation’s website at http://www.mhg.ru/  
29 http://www.memo.ru/  
30 See Chapters 4 and 5 for a full discussion of this data 
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and society as ‘integrally related, part of the same organic whole.’ The statist view therefore 
gives the state a key role in the activities of non-state social organisations, leading Putin from 
2004 onwards to pursue a policy of creating a ‘top-down’ model of civil society which 
rewarded those NGOs deemed to be carrying out socially ‘useful’ activities with grants and 
other support while ostracising those deemed to be pursuing interests or values counter to 
those of the state (Mohsin Hashim 2005; Henderson 2011). A number of human rights NGOs 
have fallen into the category of those considered to be in some way acting against the 
interests of the state, and their dependence on grants from international donors has provided a 
relatively simple way for the authorities to portray them as acting purely at the behest of 
foreign powers. From 2004 onwards Putin began using much more critical rhetoric about 
organisations receiving foreign funding and in 2006 new legislation was introduced which 
placed stricter regulations on the registration and accounting procedures for NGOs. In 
addition, a number of well-known Russian human rights NGOs including the Moscow 
Helsinki Group were accused of involvement in espionage and subjected to a hostile 
campaign in the state-controlled media (RFERL 2006). More recently, in 2012 Putin 
approved a law requiring NGOs which receive funding from abroad and are considered to be 
engaging in political activity to register as ‘foreign agents’ (BBC News 2012).  
 
In contrast, those organisations engaged in more ‘social’ work and operating within the 
Kremlin’s ‘prescribed boundaries’ have been able to apply for large grants awarded via an 
annual Kremlin-sponsored grant competition since 2006 (Richter 2009b:8). Evans (2006: 
149) describes this as part of Putin’s vision of ‘…a quasi-civil society…in which social 
organisations are subordinated to the authority of the state and express demands within the 
parameters of the program of the highest executive leadership.’ This interpretation is 
supported by other measures taken by the Putin administration such as the creation of the 
Public Chamber in 2005, a body made up of delegates chosen by the Kremlin which was to 
advise the administration on matters pertaining to civil society (Richter 2009b). As Chapter 5 
will discuss, however, several of the respondents interviewed for this study noted that the 
situation may not be as simple as NGOs simply being ‘co-opted’ by the state. Given the 
scarcity of resources available for NGO activity in Russia, many groups engaged in socially-
oriented work have little choice but to accept funding from local or federal government 
sources. As Javeline and Lindemann-Komarova (2010:179) point out, ‘the alternative of 
completely avoiding funding by Russian local or federal government is not in the interests of 
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civil society development, especially if the low level of resources otherwise available to most 
Russian citizens would prevent them from organizing.’  
 
In addition, several of the Russian civil society representatives who took part in this study not 
only saw cooperation with the local authorities in particular as unavoidable in terms of their 
ability to achieve their aims and assist those on whose behalf they operate but were also 
cautiously optimistic about the results such cooperation could produce. Indeed, Kulmala 
(2011:74) points to the mutually beneficial relationship established between local authorities 
and civil society organisations that she identified during her fieldwork in the Russian region 
of Karelia, and points out that ‘…cooperation does not necessarily mean co-optation…civil 
society organisations have the most influence in situations when they collaborate actively 
with the local authorities and…when the roles of the state and civil society actors overlap.’ 
Certainly such cooperation offers at least the possibility of input into policymaking where 
social policy and the realisation of certain economic and social rights are concerned, whereas 
human rights NGOs have for the most part been shut out of the policymaking process during 
Putin’s tenure (Klitsounova 2008).  
 
In terms of the implications this has for the EU, it is clear that without the support of 
international donors such as the Union many of those organisations which focus on 
promoting a concept of human rights which focuses on the civil and political would struggle 
to survive. It is also understandable that the EU should be keen to support those NGOs which 
appear to reflect its own self-declared value system where human rights are concerned. In 
addition, the EU has to some extent engaged with more socially-oriented organisations in 
terms of funding, as Chapter 7 will explore in more detail. Yet continuing to support a small 
group of organisations which have a narrower view of what constitutes ‘human rights’ while 
separating the more socially-oriented projects the EU funds in Russia into a separate category 
which is not discussed in ‘rights’ terms denies the work done by more socially-oriented 
groups the ‘moral authority’ that framing their work as human rights claims or promotion 
could provide. This approach also serves to perpetuate the existence of a small, isolated yet 
well-funded elite of human rights NGOs who tend to be sidestepped by both other civil 
society actors and the local and federal authorities, and largely ignores those concerns which 
appear to resonate more deeply with the Russian public. One of the arguments this study 
seeks to put forward is that, in terms of having any influence over long-term social and 
63 
 
political development in Russia, engagement with a wider range of organisations and a 
broader understanding of what the concept of ‘human rights’ means in the Russian context 
could prove more fruitful from the EU’s perspective, as several of the respondents who took 
part in this study pointed out. 
 
2.7   Conclusions 
 
This chapter has aimed to explore a number of theoretical and policy issues which relate to 
the main themes of this study, including the nature of the different actors involved, including 
the institutions that make up the European Union; the contemporary Russian state; and 
Russian civil society actors engaged in human rights promotion and more socially-oriented 
work. It has sought to explore some of the difficulties surrounding any attempt to classify the 
EU as an international actor, and some of the complexities and inconsistencies involved in 
the Union’s attempts to conduct a common foreign policy. It has also examined the debates 
surrounding the EU’s supposed ability to act as a ‘normative power,’ and highlighted the fact 
that, rather than existing in a vacuum, attempts by the Union to promote human rights in 
general and economic and social rights more specifically in its external relations must 
compete with more instrumental interests of its own and of its Member States. It has aimed to 
demonstrate the continued importance of economic and social rights in the Russian context, 
and the challenging circumstances in which many Russian civil society organisations must 
operate. It is clear that there are a number of extremely complex factors at play which 
influence the EU’s engagement with the issue of human rights in general, and economic and 
social rights more particularly, within the context of its overall relationship with Russia. 
These factors will be returned to in more detail in Chapters 4 to 7, following a discussion of 
the methodology employed in order to answer the research questions set out in the 
introduction to this study. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Methodology 
 
 
3.1   Introduction 
 
The previous two chapters aimed to set out the theoretical and contextual framework within 
which this study has been conducted. The findings it will explore in more detail in Chapters 4 
to 7 were generated by extended fieldwork conducted in Brussels and Russia in 2011 and this 
chapter aims to provide some background to the choice of methods employed in carrying out 
my field research which included semi-structured interviewing and discourse analysis. The 
chapter will begin with a discussion of how the research questions came to be formulated and 
the influence my own background had on this process. It will then detail the planning that 
went into designing the research project, the experience of gathering data in the field 
including recruiting and interviewing respondents, and the process of post-fieldwork analysis. 
It is also designed to reflect upon some of the ethical issues that arose before, during, and 
after the fieldwork period as a result of conducting ethnographically-informed research and to 
explore some of the dilemmas which came up during and after the fieldwork process such as 
issues of translation and transcription.  
 
This study aims to address the following research questions: 
 
• How are economic and social rights and the role of the State in guaranteeing such 
rights conceptualised by the various EU institutions, the Russian authorities and 
Russian civil society actors? 
• What influence do these understandings exert on the interaction between the EU, the 
Russian authorities and Russian civil society actors? 
• What implications might these understandings have on the EU’s strategy towards 
promoting human rights in Russia? 
 
My interest in this topic came about due to a number of reasons. Having spent a period of 
several years studying Russian language and history and having a long-standing interest in 
human rights and the NGO sector, I moved to Moscow in 2005. After working for a number 
of different organisations there, I became a research assistant in the Moscow office of the 
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international NGO Human Rights Watch where one of my responsibilities was organising 
press conferences and information sessions for international diplomats, almost always from 
EU Member State countries and the US and Canada. It was clear that there was a great deal 
of interest in human rights issues in Russia amongst these diplomats, and that there were EU-
level funding programmes in place which aimed to support domestic human rights NGOs, 
many of whom had excellent professional contacts with these diplomats and others. Much of 
my work involved interacting with these NGOs, most of which were established and still run 
by activists such as Lyudmila Alexeyeva, the now 85-year-old head of the Moscow Helsinki 
Group,31 who had been dissidents during the Soviet era campaigning for greater civil and 
political liberties. While this community of human rights NGOs was extremely close-knit and 
to a large extent integrated into EU lobbying networks, it soon became clear that Russian 
friends and acquaintances who I made outside of this circle had either never heard of these 
organisations or were critical of the work they were doing, seeing it as overly influenced by 
the agendas of the international donors funding their work or as too distant from the lives and 
concerns of ordinary Russians. While such NGOs were undoubtedly operating in an 
atmosphere of at best indifference from the authorities and at worst hostility, there did not 
seem to be much desire on their part to appeal to a constituency beyond that of other similar 
domestic and international organisations and the international diplomatic community. As a 
result, they and the diplomats and international donors they interacted with appeared to be 
operating in a kind of mutually-reinforcing vacuum with little influence on public opinion.  
 
This struck me as something worthy of further research, and my initial research project aimed 
to look at how the EU attempted to promote human rights as a general concept in its relations 
with Russia. I soon realised, however, that for practical reasons it would be more worthwhile 
to give the project a more specific focus. My early desk-based research soon revealed that, 
while much has been written about the EU and ‘human rights’ in relation to Russia, the vast 
majority of this literature either treated human rights as a general concept which did not need 
to be deconstructed or focused much more on issues which fall into the category of civil and 
political rights. These tended to include freedom of speech, the abolition of the death penalty 
and torture and disappearances during Russia’s military operations in the North Caucasus 
(Saari 2006; Forsberg and Herd 2005; Smith 2005). In contrast, despite the apparent 
‘universality and indivisibility’ of the human rights the EU seemed committed to promoting 
                                                          
31 www.mhg.ru  
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in its relations with Russia, economic and social rights relating to perhaps more prosaic issues 
such as housing, healthcare, working conditions and social security had largely been left out 
of the equation. This seemed particularly curious given the long-standing and deeply-rooted 
conception of such rights that existed in Russia and the fact that many of the previous social 
and economic guarantees provided by the state had crumbled in the post-Soviet period, 
affecting large swathes of the population (Chugrov 2000). This led me to focus on how these 
rights are understood within different contexts, in this case those of the EU institutional set-
up and the Russian political and social context, and the impact such understandings might 
have on policy in these contexts. A social scientific approach which moves away from the 
focus on international law which tends to dominate much of the existing research on human 
rights thus seemed the most suited to the aims of this study. As Landmann (2009:22) points 
out, this approach aims to explore ‘…the pragmatic functions and dimensions of human 
rights, the ways in which they are contested, and the ways in which the variation in their 
promotion and protection can be explained.’  
 
3.2   Selecting the research methods: interviewing elites 
 
The research undertaken within this study has been directed at ascertaining and interpreting 
the views of EU policymakers, Russian NGO representatives and a small number of relevant 
Russian officials and academics on a range of issues connected to EU human rights policy 
and the situation regarding human rights in Russia, with a focus on economic and social 
rights. It has sought to take an inductive and interpretivist approach to the data it has 
generated, rather than beginning with a set of clear hypotheses to be tested.  
 
In undertaking the fieldwork aspect of this research, qualitative research methods appeared to 
be the most appropriate methods to employ since such methods are concerned with exploring 
how people interpret the social world around them (Bryman 2008). One of the main aims of 
my research was to examine the opinions and attitudes of EU policymakers working on 
human rights policy in general and towards Russia in particular and those of representatives 
of Russian social and human rights NGOs and Russian regional human rights ombudsmen 
towards that policy. Qualitative interviews appeared to offer the time and space to explore my 
respondents’ attitudes and beliefs in a way that, for example, questionnaires could not. 
Interviews are capable of providing access to the meanings people attribute to both their 
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experiences and the social world around them (Miller and Glassner), while Holstein and 
Gubrium (1997: 122) talk of ‘the interview situation’s ability to incite the production of 
meanings that address issues relating to particular research concerns.’ The degree of 
flexibility provided by using interviews was also an important consideration when it came to 
choosing my methods for the study. I felt that adopting a semi-structured approach by using 
an interview guide of possible questions or themes to raise during the interview rather than 
using a completely structured approach with a list of ‘closed’ questions or an unstructured 
approach would provide the most scope for exploring meaning and allowing the respondent 
to lead the interview in different directions. As Holstein and Gubrium (1997: 123) point out, 
‘the objective is not to dictate interpretation, but to provide an environment conducive to the 
production of the range and complexity of meanings that address relevant issues, and not to 
be confined by predetermined agendas’. In addition, opting for a semi-structured approach 
allows the interviewer to seek clarification of responses if necessary and thus provides greater 
flexibility for probing those responses. The interview thus becomes a ‘co-production’ 
between the interviewer and interviewee in a way that would not be possible using an 
unstructured or fully structured approach (Wengraf 2001: 3). 
 
The semi-structured approach also seemed particularly relevant given that I intended to 
conduct interviews with policymakers, NGO representatives, a small number of Russian 
officials working on human rights issues and academics with an interest in my area of 
research, all of whom could be categorised as elite respondents. According to Richards 
(1996:199), ‘…the whole notion of an elite implies a group of individuals who hold, or have 
held, a privileged position in society and…as far as a political scientist is concerned, are 
likely to have had more influence on political outcomes than general members of the public.’ 
Although the respondents represented very different interest groups in several different 
locations, they could be classified as elites since they enjoyed a certain status. The EU 
officials were instrumental in developing and implementing EU policy on human rights 
and/or EU-Russia relations and representing the EU during official meetings and discussions 
with their Russian counterparts. The Russian NGO representatives almost all had experience 
of working with international organisations and often foreign governments, frequently spoke 
foreign languages and could be classed as members of the intelligentsia – many had also 
occupied positions of relatively high status during the Soviet period in the academic sphere or 
in local government. The academics I interviewed all worked for prestigious universities in St 
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Petersburg and also had extensive experience of working abroad and consulting on 
international projects; and the Russian officials I met with all represented the interests of 
local government institutions. Semi-structured interviews appeared to offer the most effective 
way to explore these respondents’ views on policy and their understandings of human rights 
issues since they allow the interviewer the scope to investigate what Aberbach and Rockman 
(2002: 674) call the ‘contextual nuance of concept.’  
 
3.3    Analysis of documents and transcripts before, during and after fieldwork 
 
The second method employed in the course of this study involved analysing various 
documents and ‘texts’ including my interview transcripts and EU policy documents 
concerning the Union’s strategy towards human rights in general, economic and social rights 
more particularly, and on human rights in relation to Russia. The relevant documents were 
accessed via the European Parliament’s OEIL database32, the European Union’s EUR-Lex33 
database and the inter-institutional database Pre-Lex34 and consist of a number of sources: 
public and internal statements on policy by various committees and departments; official 
treaty documents; reports and other publications; and meeting summaries. The documents 
used cover the period from 1997, when the Treaty of Amsterdam, which placed greater 
emphasis on the EU’s commitment to promoting human rights in both internal and external 
relations,35 was signed, and July 2012, when my period of thesis research came to an end. I 
also analysed a number of statements made by Presidents Putin and Medvedev in relation to 
economic and social rights and the role of the state and the regional human rights 
ombudsmen in Russia. These statements appeared either on the official Kremlin website36 or 
in Russian media outlets and were accessed via web-based archival searches. Where an 
official translation into English already existed, as it sometimes did with statements and 
speeches which appeared on the Kremlin website, this was used in order to reduce the time 
spent on translating texts from Russian into English. The number of such statements analysed 
was, however, relatively small given my desire to focus very specifically on economic and 
social rights and related issues rather than exploring the ways in which Russian officials talk 
about human rights on a more general level. In addition, much of the academic literature 
                                                          
32 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/  
33 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm  
34 http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/apcnet.cfm?CL=en  
35 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/amsterdam_treaty/a10000_en.htm  
36 www.kremlin.ru  
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relating to economic and social rights which was used to underpin this study was in English 
rather than Russian due to the fact that this area of human rights remains relatively under-
explored in the Russian-language literature on political science and in the more legalistic 
literature on human rights which tends to be more widely available. While there have been 
some attempts to address this (eg Glushkova 2006), these rights tend to be explored in a 
descriptive rather than analytical way and the general lack of research on these rights in the 
Russian context was something which was highlighted by several of the Russian academics 
who I interviewed and with whom I have continued to work. 
 
The analysis of the body of documents mentioned above commenced prior to fieldwork and 
continued during and after the fieldwork period. Its purpose was twofold: to examine the 
context in which EU policy on human rights, particularly on economic and social rights, was 
and is being formulated; and to gain insight into the ways in which the concepts of human 
rights and economic and social rights more specifically are understood by EU policymakers. 
The method of discourse analysis was in some respects influential when it came to 
investigating these two areas since it gives due consideration to the importance of the context 
surrounding a text (Richardson 2007: 15). Indeed, discourse analysis implies not just a 
straightforward reading of a text, but an attempt to uncover the ways in which social reality 
and meaning is produced (Phillips and Hardy 2002: 6). This is particularly important where 
the analysis of official discourse is concerned, since this type of discourse is influenced by a 
diverse range of political, social and cultural factors, as are the audiences for such discourse. 
As Fairclough (2003: 11) points out, ‘…we must take account of the institutional position, 
interests, values, intentions, desires etc. of producers, the relations between elements at 
different levels in texts; and the institutional positions, knowledge, purposes, values etc. of 
receivers’. Since perceptions of social reality are likely to differ between different types of 
society and different cultural contexts, studying the official discourse of a particular society 
or community allows insight into what Foucault (2001: 131) calls each society’s ‘regime of 
truth…the types of discourse it accepts and makes function as true.’  
 
Where the interview transcripts were concerned, although they constitute a very different 
type of ‘text’ from official policy documents, discourse analysis can nevertheless be used to 
explore the political and social context and the position and interests of the interviewee which 
provide the background to and influence their ‘speech acts’ as expressed in the interview. The 
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aim was therefore to analyse the discourses on economic and social rights employed by both 
the EU and Russian respondents involved in this study and to compare these types of 
discourse with that expressed more formally in the policy documents and Russian official 
statements in order to explore how the language of such rights is used in different contexts. 
At the same time, it is worth pointing out that my analysis of the documents mentioned above 
was intended primarily to provide context for the main arguments developed in this thesis 
which relied on both the theoretical framework outlined in the first two chapters and the 
extensive empirical evidence provided by the interviews I conducted. This was as opposed to 
constituting a full discourse analysis which would have involved a much more detailed 
consideration of the linguistic aspects of the various documents used in this study. As a 
result, documentary analysis constituted a supplementary method of investigation for this 
study rather than a primary source of evidence in the way that the interviews did. 
 
3.4   The research location 
 
Given the focus of the research, it was clear that the main fieldwork period would involve 
conducting interviews in two very different countries: Belgium and Russia. Two pilot 
interviews with members of the European Parliament had already been conducted during one 
of the Parliament’s regular sittings in Strasbourg in June 2010 while I was carrying out an 
internship there at the Council of Europe, but the vast majority of EU officials with whom I 
wished to make contact were based permanently in Brussels. The fact that most of the EU’s 
institutions and representatives, and certainly all of those with whom I needed to make 
contact, were located not only in Brussels but in very close proximity to each other was of 
great assistance when arranging and travelling to interviews. Although I had never been to 
the city prior to starting my fieldwork there, it proved extremely easy to navigate and this 
meant that the length of time required for the fieldwork was reduced since it was easily 
possible to conduct several interviews in just a few days. It also meant that it was possible to 
arrange further interviews at very short notice since I had quickly become familiar with the 
layout of Brussels’ EU Quarter and the institutions’ buildings themselves. In planning my 
fieldwork I decided to make two separate visits to Brussels to carry out interviews: one in 
January 2011 prior to travelling to Russia and another in September 2011 after my Russian 
fieldwork had finished. The rationale behind this was first to give me some background 
information on EU human rights policy which I could then take into the field in Russia, 
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particularly in my interviews with EU officials working in Moscow and St Petersburg; and 
second to return to Brussels with the benefit of having gathered extensive data from my 
interviews in Russia with which to question EU policymakers in more depth. As will be 
further discussed below, it proved surprisingly easy to arrange a relatively large number of 
interviews in Brussels simply by emailing respondents directly. 
 
The main body of the fieldwork – a period of six months – was spent continuously in Russia. 
It was clear that interviews here would require considerably more time than those in Brussels 
given the distances involved in travelling between interview locations and the fact that I 
wanted to interview respondents outside of the two main cities of Moscow and St Petersburg 
in order to gain greater perspective on the work of organisations operating in a more regional 
setting. As I was repeatedly reminded by my respondents, there are huge differences between 
the socio-economic conditions of those residing in the two largest urban centres and those 
affecting the vast majority of the population who live in Russia’s regions. Brade and Rudolph 
(2004: 72), for example, point to the success of these two ‘capital city regions’ in consistently 
attracting political and economic resources even as many Russian regions fell into long-term 
decline as a result of the economic and political changes following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. In addition, the vast majority of the organisations which receive project funding from 
the EU are based in these two cities or maintain links with colleagues there. As a result, I was 
anxious to at least attempt to gain some insight into the social reality of those working on 
rights-related issues outside of the major cities who could perhaps offer a slightly different 
perspective on the EU’s funding policy for Russian NGOs. 
 
I decided to base myself in St Petersburg for the majority of my fieldwork period for a 
number of reasons. I was already familiar with the city, having previously studied there and 
visited it subsequently for professional reasons and, through my home university department, 
I was able to arrange affiliation with the Centre for European Studies at the European 
University at St Petersburg (EUSP)37, a respected graduate institution with excellent links to 
other universities in Russia, Europe and the US.  The university provided me with space to 
work and the possibility of useful contacts.  Indeed my arrival coincided somewhat 
precipitously with the conclusion of an agreement between the EU’s new European External 
                                                          
37 http://www.eu.spb.ru/en  
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Action Service (EEAS)38 and the EUSP to turn the Centre for European Studies into an EU 
Centre for North-West Russia which would form part of an existing worldwide network of 
such centres.39 As will be discussed below, this proved to be extremely useful in providing 
me with early access to potential respondents. Finally, and most importantly, I knew from my 
previous experience of working with NGOs based in Russia and my own research pre-
fieldwork that the city had a thriving civil society sector, with several prominent human 
rights and social NGOs basing themselves in St Petersburg.40 In addition, a number of the 
larger EU Member States maintain consulates in the city and it seemed possible that it might 
be easier to identify and make contact with representatives of these consulates who operate in 
a far smaller diplomatic community than their colleagues in Moscow. I also hoped that initial 
contact with these consular staff would facilitate contacts and subsequent interviews with 
their Moscow-based colleagues at a later date.  
 
Having established a base from which to begin my fieldwork, it was clear that it would be 
necessary to spend a certain amount of time in Moscow given the presence there of the EU 
Delegation to Russia, all of the Member States’ main embassies, and a large number of 
human rights and more socially-oriented NGOs. As a result, I made two trips to Moscow in 
April and June 2011 where I was able to carry out a number of important interviews. In terms 
of conducting fieldwork outside of Moscow and St Petersburg, given the often huge distances 
involved in travelling around Russia and the limited amount of time I had in which to conduct 
my fieldwork I selected two further locations - Nizhniy Novgorod and Ryazan. These were 
chosen partly due to their relative proximity to Moscow (approximately 5 hours and 3 hours 
by train respectively) which meant that both research sites could be visited as part of one of 
my trips to Moscow. More importantly, both places were home to well-known NGOs, one of 
which focused on more ‘traditional’ civil and political rights projects and had strong ties to 
European and other international donors and NGOs, and the other of which had also 
previously focused more on these traditional rights issues but had recently launched a project 
focusing exclusively and explicitly on economic and social rights. The relatively small size of 
both locations – Nizhniy Novgorod has a population of 1,278,800 while Ryazan has a 
                                                          
38 http://www.eeas.europa.eu/    
39 For further details see the Centre for European Studies - EU Centre’s homepage at 
http://www.eu.spb.ru/en/research-centers/ces/eu-centre  
40 One example of this is the St Petersburg Human Rights Council, an umbrella organisation which brings 
together many of the most prominent human rights and social NGOs in the city and publishes regular reports on 
various rights-related issues (http://www.hrcspb.ru/). 
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population of 509,39241 - in comparison to Moscow and St Petersburg also made it easier to 
navigate both places and meant that it was not necessary to spend large amounts of time there 
in order to conduct interviews. 
 
Given the small number of locations visited and the relatively small number of organisations 
interviewed it is obviously not possible for this study to provide a fully representative picture 
of the circumstances in which Russian human rights and socially-oriented NGOs operate or 
of the manner in which the EU interacts with these organisations. Nevertheless, there was a 
rationale behind the choice of organisations and locations which went further than mere 
practical convenience. Firstly, the decision to focus the study on European Russia was 
motivated largely by the fact that most of the NGOs of interest to this study were located in 
this part of the country. Beyond the mere fact of relative proximity to each other, however, 
these organisations form a dense network made up of professional contacts and personal 
relationships within the relatively small and close-knit NGO community in Russia. Many of 
them also have experience of working with international donors, including the EU, and were 
therefore in a position to offer their opinion on the merits and disadvantages of the EU’s 
approach to promoting certain rights in the Russian context. The Ryazan NGO, for example, 
had a very small number of employees and a very local focus but was affiliated with a much 
larger and better-known organisation in Moscow and through this link had established 
contacts with international donors and consultants. The organisation in Nizhniy Novgorod 
also had excellent links with other similar Russian organisations, international NGOs such as 
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International which maintain a presence in Russia, and 
with the EU institutions and individual Member State governments which fund civil society 
projects in Russia. Focusing on this particular network of actors thus allowed me to build up 
a picture of how they interacted with each other, the EU institutions and the Russian federal 
and local authorities. While my visits to Ryazan and Nizhniy Novgorod were necessarily 
short, this made it easier to set up meetings with the relevant organisations since they were 
aware that this was my only chance to meet with them. In addition, the fact that in each 
location the organisation I was seeking to make contact with was the only one of its kind in 
that particular place obviated the need to spend a longer period there since I was able to carry 
out lengthy interviews with representatives of each NGO in a short period of time.  
                                                          
41 http://russiaprofile.org/bg_places/resources_territory_districts_nizhniy.html; 
http://russiaprofile.org/bg_places/resources_territory_districts_ryazan.html  
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3.5   Identifying and contacting respondents 
 
The 37 interviews I conducted in the different research locations involved a sample of elite 
respondents representing very different organisations or interest groups (See Appendix A for 
a full list of respondents and their respective roles and locations). This section will thus 
address each broad category of respondent in turn. 
 
EU respondents: 
 
In terms of selecting EU officials to approach with an interview request, I was able to identify 
several distinct but overlapping groups of policymakers. The complex nature of the EU’s 
policymaking process and the organisation’s sheer size and range of different institutions 
made this somewhat challenging. Within the EU legislative competencies are shared between 
the Union’s Council of Ministers, also known as the Council of the European Union, the 
European Commission and the European Parliament, while responsibility for the 
implementation of rules is shared between the Commission and the EU’s Member States 
(Neyer 2003). In terms of legislative proposals, the Commission proposes these and the 
Council of Ministers then votes on them, with the Commission also responsible for 
implementing these proposals once they have been approved, while the Parliament has the 
power to amend, reject or block legislation (Smith 2003a). Where the implementation of the 
Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy is concerned, this is now overseen by the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who is also a Vice-
President of the European Commission and supported by the European External Action 
Service (EEAS), which was formed by the merging of Commission and Council foreign 
policy departments in January 2011.42 The purpose of identifying respondents was further 
complicated by the fact that my fieldwork period began just as the EEAS was coming into 
existence, which meant that there was still a great deal of movement of staff between 
institutions and a certain confusion over the new division of responsibilities and 
competencies. Nevertheless, I was anxious to try and interview representatives from a range 
of institutions which carry out work related to either the EU’s external human rights policy, 
                                                          
42 For further details see ‘The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,’ 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/ashton/index_en.htm  
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or to its external relations with Russia, or both. The first group I was able to make contact 
with were MEPs who were active either on the European Parliament’s delegation to the EU-
Russia Parliamentary Cooperation Committee (EU-Russia PCC)43 or on its Subcommittee on 
Human Rights (DROI).44 The EU-Russia PCC has been in existence since 1997 and is made 
up of equal numbers of MEPs and Russian parliamentarians. It meets several times a year in 
either Brussels, Strasbourg or Russia and is designed to act as a forum for discussion on a 
range of political and economic issues of interest to its members, occasionally including 
human rights issues.45 The DROI organises hearings and discussions for MEPs on a range of 
human rights issues and adopts reports and resolutions. Both committees are also briefed 
regularly on human rights-related policy matters by officials working for the Commission and 
now the EEAS.46  
 
Subsequently I was able to interview researchers at the European Parliament who provide 
information on human rights issues in Russia to both these committees and who arrange the 
committees’ hearings on human rights and other issues which regularly relate to Russia. The 
second group I wished to approach consisted of staff working for the EEAS on the EU’s 
human rights strategy in general and more specifically in relation to Russia. The final group 
consisted of diplomatic staff working for the Delegation of the EU to Russia47 which 
represents the EEAS in Russia, or for individual EU Member State embassies and consulates 
in Moscow and St Petersburg who had responsibility for following human rights 
developments in Russia and often for implementing local human rights projects in 
cooperation with Russian human rights NGOs. These Member State diplomatic staff also had 
frequent contact with the EU Delegation and were thus able to provide their opinion on EU 
human rights policy at a local level. A supplementary interview was also conducted with a 
representative of a Brussels-based think-tank specialising in EU-Russia relations. 
 
In most cases I was able to identify the respondents I wished to contact from the EU’s own 
online information and from embassy and consulate websites, although in several cases I was 
referred on to someone else by the person I had originally contacted or interviewees would 
suggest names of other potential respondents during the interview itself. With all 18 of the 
                                                          
43 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/d-ru/home.html  
44 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/droi/home.html  
45 Interview with Johannes, MEP and member of the committee, Strasbourg, 16th June 2010 
46 Interview with Rachel, EEAS official, Brussels, 27th January 2011 
47 http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/index_en.htm  
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interviews I conducted with EU or Member State representatives in Brussels and Russia, I 
first contacted the respondents by email in which I explained my position and institutional 
affiliation and the purpose of my research. I also attached a further information sheet which 
gave more information about my research and the funding for it, the interview process and 
how the data would be used in future. I was also careful to emphasise that the interview 
would be completely confidential. Although I had expected that it might be difficult to 
persuade people to agree to an interview, in fact the response once I had identified fairly 
precisely who I needed to talk to was overwhelmingly positive: only a very few people failed 
to reply to my emails and where people were unable to take part in an interview due to other 
commitments they almost always referred me on to colleagues who would then agree to take 
part. In one instance a much more senior member of consulate staff heard that I would be 
conducting an interview with one of his colleagues and asked to join us in order to contribute 
his views.  
 
My strategy of first contacting staff at the smaller Member State consulates in St Petersburg 
before approaching their embassy counterparts in Moscow proved successful in that the 
consulate staff were able to identify their relevant colleagues for me. I also felt that it helped 
my cause considerably when approaching the Moscow staff to be able to say that I had been 
referred on to them by their colleagues in St Petersburg. I was also helped unexpectedly at the 
very beginning of my time in Russia when the European University in St Petersburg held a 
launch event for the new EU Centre to which all the local Member State consuls were 
invited. I was asked to give an informal presentation on my research and institutional 
affiliation, and immediately afterwards was approached by diplomatic staff who offered to 
put me in touch with colleagues of theirs who worked on human rights issues. This led 
directly to three subsequent interviews being set up in St Petersburg and Moscow. As will be 
discussed below, many of the EU respondents seemed flattered to be asked to participate in 
an interview and responded to my request extremely quickly: this may be due to the fact that, 
as Aberbach and Rockman (2002) point out, bureaucratic elites tend not to be studied very 
often by political scientists and as a result response rates can be very high. 
 
NGO representatives: 
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A second distinct group of respondents with whom I was keen to make contact were 
representatives of two different types of Russian NGO: those working on issues more related 
to economic and social rights such as social care,  children’s rights and trade union issues; 
and those focusing on civil and political rights issues such as freedom of speech and 
assembly, police and judicial reform, the prevention of torture, and prison conditions. Again, 
I began by first approaching potential respondents who I had identified from various Russian 
online databases by email, although unlike the EU respondents those in Russia often 
preferred to have a subsequent telephone conversation where I would reiterate the purpose of 
my research and we would arrange a time and place for the interview. As with the EU 
respondents, I used these emails (this time in Russian, see Appendix 3 for an example) to 
outline my own background, institutional affiliation and research project and to emphasise 
the confidential nature of the interviews. I felt that my affiliation with the European 
University at St Petersburg was of great assistance when contacting these respondents, 
particularly those based in St Petersburg itself, as it is a well-known and respected institution 
whereas many of my Russian respondents were not familiar with the names or locations of 
UK universities. It was also clear with this group of respondents that there was significant 
interest in me as a foreigner who was able to communicate in Russian. Although there were 
far more instances with this group where people simply failed to respond to my emails, those 
who did frequently complimented me on my knowledge of the language and expressed 
interest in meeting me. I was also fortunate to have a couple of ‘leads’ when I arrived in 
Russia in the form of three contacts at NGOs in St Petersburg and Ryazan whom I had been 
referred to by colleagues at my own university: all three proved to be extremely helpful in 
arranging interviews with other staff at their respective organisations. Overall, however, with 
the 12 interviews I conducted with respondents from this group it was again a very direct 
approach to making contact rather than ‘snowballing’ which led to the greatest number of 
interviews being arranged. 
 
Regional human rights ombudsmen: 
 
A third group with whom I wished to make contact while in Russia were some of the regional 
human rights and child human rights ombudsmen – government officials whom members of 
the public can make complaints to regarding alleged violations of their rights by the state and 
who can then demand a response from whichever government department is responsible for 
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resolving the issue (see Section 4.2 for more detail). The system is still very much in 
development and not all of Russia’s 87 regions have a human rights or child human rights 
ombudsman (the current figure stands at 63 for the human rights ombudsman and 74 for the 
child human rights ombudsman).48 In addition, many of my Russian respondents were critical 
of some of the officials currently occupying this role, claiming that they were too close to the 
regional authorities to be effective or that they seemed to undertake very little activity. 
Nevertheless, I felt it would be worthwhile to approach the ombudsmen in the areas where I 
was intending to carry out other interviews in order to gain some insight into the types of 
human rights issues being raised by the members of the public who had appealed to them and 
to find out more about their experience of working with European organisations since the EU 
backed a Council of Europe-led project to develop the regional ombudsman institution from 
2008 to 2009.49 The ombudsmen system and the role these officials play within the 
interaction between Russian government institutions and civil society actors constituted a 
supplementary issue for this thesis rather than a key focus. Nevertheless, as the only official 
regional state-affiliated body with specific responsibility for human rights issues and one 
which was mentioned fairly frequently in my interviews with Russian civil society 
organisations it seemed useful to approach a small number of them to see if they would agree 
to an interview.  
 
I was able to make contact with two regional human rights ombudsmen and one child human 
rights ombudsman in the North-West Federal District which includes the city of St Petersburg 
and its surrounding regions. All three expressed their willingness either to take part in an 
interview or to arrange for one to be conducted with a member of their staff, although 
ultimately it proved impossible to arrange an interview with one of them. In addition, on one 
of my trips to Moscow I was able to interview a Moscow Region human rights ombudsman. 
In terms of the other research locations I visited, the Nizhniy Novgorod Human Rights 
Ombudsman failed to respond to my attempts to contact her and Ryazan Oblast appointed its 
human rights and child human rights ombudsmen later in 2011 after my fieldwork period had 
                                                          
48 ‘Ombudsmeni obsudyat zlobodneviye temi v sfere zashiti detstva,’ Prava cheloveka v Rossii [Human Rights 
in Russia], 10 October 2012, available at http://www.hro.org/print/12020; Stanovlenoye instituta 
Upolnomochenniye po pravam chekoveka,’ Official site of the Human Rights Ombudsman in the Russian 
Federation, available at http://ombudsmanrf.org/2009-11-02-08-43-32/2009-11-19-08-09-17.html 
49 http://www.coe.int/t/commissioner/Activities/themes/nhrspeertopeer_en.asp 
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ended.50 In the four cases where I was able to arrange interviews I was assisted greatly by the 
fact that the ombudsmen in question had extremely active and enthusiastic press officers or 
other advisors who, as will be discussed further below, were keen for the interviews to take 
place and clearly saw them as an opportunity to promote the work of their office to an 
international audience.  
 
Academics: 
 
The final group of respondents with whom I wished to make contact towards the end of my 
fieldwork period were academics in St Petersburg who specialised in human rights issues and 
who often had close ties with both the NGO community in the city and international 
organisations and government representatives. I felt this would be a valuable opportunity to 
gain some perspective on the communities I was researching from respondents who are 
involved with them but at the same time remain slightly ‘outside’ them. Making contact with 
this set of respondents was very straightforward: one was an academic who I had previously 
met at a conference in Moscow, while another gave a seminar early on during my stay in St 
Petersburg which I attended and where I was able to make an initial introduction. The third 
respondent I contacted by email and he then arranged another interview with one of his 
colleagues who happened to be visiting the city at the time. Again, I felt my institutional 
affiliation with a local university was helpful in securing these interviews since the academic 
community in St Petersburg is fairly small and close and as a result the academics I contacted 
were able to ‘place’ me.  
 
It is worth noting that, rather than constituting four completely separate groups of 
respondents, there was considerable overlap between them. Many of the NGO respondents 
had close ties with each other, even if they worked in different spheres, and also interacted 
with some of the EU respondents and the ombudsmen on a fairly regular basis. The 
academics interviewed were also frequently connected to the civil society community and 
had often worked in a consultant capacity for EU or Member State-funded projects. In 
                                                          
50 ‘Ryazan: Upolnomochennym po pravam cheloveka naznachen general FSIN,’ Prava Cheloveka v Rossii, 
www.hro.org/11720; V Ryazani poyavilsya upolnomochenniy po pravam rebyonka,’ Prava Cheloveka v Rossii, 
www.hro.org/12812  
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addition, several of the EU and Member State respondents had met with the ombudsmen on a 
number of occasions and were keen to maintain or increase this level of contact.  
 
3.6    Gatekeepers 
Most of the interviews I conducted were, as previously mentioned, arranged by making direct 
email contact with the person with whom I wished to speak, meaning that the ‘snowballing’ 
technique was not employed as much as I had expected it would need to be, particularly in a 
post-socialist context where personal contacts and connections can be of vital importance in 
many areas of professional and personal life (Bruno 1998). There were, however, several 
occasions where it was necessary to rely on gatekeepers, usually employees or colleagues of 
the person I was attempting to gain access to. At times, this could lead to interview situations 
where I felt somewhat ill at ease: with one interview with an NGO it transpired that the 
gatekeeper who had arranged the meeting wanted his wife, also a researcher, to join me and 
to conduct her own interview with my respondent immediately afterwards. Although she was 
in no way obstructive I had nevertheless not expected to conduct my interview in front of 
someone I had never met before yet did not feel in a position to object. On another occasion 
with an NGO in Ryazan I had arrived on a Sunday afternoon expecting to conduct my 
interview at the organisation’s offices the following morning, only to be met by the 
gatekeeper who informed me that she was going to drive me straight to a forest outside the 
city where my respondent was camping with friends. When we arrived he was friendly but 
clearly had not been told who I was and I felt very uncomfortable intruding on his leisure 
time. I was also completely dependent on the gatekeeper in terms of when I could leave to 
return to the city. 
 
 Where the human rights ombudsmen were concerned, gatekeepers were key in arranging 
these interviews since in only one instance did I have direct email contact with an 
ombudsman and ultimately I was unable to arrange an interview with him. In two of these 
cases the interviews were arranged by press officers or assistants who were very keen for me 
to speak with the ombudsmen and could not have been more helpful, but upon arriving for 
the interview I would realise that the ombudsmen in fact had no idea who I was and were not 
particularly interested in speaking to me. In one of these interviews the gatekeeper joined us 
for the duration and it was purely thanks to her enthusiasm for it to succeed and her 
prompting her superior that I was able to obtain some useful data from the interview. In the 
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other case the ombudsman proved to be very difficult to interview and was clearly more 
interested in quizzing me on my education and impressions of life in Russia. With these 
interviews there appeared to be some tension between the ombudsmen themselves, who were 
much older, had had lengthy careers during the Soviet period and seemed very aware of their 
relatively high status and somewhat suspicious of speaking to a foreign researcher, and their 
staff, who were younger and keen to interact with a foreign visitor and promote the work of 
their organisation. These staff showed great interest in my research and were anxious to 
ensure that I had access to any of their office’s reports or publications which might assist me. 
One of them also spontaneously invited me to a subsequent event organised by her office in 
Vyborg, a town approximately 2 hours from St Petersburg by train where the local human 
rights ombudsman was holding a reception for local people who wished to make a complaint 
concerning a violation of their rights. The event was open to the press but not the public so 
without her invitation I would not have known about or been able to attend the event, which 
proved to be valuable from a research perspective in seeing how the ombudsman interacted 
with the local community and the type of complaint people were bringing to him. 
 
3.7   The interview process and ethical issues 
Most of the interviews I conducted took place at the respondent’s place of work, although a 
few were conducted in cafes. In each case I asked the respondent to choose the location most 
convenient to them. Whereas in Brussels my respondents all had private offices and seemed 
familiar with the idea of taking part in a research interview, in Russia the interview location 
presented a number of practical and ethical challenges. Those conducted in workplaces were 
frequently interrupted by other colleagues entering the room or by telephone calls, and on one 
occasion I was required to conduct the entire interview in the presence of other colleagues 
who were not aware of my reasons for being there. Where the EU or Member State 
respondents were concerned, I reiterated the information about my role and the confidential 
nature of the interview and asked them to sign a form consenting to both the interview and 
the audio-recording of it. In almost all of these interviews my respondents seemed to expect 
to sign such a form and were keen to stress that their identities must not be traceable. While 
none of the members of staff working for the EU in Brussels whom I interviewed had any 
objections to the audio-recording, several of the Member State embassy staff in Moscow 
were not willing to have it recorded and thus I was forced to rely on note-taking during the 
interview. Where the Russian interviews were concerned, I felt that the use of formal consent 
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forms would be inappropriate given that it is not a common research practice in a post-Soviet 
setting and that it might create suspicion regarding the nature of my research. As a result, I 
received approval from my university ethics committee to rely on email consent for these 
interviews provided that my initial email set out all the main points of my research and the 
confidential nature of the interview. At the beginning of the interview I would reiterate the 
confidentiality aspect and ask for verbal consent to record the interview, to which none of my 
Russian respondents had any objection. 
 
Where the EU interviews were concerned, the interview process was somewhat formal and I 
was conscious of not taking up more than an hour of my respondents’ time given their 
obviously busy schedules – at times I would be informed at the start of the interview that they 
only had a very set amount of time to spare. At the same time, in many of these interviews I 
was treated as an equal and almost as an ‘expert’ on Russia given my previous experience of 
working with NGOs in Moscow and my knowledge of the language and political 
developments there, particularly in Brussels where the majority of respondents I spoke with 
were not Russia specialists and were often responsible for covering other countries in their 
work as well. Many of these respondents were very approving of my choice of research topic 
and expressed interest in hearing my conclusions once the thesis was finished. While several 
clearly had experience of participating in similar research interviews, others seemed flattered 
to be asked their opinion on various policies and expounded on their views at some length: 
one diplomat told me how much he had enjoyed the interview since ‘no one ever asks me my 
opinion, usually I’m the one asking others for theirs.’51 As Kvale (1983:179) points out, 
respondents can find the interview process to be a positive experience since ‘it is probably 
not a very common experience from everyday life that another person in an hour or more is 
only interested in, sensitive towards, and seeks to understand as well as possible one’s 
experience of a subject matter.’  
 
With the EU and Member State interviews I conducted in Russia I found it helpful to provide 
details of the work I had done for a major international human rights NGO in Moscow from 
2005 to 2006 since it helped to indicate my familiarity with the field, and the issues and 
personalities my respondents were dealing with in their work. Upon realising that we had 
both worked with some of the same organisations and human rights activists, several of my 
                                                          
51 Interview with John, EU Member State diplomat, Moscow, 18th April 2011 
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respondents took the opportunity to vent their frustrations at dealing with some of the more 
difficult personalities in the civil society sector in Russia and seemed to find it cathartic to 
express these frustrations without needing to worry about any potential impact on their 
position or reputation due to the confidential nature of the interview. In addition, my strategy 
of interviewing diplomats representing the same Member State at the country’s consulate in 
St Petersburg and embassy in Moscow generated some interesting data since representatives 
of the same country but working in different locations often had very different views on both 
their own country’s policy on human rights projects in Russia and on that of the EU. 
 
While my experience of conducting interviews with the Russian respondents was 
overwhelmingly positive, at the same time a number of very different issues arose. The 
interviews with the human rights ombudsmen and their staff tended to be more formal and I 
felt that I was not viewed as being on an equal footing due to my age and perceived lack of 
experience. This may be related to the fact that there is a general trend in Russian universities 
for PhD students to begin their degrees very soon after completing their undergraduate or 
Masters’ studies and so they tend to be fairly young. As a result, I felt that some respondents 
perceived me to be younger than in fact I was: several seemed surprised, for example, to learn 
that I had already had opportunities to teach, despite still being in the midst of my studies. 
One factor that was common in all of my interviews with Russian respondents was the level 
of interest in my background, my reasons for studying Russian language and politics, and my 
impressions of life in Russia. I frequently found myself being questioned, for example, on my 
favourite Russian authors and composers, or on which parts of the country I had travelled to. 
There is no question that my knowledge of the language was an enormous advantage. Many 
respondents seemed extremely gratified that I had spent a period of several years studying 
Russian and living in Russia, and the fact that they could speak freely with me and introduce 
me to their colleagues or take me to meetings in the knowledge that I could understand and 
communicate without assistance made for a much more relaxed and fruitful interview 
process. This corresponds with what Welch and Piekkari (2006:420) see as the ability of a 
shared language between interviewer and interviewee to ‘establish an atmosphere of rapport 
and trust that will allow interviewees to produce genuine and open responses.’  
 
At times, however, my identity as a Russian-speaking foreigner could bring certain 
disadvantages: whilst I felt it made respondents whom I sought to interview far more likely to 
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agree to an interview, it also meant that on occasion respondents would in fact not have much 
interest in my research or questions and simply wanted to meet me on a personal level out of 
curiosity. Another factor which arose in the Russian interviews and which I felt was 
particularly important was the idea of reciprocity. As Michailova (2004:369) points out, in 
the post-Soviet context ‘reciprocity is a vitally important feature of personal networking. One 
is viewed as untrustworthy in Russia if one refuses to return a favour and does not follow the 
reciprocity rule. Helping friends through connections is regarded as a pleasure by many 
Russians.’ Having conducted an interview with a respondent who had been particularly 
helpful, out of gratitude I often felt compelled to offer my services as a translator or editor of 
grant applications to those organisations that had few resources and no access to native 
speakers of English who could help them with their funding applications to international 
organisations. This offer was only occasionally taken up and, when it was, it in fact proved 
useful from a research point of view or interesting from a more personal point of view. At 
one point I was asked to interpret at a meeting between NGO staff and some international 
consultants who were interested in working on a project together, an occasion which gave me 
greater insight into the workings and objectives of the NGO.  
 
In another case I regularly edited grant applications for a well-known academic who had been 
extremely supportive throughout my time in St Petersburg in addition to agreeing to an 
interview and with whom I hope to work in the future. Another of my respondents who 
worked on social care issues asked me to attend a ‘coffee morning’ which she organised for 
various elderly local residents and to speak to those present about life in the UK and my 
impressions of Russia, an event which proved to be extremely enjoyable. At no point was I 
made to feel obliged to assist former respondents or to attend these events: such requests 
came only after I had already offered to help. I was, however, anxious to show my 
appreciation of the kindness I had been shown and at times developing these reciprocal 
relationships undoubtedly benefited my research since, as Krieger (1996) points out, data 
consists not just of interview notes but also of time spent participating in the community. The 
respondent who had organised the coffee morning later invited me to a meeting of the St 
Petersburg Human Rights Council and introduced me to her colleagues there – since this 
meeting is usually open only to members of the Council I would not otherwise have been able 
to attend. 
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3.8    The field diary 
Keeping a research diary while in the field can serve a number of useful purposes. Burgess 
(1981), for example, points to the diary’s ability to provide a substantive account of the 
interview process and related events; a methodological account of the approaches being used 
in the research; and an analytic account which focuses on the ideas and ‘hunches’ that the 
researcher may have while conducting their fieldwork. Throughout my fieldwork period I 
kept a research diary which was used for two purposes: to supplement the data generated by 
my interviews by recording my observations on the research setting and experience of 
conducting interviews, and to provide an outlet for expressing emotions about any problems 
or frustrations encountered during the research. In keeping such a diary I was attempting to 
be more reflective as a researcher and to provide some context to the interviews I was in the 
process of carrying out.  
 
Janesick (1999:521) argues that journal-writing functions as a powerful tool for reflecting on 
our own thoughts, beliefs and behaviours and those of our respondents since ‘the definitions 
of the roles of the researcher and the participants in a study are clarified through the reflection 
and the writing process...keeping a journal is a check and balance in the entire course of a 
qualitative research project.’ As a result, the diary offers a way to revisit and explore some of 
the tensions which arise in the course of the fieldwork. Although I did not add to this diary on 
a daily basis, the observations I made note of, particularly during my time in Russia, 
contributed to my understanding of the social and cultural context in which I was operating 
and complemented the other data being gathered and were particularly important during the 
period of post-fieldwork analysis described below. At the same time, this diary was only ever 
intended to act as a supplementary source of contextual information and an opportunity for 
reflection, rather than constituting an ethnographic research method in its own right. This 
conforms to the general purpose of this project, which was to carry out ethnographically-
informed qualitative research, rather than a full ethnography. 
 
3.9    Transcription, translation and post-fieldwork analysis 
Having conducted my interviews and, in most cases, having recorded them, I was faced with 
the practical issue of transcribing the recordings, which were in either English or Russian. 
Transcribing in one’s native language is, more often than not, a very time-consuming 
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process: according to Bryman (2008), one hour of recorded speech can take up to 5-6 hours 
to transcribe. Nevertheless, I decided to transcribe my 18 English-language interviews myself 
in order to avoid creating too much distance between myself and the data given the 
importance of the choices made by the transcriber in producing the final text. As Bucholtz 
(2000:14440) points out, ‘embedded in the details of transcription are indications of purpose, 
audience, and the position of the transcriber towards the text.’ Where the Russian-language 
interviews were concerned, however, I decided to ‘contract out’ the transcription to a Russian 
student at the European University at St Petersburg who applied for the work after a contact 
at the university kindly agreed to email the details to all of her graduate students. Although I 
had imagined it would be necessary to hire a number of students to carry out the work, in fact 
the first person I dealt with proved to be so efficient that I worked with her for the duration of 
my time in Russia. In order to maintain confidentiality each audio file was given a number 
but had no other identifying marker.  
 
Having a native speaker of Russian transcribe these interviews saved me an enormous 
amount of time and meant that as I arranged more interviews I could look back at the 
transcripts of those I had already done and refine my interview guide in the light of this. In 
some cases there were minor omissions in the transcripts or places where the name of an 
individual or organisation was not quite correct but I was able to rectify these minor issues by 
checking over the transcripts carefully and comparing them with the original recording. 
Following my return from fieldwork I found it useful to re-listen to my Russian-language 
interviews in order to ensure that I had correctly understood the points being made and to 
check once again that there were no omissions in the transcripts which I was using as the 
basis for my analysis. In terms of the approach I took to transcribing the interviews I had 
conducted in English, I took what Oliver et al (2005:1277) describe as a ‘denaturalized 
approach.’ This approach is less concerned with capturing specific features of language or 
expression such as accents or non-verbal communication and more to do with capturing the 
substance of the interview and ‘...the meanings and perceptions created and shared during a 
conversation.’  
 
In terms of translating these transcripts into English which was necessary both for analysis 
and to select which excerpts from the transcript would be reproduced in the text of the thesis, 
I conducted all the translation myself. Although I have many years’ experience of translating 
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from Russian to English and have been employed formally in this capacity, the translation 
process nevertheless always poses a number of dilemmas for the researcher, perhaps 
particularly where Russian is concerned. Müller (2007) and Bruno (1998) have both written 
of the difficulties in translating a language as rich as Russian, which often has many different 
words to express similar concepts, into English, which may have only one variant which does 
not fully convey the true sense of the original term used. Müller (2007: 207), for example, 
describes the problem of having several different Russian words (derzhava, vlast’ and sila) 
which can all be translated into English as ‘power,’ yet which all have quite different 
meanings, with derzhava referring to the state as a power, vlast’ denoting ‘a fusion of 
political power, state and territory,’ and sila referring to power as military strength. As a 
result, it is impossible to provide a completely accurate and true translation of a transcript or 
other text, particularly given that the social, political and cultural contexts in which both text 
and researcher are embedded also influence both the way in which concepts are expressed in 
the original language and how they are rendered in translation (Temple and Young 2004). In 
this sense Muller (2007:208) argues that the act of translation ‘assumes a political quality.’ In 
addition, by assuming responsibility for translating the words of their respondents, the 
‘active’ researcher also takes on the responsibility of trying to represent both the participants 
and their language (Temple and Young 2004). While there are no easy solutions to these 
dilemmas, having spent a period of many years engaging with Russian language, history, 
politics and culture I felt I was as well-placed as I could be to render the translation of my 
interviews in a sensitive and informed manner.  
 
3.10   Conclusions 
This chapter has aimed to provide a detailed account of the manner in which the fieldwork 
aspect of this research project was conducted, and to explore the use of the methods of 
qualitative methods such as semi-structured interviewing and discourse analysis in gathering 
and interpreting research data. It has also discussed the rationale behind the programme of 
fieldwork which was carried out and has sought to reflect on some of the practical and ethical 
challenges and dilemmas which arose during the process of engaging in fieldwork in two 
very different countries and frequently in a different language. In this way it has sought to 
convey that the choice of methods used and the role and experiences of the researcher have 
had a major influence on the way in which the data has been analysed and the manner in 
which the findings discussed in the following four chapters have been formulated.  
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Chapter 4 
Constructing Economic and Social Rights in the Russian Context: Conflicting, 
Contrasting or Coinciding Interpretations? 
 
4.1     Introduction 
The previous three chapters have explored the theoretical and contextual frameworks 
underpinning this study, and the methodological approach taken in terms of carrying out the 
research in question. This chapter aims to engage in more depth with some of the empirical 
findings generated by this research. It sets the scene for analysing the interaction between 
Russia and the EU on economic and social rights issues by examining the influence which 
Soviet conceptions of human rights continue to exert on contemporary understandings of 
rights in Russia. It then goes on to explore the way in which economic and social rights were 
conceptualised by the Russian respondents interviewed for this study52 and their perceptions 
of how important such rights are to the wider Russian public, before exploring the extent to 
which NGOs which continue to focus on civil and political rights issues have become 
marginalised as a result of this approach. This chapter will argue that, despite a widespread 
acknowledgement on the part of almost all the Russian respondents interviewed that 
economic and social rights are of far greater interest and importance to the general public, 
many of those engaged in human rights activism have difficulty conceptualising such rights 
or seeing them as issues which require more of their own or international attention. As a 
result, there is significant divergence between the rights and issues which human rights 
NGOs choose to focus on and those which appear to resonate with the public, leading to the 
increasing isolation of such NGOs both from mainstream public opinion and from more 
socially-oriented organisations in the civil society sector. 
4.2   The landscape of human rights protection in the Russian Federation 
Prior to engaging with the themes mentioned above, it is important to provide a brief 
overview of the different institutions in Russia which have responsibility for the protection 
and promotion of human rights. As mentioned in Chapter 1, in terms of international human 
rights treaties Russia is a signatory to the two main covenants of the UDHR (the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
                                                          
52 See Appendix 1 for the full list of respondents 
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and Cultural Rights) and to the ECHR and the European Social Charter. Russia’s membership 
of the Council of Europe also makes it subject to the rulings of the European Court of Human 
Rights (see Section 1.5). In addition, Russia’s Constitution has clearly-stated commitments to 
upholding a range of civil, political, economic and social rights.53 Chapter 3 outlined the civil 
society actors relevant to this study such as the small community of Russian human rights 
NGOs and those involved in more socially-oriented work, both of which will be returned to 
in this chapter, but there are also several domestic institutions tasked with involvement in 
human rights issues.  
 
The first of these is the Presidential Council for the Development of Civil Society and Human 
Rights,54 an advisory body which counts various NGO leaders and human rights activists 
among its number and meets with the President several times a year to discuss pertinent 
human rights issues. The second is the Public Chamber, another advisory body with a number 
of regional offshoots whose members are partially selected by the presidential administration 
and which is in theory designed to ‘…resolve the most important problems of economic and 
social development…and to defend the rights and freedoms of citizens of Russia,’55 although 
it has been heavily criticised for its lack of accountability and what is perceived to be its 
overly close relationship with the authorities (Richter 2009a). Finally, and most importantly 
for the purposes of this study, Russia has established the institutions of the human rights 
ombudsman and child human ombudsman, which exist at both federal and regional levels.  
 
The federal human rights ombudsman, whose office has been in existence in Russia since 
1993, is a state-funded institution designed to advise the Presidential Administration on 
human rights questions but it is also intended to act independently.56 The federal child human 
rights ombudsman57 has a slightly different status in that his office is incorporated within the 
structure of the Presidential Administration (interview with an advisor to a regional Child 
Human Rights Ombudsman). Both institutions respond to complaints of human rights 
                                                          
53 See Appendix 8 for the text of the relevant articles of the Russian Constitution 
54 www.president-sovet.ru  
55 ‘About the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation,’ available at www.oprf.ru/en/about  
56 www.ombudsmanrf.ru  
57 http://english.rfdeti.ru/  
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violations made by members of the public and by organisations, but also carry out their own 
research and publish regular reports on their activities.58 
The institutions of most relevance to the purposes of this study, however, are those of the 
regional human rights and child human rights ombudsmen since the NGO representatives and 
to some extent the EU Member State officials who were interviewed for this project were far 
more likely to have had contact with these bodies than with the higher-level federal 
ombudsmen. In addition, as Chapter 5 will explore in more detail, these regional officials 
tend to see themselves as intermediaries between the state and society and appear to see the 
focus of their work as relating directly to economic and social rights issues. They are also the 
only regional-level bodies with direct responsibility for human rights issues.  
 
The development of these two related institutions is a relatively recent phenomenon, dating 
from the late 1990s onwards (Glushkova 2006), and at present 63 of Russia’s 87 federal 
subjects have a human rights ombudsman and 74 regions have a child human rights 
ombudsman.59  In contrast to the federal-level ombudsmen, the status of the regional human 
rights and child human rights ombudsmen varies from region to region, as one respondent 
pointed out:  
Child human rights ombudsmen in the various Russian federal subjects don’t 
have a uniform status: in some places they sit within the structure of the local 
authority and duplicate the status of the federal [child human rights] ombudsman. 
There are also those ombudsmen who were given an independent status and they 
have the right to intervene in investigations, they are independent legal figures 
with their own budget and apparatus and they are independent of any political 
bias and so on. (Sergey, advisor to a regional child human rights ombudsman) 
In terms of their appointment, the regional human rights ombudsmen are approved by the 
region’s local legislature, while for child human rights ombudsmen they can be appointed by 
the legislature or by the local governor, in which case they are included in the executive 
                                                          
58 See for example ‘Dokladi,’ Upolnomochenniy po pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi Federatsii,’ available at 
http://ombudsmanrf.org/doklady and ‘Dokladi,’ Ypolnomochenniy pri Presidentoi Rossiiskoi Federatsii po 
pravam rebyenka, available at http://www.rfdeti.ru/files.php?id=32  
59 ‘Ombudsmeni obsudyat zlobodneviye temi v sfere zashiti detstva,’ Prava cheloveka v Rossii [Human Rights 
in Russia], 10 October 2012, available at http://www.hro.org/print/12020; Stanovlenoye instituta 
Upolnomochenniye po pravam chekoveka,’ Official site of the Human Rights Ombudsman in the Russian 
Federation, available at http://ombudsmanrf.org/2009-11-02-08-43-32/2009-11-19-08-09-17.html  
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system (Roudik 2007). Similarly to the federal-level ombudsmen, the regional ombudsmen 
are expected to deal with individual and collective complaints concerning rights violations by 
the local authorities, monitor the human rights situation in their region and cooperate with 
local bodies such as the prosecutor’s office and the courts (Gradskova 2012). While these 
ombudsmen frequently interact with local NGOs of the type this study focuses on, Chapter 5 
will discuss the often complicated and contested nature of this interaction. 
4.3   The Soviet context to economic and social rights and public perceptions of 
‘human rights’ 
Chapter 1 outlined some of the ways in which the Soviet approach to human rights which 
emphasised the primacy of economic and social rights over civil and political rights claims 
influenced and arguably continues to influence contemporary understandings of human rights 
in Russia. This chapter explores this influence in greater depth since the Soviet concept of 
human rights appears to remain powerful not only in terms of how the Russian respondents 
involved in this study interpreted the meaning and significance of economic and social rights, 
but also in terms of how it seems to shape the activity and perceptions of those Russian 
NGOs which identify themselves specifically as human rights organisations. This is 
important within the context of this study since, as will be explored in more detail in Chapter 
7, it is precisely these organisations which appear to have the closest links to the EU amongst 
Russian civil society organisations and which receive a significant proportion of the funding 
it has available for civil society projects in Russia. As this study will argue, however, such 
groups have become increasingly marginalised in terms of public support and domestic 
political impact. 
 
In terms of how ‘human rights’ were conceptualised on an official level during the Soviet 
period, it has become common amongst ‘Western’ scholars to assert that the concept of rights 
was one which was alien to the Soviet Union and its citizens until the Brezhnev era (Betts 
2012). Thomas (2005: 117), for example, argues that ‘ideas of human rights have a long 
pedigree in Enlightenment and liberal thought, but they did not become salient within the 
countries of the Communist bloc, or within East-West relations, until the 1970s.’ Smith 
(2012), however, contends that basic economic and social rights such as the right to work and 
social security were in fact conceived of as rights in the Soviet Union as early as the 
constitution of 1918, although it was only in the period following Stalin’s death in 1953 that 
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such rights came to be realised in practice under Krushchev and Brezhnev. As a result, ‘a 
system of social rights was inherent to Soviet life’ (Smith 2012:386). This system continued 
to be codified on an official level during the later Soviet period: both Hawkesworth (1980) 
and Sajo (1996) have highlighted the primacy of economic and social rights such as the right 
to labour, healthcare, housing, education and social security in the Soviet Constitution of 
1977, with civil and political rights listed only after these rights and contingent upon them. 
According to Sajo (1996: 141), under the Soviet legal system economic and social rights 
were seen as ‘a precondition for the enjoyment of more traditional rights like free speech or 
freedom of beliefs,’ while Hawkesworth (1980:72) argues that, according to Marxist-Leninist 
doctrine, some rights were ‘clearly more important than others for the promotion of human 
well-being. The rights to food, clothing, shelter, work, rest, and education constitute[d] a 
hierarchy of rights which socialism must advance and protect.'  
 
The practical implementation of such rights was undoubtedly flawed in many respects. Betts 
(2012: 409) points out that the provision of such rights was highly dependent on the extent to 
which a Soviet citizen was seen to be ‘engaged, productive and cooperative,’ while Sajo 
(1996) argues that the system of social services which was intended to implement these rights 
was provided on a discretionary basis and in return for loyalty to the state. Nevertheless, the 
existence of an extensive official discourse on economic and social rights demonstrates that 
there was in fact a longstanding conception of ‘human rights’ in the Soviet Union which, 
while quite different from Thomas’ ‘liberal’ conception of human rights, nevertheless 
preceded the creation of the key instruments of international human rights law such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and the European Convention on Human 
Rights of 1950. Yet, as Betts (2012:407) points out, Western scholars tend to analyse human 
rights in the Soviet Union in terms of how they measure up to ‘Western liberal 
understandings of these rights ideals’ rather than being interpreted in their own context as a 
particular understanding of human rights.  
 
Smith (2012) also points to the widely-held misconception that the discourse of human rights 
was imposed on the Soviet Union in the 1970s by international conventions such as the 
Helsinki Final Act of 197560 and internal pressure from the small dissident movement. As 
                                                          
60 This act was signed by 35 member states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (now the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) including the USSR and committed the signatories to, 
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Smith points out, this stance was in some ways perpetuated by the approach taken by these 
dissidents, who included human rights activists such as Lyudmila Alexeyeva61 and Lev 
Ponomarev62 who remain active in the contemporary Russian human rights movement. These 
activists sought to promote the civil and political rights which were then being denied in the 
Soviet Union and to hold the Soviet authorities to the commitments to upholding these rights 
made in the Soviet constitution and in the Helsinki Final Act. They demonstrated little 
interest in those economic and social rights which, while imperfectly implemented, were 
nevertheless promoted on an official level. At the same time, they increasingly looked to the 
West for support for their cause and were successful in attracting the attention of the 
international press to their struggle and in establishing solid relationships with Western 
human rights groups (Dean 1980b). In this way ‘the tone of dissidence...was set by 
intellectuals with left-liberal, Western-oriented views’ (Smolar 1996:32) who saw themselves 
as part of the intelligentsia and as continuing a long tradition of Russian liberal dissent and 
criticism of the authorities going back to the late 19th century (Lipset and Dobson 1972; 
Horvath 2005).63 As will be discussed below, this is a pattern which has to some extent 
continued in the contemporary period in terms of the approach taken by various Russian 
human rights NGOs.  
 
The Russian respondents interviewed as part of this study represented a range of different 
organisations and interests and included representatives of human rights NGOs; those 
engaged in more socially-oriented work such as assisting children, the elderly or the disabled; 
academics; and regional human rights ombudsmen and their advisors. Yet they demonstrated 
a considerable degree of consensus in their views on the influence that the legacy of the 
Soviet definition of human rights continued to exert on public understandings of rights and on 
the modus operandi of those human rights organisations established and frequently still run 
by former Soviet-era dissidents.  Several pointed, for example, to what they saw as the more 
‘collective’ nature of Russian society and the enduring influence of the Soviet emphasis on 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
amongst other things, ‘respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.’ For further details see ‘Helsinki 
Final Act signed by 35 participating states, OSCE, available at http://www.osce.org/mc/58376  
61 Alexeyeva is head of the Moscow Helsinki Group NGO and lived in exile in the US between 1977 and 1989 
(www.mhg.ru). 
62 Ponomarev was one of the founders of the Memorial human rights NGO in the late 1980s and now heads the 
‘For Human Rights’ (Za prava cheloveka) NGO (www.zaprava.ru)  
63 It is worth noting that the Soviet dissident movement was not a homogenous group of activists but rather 
brought together supporters of various ideologies including Marxism-Leninism, Christianity and liberalism 
under the banner of a ‘Democratic Movement’ committed to the rule of law and the observance of basic human 
rights (Lipset and Dobson 1972; Keep 1971). 
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economic and social rights on contemporary values and conceptions of rights: 
 
Here we have above all the idea of a collective society, whether that be the state, 
society, in Soviet times it was the party, and as a result values such as solidarity, 
collectivism and so on – if the Western European tradition is characterised above 
all by the priority given to individual rights and freedoms, then in the Russian 
tradition, and this was defined and upheld particularly clearly during the Soviet 
period, social and economic rights take precedence. (Pavel, academic, St 
Petersburg) 
This idea of a historic gap between Russian and ‘Western’ concepts of human rights and their 
differing emphases on group and individual rights was also expressed by another respondent, 
an academic specialising in law: 
The public’s awareness of the law undoubtedly favours social and economic 
guarantees rather than the legal culture of individual rights which is 
characteristic of the West. (Andrey, academic, St Petersburg) 
According to Ordzhonikdze (2008:20), ‘for the most part, when Russians think about ‘human 
rights’ they have in mind a paternalistic state’s guarantees ensuring the life of an individual, 
his work and the pay that he receives for his work, his education, medical treatment, social 
security and so on.’ The most recent Russian Constitution of 2008 appears to uphold these 
guarantees while also outlining the protection of the ‘rights and freedoms of man and the 
citizen’ which cover civil and political rights such as the right to life and freedom of speech. 
It proclaims that Russia is, 
 ...a social State whose policy is aimed at creating conditions for a worthy life and 
the unhindered development of man... the labour and health of people shall be 
protected, guaranteed minimum wages and salaries shall be established, state 
support ensured for the family, maternity, paternity and childhood, for disabled 
persons and the elderly, a system of social services developed, state pensions, 
allowances and other social security guarantees shall be established.64 
                                                          
64 See Appendix 8 for the text of the relevant Article of the Russian Constitution.  
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In terms of public opinion, survey data from 2010 appears to indicate that economic and 
social rights are indeed held to be the most important rights claims and at the same time the 
most at risk in the eyes of the public. A survey conducted by the Russian Public Opinion 
Research Center (VTsIOM) in December 2010 asked respondents ‘which fundamental rights 
and freedoms proclaimed in the Constitution are violated most often in our country?’  A total 
of 38% felt that the right to health protection was the most frequently violated, with 35% 
citing the right to housing and 32% the right to education. A further 21% highlighted the right 
to leisure and 20% to the right to social security. Only 19% pointed to violations of the right 
to freedom and security of the person, 18% to the right to life, and 14% to freedom of thought 
and expression. When asked which categories of the population suffered the most frequent 
rights violations, respondents identified orphans (39%), the disabled (35%) and the elderly 
(31%) as the most likely to have their rights violated.65  
 
Similar data gathered by the Levada Center in October 2010 asked respondents to rank 
various rights in their perceived order of importance: 69% cited the right to free education, 
medical assistance and social security in sickness and old age, while 57% pointed to the right 
to life as the most important. The right to well-paid work in one’s discipline (50%) and the 
right to a state-guaranteed minimum level of subsistence (36%) came ahead of freedom of 
speech (34%) and freedom of information (22%).66  
 
This data indicates that there is in fact a significant degree of awareness of the existence and 
importance of certain civil and political rights, and this awareness may increase given the 
wave of political protests against elections which were believed to be fraudulent which took 
place across Russia in late 2011 and early 2012, although this is very hard to predict.67 To 
some extent this challenges the concept of cultural relativism expounded by theorists such as 
Pollis (2008) and Inoue (2003), who argue that civil and political rights issues are a feature of 
‘Western’ political culture only. Yet it also indicates that economic and social rights and 
                                                          
65   ‘Press Release No.1648: Whose Rights and Which Rights Are Being Violated Today?’ [ in Russian], 
VTsIOM, 10 December 2010, available at http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=459&uid=111158 
66 ‘Which human rights are, in your opinion, the most important?’ [in Russian], Levada Center, 8 September 
2011, available at http://www.levada.ru/archive/prava-cheloveka/kakie-iz-prav-cheloveka-po-vashemu-
mneniyu-naibolee-vazhny-otvety-ranzhirova  
67 See for example BBC News, ‘Moscow protest: Thousands rally against Vladimir Putin,’ 25 December 2011, 
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16324644; RIA Novosti, ‘Russians Rally as Putin Hints 
Reforms, Warns of Regime Change,’ 4 February 2012, available at 
http://en.rian.ru/society/20120204/171125937.html  
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violations of such rights are, at least at present, perceived as being of more immediate 
concern to the public at large.  
 
In addition, issues connected to economic and social rights also have the ability to cause 
large-scale protests. Perhaps the best-known example is those which took place in early 2005 
when hundreds of thousands across the country protested following an attempt by the 
government to replace l’goty, or in-kind benefits, such as free transport and subsidised 
housing and medicines which were paid to certain specific categories of citizen such as 
pensioners, war veterans and the disabled with lower-value cash payments (Buckley and 
Ostrovsky 2005; Wengle and Rasell 2008). More recently in September 2012 and January 
2013 there were protests in several Russian towns and cities following announcements that 
first the federal authorities and then the regional authorities planned to increase the cost of 
housing services and public utilities [zhilishno-kommunalnoye khozaistvo or ZhKKh] which 
are payable by all residents but have been heavily subsidised by the state since the Soviet 
period, although the level of subsidy varies between regions.68 As one regional publication 
pointed out, this increase was likely to have the most impact on pensioners and those on low 
incomes since increases in utility tariffs have outstripped increases in wages and pensions 
over the past nine years.69 Although President Putin responded to the outcry by insisting that 
any increase in the tariff must be ‘socially fair,’70 housing and utilities are now the main issue 
of concern for Russians, with 58% of respondents choosing these issues followed by low 
living standards (51%) and corruption (50%).71  
 
There is also some evidence of citizens using the courts in an attempt to challenge perceived 
infringements of their economic and social rights such as the ‘monetization’ of in-kind 
benefits mentioned above. According to Chandler (2013), who has examined 97 cases 
concerning social welfare issues brought mostly by individuals at Russia’s Constitutional 
Court between 1992 and 2009, the majority of these cases invoked the constitutional right to 
                                                          
68 ‘Politika: Rossiyane vyshli na ulitsi protestovat’ protiv rosta tarifov ZhKKh,’ Argument i Fakti, 22nd 
September 2012, available at http://www.aif.ru/society/news/211959 [accessed 14th March 2013] 
69 ‘Vserossiiskaya aktsiya protesta protiv rosta tarifov na uslugi ZhKKh proshla v Irkutske,’ Gazeta Irkutsk, 22nd 
September 2012, available at http://www.gazetairkutsk.ru/2012/09/22/id61824/ [accessed 14th March 2013] 
70 ‘Putina shokirovali dannymi o roste tarifov ZhKKh v regionakh: “s uma soshli, chto li,?’ Newsru.com, 25th 
February 2013, available at http://realty.newsru.com/article/25Feb2013/putin_shok [accessed 15th March 2013] 
71 ‘Housing Problems Bother Russians Most – Poll,’ RIA Novosti, 9th January 2013, available at 
http://rianovosti.com/russia/20130109/178661238.html [accessed 15th March 2013]  
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social protection72 and over a quarter related to the 2004 monetization law, thus constituting 
what Chandler (2013:9) claims is a ‘peaceful, constitutional form of protest’ against 
unpopular welfare reform measures. All of this indicates both a high level of awareness of 
economic and social rights and a deep sense of insecurity about the extent to which they are 
being upheld in contemporary Russian society. 
 
One respondent who took part in my own study expressed the view that, rather than being 
caused by any great feeling of ‘collective solidarity’ in Russian society, this ongoing concern 
with economic and social rights issues was in fact linked both to age and to a sense of 
individualism whereby people only became interested in such issues when they had a direct 
impact on their own lives: 
 
The older generation only start to see all of these social problems as civic 
problems when they start to impinge on their own interests. That means that in 
terms of the wider political situation they don’t feel affected by them. But when 
their home is taken away from them, or something is taken away from their 
children or grandchildren, that’s when they start to engage in personal activism. 
(Anya, NGO manager, St Petersburg) 
Another respondent who was Russian but worked for an EU Member State consulate saw the 
level of interest in economic and social issues more positively as a spur for greater civic, as 
opposed to individualist, activism. She argued that, while people were largely indifferent to 
the work of those Russian human rights NGOs which focused predominantly on civil and 
political rights campaigns, they were far more likely to get involved in volunteering for 
various social causes and organisations: 
Not many young people get involved with the human rights defenders – they are 
indifferent for various reasons. There is definitely more public support for social 
rights issues than traditional human rights issues. Even in the big cities people 
feel social problems are closer to their own lives - health, children and so on - so 
more people volunteer for these issues. (Katya, EU Member State diplomat) 
                                                          
72 See Appendix 8 for the relevant articles of the Russian Constitution 
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Another respondent also pointed to the growing popularity of grassroots activist groups 
which tend to coalesce around a single social issue or campaign: 
There are people who come together to defend their social rights - people who 
took part in the Chernobyl clean-up and other victims of Chernobyl, army 
servicemen who have not been given proper housing. But one has to be aware 
that their aims are very limited. They don’t as a rule see their situation as the 
result of some systemic breakdown or failure and they tend not to insist on 
systemic or institutional changes – they are only demanding a very localised form 
of redress for the violation of their rights. (Andrey, academic, St Petersburg) 
These views on public awareness of social and economic rights issues raise the question of 
the extent to which the wider public is better able to engage with economic and social rights 
issues which can be related to the more concrete realities of everyday life, as opposed to the 
perhaps more distant and obscure issues pursued by human rights NGOs which are 
nevertheless the most integrated into a civil society network which encompasses international 
donors such as the EU and its individual Member States (Klitsounova 2008). As will be 
argued below, many respondents felt this had a major impact on the way in which such 
NGOs are perceived by others within the NGO community and by the public at large as it has 
implications for the degree of public support and interest which these NGOs are able to 
command.  
4.4    Civil society actors and contemporary constructions of economic and social 
rights 
Having explored the issue of public support for, and interest in, economic and social rights 
issues, attention now turns to one of the key aims of this study, which was to ascertain how 
the different groups of Russian respondents who were interviewed themselves conceptualised 
these rights (see Appendix One for a list of interviews conducted). A number of interviews 
were conducted with representatives of Russian NGOs which identify themselves as 
engaging in human rights activism and which often had substantial experience of working 
with international donors such as the EU and US government agencies and foundations such 
as USAID.  
 
These respondents expressed a range of opinions which indicated that, rather than subscribing 
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to a broadly similar definition of what economic and social rights mean and of their 
significance, or lack of it, they in fact conceptualised economic and social rights in very 
different ways. This was despite the fact that they engaged in quite similar and frequently 
overlapping activism in support of what they defined as ‘human rights’ issues which tended 
to concentrate on the civil and the political such as freedom of assembly or the prevention of 
torture, and that they were frequently acquaintances in the close-knit Russian human rights 
community. They also acknowledged that economic and social rights were far more 
prominent in the public eye than the more ‘liberal’ concepts of civil and political rights which 
they were engaged in promoting. Yet, as will be discussed below, this acknowledgement was 
on occasion tinged with a hint of disdain for the Russian public and their seeming lack of 
understanding of what ‘real’ human rights should mean.  
 
One respondent, a veteran human rights activist from St Petersburg who has been a 
prominent figure in local civil society since the early 1990s, began by talking at great length 
about the various human rights problems she and her colleagues worked on, all of which 
related to aspects of civil and political rights issues such as the right to hold demonstrations 
and the need to improve prison conditions. When, however, she eventually turned to the issue 
of economic and social rights, she revealed a strong view on the meaning and importance of 
such rights: 
 
As far as social rights are concerned…in areas such as pensions, education 
services, medical services, social and cultural services etc – the fact is that the 
word ‘guarantee’ has been replaced with the word ‘assistance’ – and these are 
completely different things. So that’s a human rights violation. Before you start 
speaking about civil rights you need to feed the population and social rights are 
more important. You have to start with social rights, the right to work, the right to 
life, the right to a decent standard of living and so on. Civil rights will only 
appear in a society which has already realised social rights. (Nadya, human rights 
activist, St Petersburg) 
This view that the former system of social rights guaranteed by the state have been replaced 
by a far more conditional and uncertain system of social ‘assistance’ reflects some of the 
issues first raised in Sections 1.7 and 1.8 concerning the re-imagining of the role of the state 
in relation to economic and social rights and the extent to which such rights have lost some 
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of their power as moral entitlements in the context of contemporary neoliberalism and 
austerity. It also indicates that these issues resonate in a Russian as well as an EU context, 
despite the fact that, as mentioned above, the Russian Constitution in theory makes an 
unequivocal commitment to upholding various social ‘guarantees.’  The idea that the system 
of welfare provision in Russia has moved from one of rights entitlements to ‘handouts’ is 
one that appears to be shared by another veteran human rights activist, Lev Ponomarev, head 
of the ‘For Human Rights’ [Za prava cheloveka] NGO. In a recent commentary on ‘the 
destruction of the social state in the Russian Federation,’ he claimed that, 
At the moment Russia has a system of distributing socio-economic handouts and 
benefits, but there are no guaranteed rights. Neither decent medical care, nor 
education, nor a roof over one’s head are guaranteed...There are no reliable 
democratic mechanisms for defending social rights. (Ponomarev 2013) 
This indicates that some of the more experienced human rights activists have a very clear-
sighted view of the nature of economic and social rights and the extent to which they are 
currently being compromised in the contemporary Russian context. Despite her strong stance 
on the meaning and importance of economic and social rights, however, Nadya’s position 
encapsulated a possible contradiction which also came to light during other interviews with 
longstanding human rights activists, many of whom were friends and colleagues of hers: 
namely, that they acknowledged explicitly that the bulk of their work concentrated on issues 
and campaigns which were of little or no interest to the general public. Nevertheless, the idea 
that the implementation of social rights either preceded or should precede civil and political 
rights was also expressed by another human rights activist who was not part of the former 
‘dissident’ generation and was working in a very different location – the town of Ryazan near 
Moscow: 
It’s more important to resolve everyday problems. The most important social 
issue is the right to housing. This affects the disabled, orphans, the poor...it’s very 
important to them that this problem is resolved, they won’t think about civil or 
political rights until they have a roof over their heads. (Dmitriy, human rights 
activist, Ryazan) 
Such an understanding of the positioning of economic and social rights stands in stark 
contrast to the neoliberal concept of human rights outlined in Chapter 1 which only 
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encompasses the civil and political rights of the individual (Falk 2008). By arguing that 
economic and social rights must precede civil and political rights, it also challenges the 
influential characterisation of human rights first articulated by Vasak (1977) as developing in 
three consecutive ‘generations.’ This included the first generation of civil and political rights 
from the 18th century onwards; the second generation of economic and social rights which 
began to be articulated in the late 19th and early 20th centuries; and the third generation of 
rights such as the right to development and self-determination of the late 20th century. Yet it 
is a position which is in many respects much more in tune with the previously mentioned 
Soviet-era ‘culture of rights’ which emphasised the importance of economic and social rights, 
although certainly neither of these human rights activists would have wished to deny the 
importance of civil and political rights and indeed much of their work focused on these 
particular rights. As with the organisation Nadya represented, the NGO Dmitriy worked for 
had previously focused exclusively on more ‘liberal’ human rights issues such as freedom of 
speech but had been working since 2009 on a project aimed at upholding the right to state-
subsidised housing for teenagers leaving the care system and to respite care for children with 
disabilities. The organisation also stood out amongst the human rights NGOs contacted for 
this study since in its publicity materials it declared its work in the area of defending orphans’ 
and invalids’ rights to be part of its ‘strategic human rights work,’ thus making it clear that 
for them these issues constituted part of the broader concept of ‘human rights.’ As Dmitriy’s 
colleague pointed out, this approach had led to a change in the way their organisation was 
perceived by the public: 
When the human rights that we promote remain abstract in the public sphere we 
get a lot of criticism accusing us of taking American money, of not understanding 
anything, of engaging in politics – they [the public] do nothing but criticise us. 
But when we changed our strategy and started to talk in more concrete terms 
about problems which apply to people more broadly, within six months the 
criticism of us had virtually stopped. (Tanya, human rights activist, Ryazan) 
This again raises the idea of a distinction between ‘abstract’ human rights and what Dmitriy 
called the ‘everyday’ problems which mean that ‘economic and social rights are closer to 
people.’ In addition, some respondents representing human rights NGOs were quick to 
identify specific violations of social and economic rights which they believed to be a problem 
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in contemporary Russian society, with the issue of the low rate of the state pension being 
perhaps the most prominent: 
Violations of social rights are happening not just at the municipal level, they’re 
happening all over the country. This is connected above all with pension reform, 
up until now the pensions we’ve had have been so small that they barely meet the 
minimum level of subsistence, which for us is 5,500 Rubles, so $200. That’s the 
level of subsistence. And that’s it. And you have to dress and feed yourself and 
pay for communal housing services and utilities with this. (Nadya, human rights 
activist, St Petersburg) 
If we’re talking about economic rights, then in actual fact pensions in Russia are 
not very big, at the moment we have a minimum pension of around 6,000 Rubles, 
so very little, and the maximum is around 25,000 Rubles but that’s only for 
disabled army veterans who are aged over 80 and, of course, for state officials – 
they retire early and have very good pensions. So all the rest, that is the majority, 
get $200-250. And at the same time we have very high rates for communal 
housing services and utilities. So the elderly are living in dire poverty. (Svetlana, 
human rights activist, St Petersburg) 
One of these respondents also identified the issue of labour rights and the right to form and 
join a trade union as a major problem and something which her organisation had recently 
come to focus on: 
Last year one of our main projects was protecting the rights of trade unions. This 
is a very serious matter because we have this so-called Trade Union of the 
Russian Federation which has been completely absorbed into the existing power 
structure and so I personally wouldn’t describe them as people who are really 
battling for their members’ labour rights. So other trade unions have been quietly 
springing up, they have the right to exist but unfortunately they are not part of this 
official union. These new unions need legal assistance and protection for their 
leaders, who are subjected to physical threats. (Nadya, human rights activist, St 
Petersburg) 
Overall, then, it appears that even those activists who have spent the bulk of their 
professional work engaged in projects promoting civil and political rights issues had a clear 
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understanding of what economic and social rights meant, were able to acknowledge their 
importance to the wider public in Russia, and could point to clear examples of violations of 
these rights. Not all the respondents from this type of organisation, however, held this view.  
Some maintained that social and economic rights were not on a par with civil and political 
rights, a view in line with that expressed by Cranston (1983), whereby economic and social 
rights are not seen as universal rights because they do not pertain to every human being, but 
rather are rights belonging to certain groups of people such as workers who pay in to social 
security systems. As a result, these rights become ‘earned or acquired’ rights as opposed to 
the individual and universal right to life and liberty: 
The government can hand out a big pension or a small pension, that’s its choice, 
but this does not make it an inalienable right like the right to life, the right not to 
be tortured or the right to a private life. (Sergey, human rights activist, Nizhniy 
Novgorod) 
This same respondent and several others expressed frustration with, or even contempt for, the 
supposed failure of the Russian people to understand what human rights ‘really’ mean. 
According to Sergey, who represented a human rights NGO which has worked on numerous 
projects with international donors: 
People [in Russia] don’t understand what human rights are, and at times human 
rights depend on how socially useful they are to people.  With human rights 
everyone has them equally, a citizen can be socially useful or socially harmful but 
regardless of this he is still a person and there is a certain fundamental basis 
which cannot be violated. But people don’t understand this, and it hasn’t become 
a value which they hold. Bad people must be beaten, bad people must be killed. 
That’s the understanding of human rights. (Sergey, human rights activist, Nizhniy 
Novgorod) 
Another respondent also expressed disdain for what she called the ‘Russian mentality’ and 
the public’s failure to understand the ‘real’ meaning of human rights: 
Old people live in dire poverty. But they still support the authorities and vote for 
them every time, they’re given presents before the elections. But then that’s the 
mentality of an old person used to Soviet times, unfortunately. In Soviet times we 
didn’t have any human rights, and now I think many people don’t understand 
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what human rights mean. And then of course you have the Russian mentality – to 
hope for a tsar-figure, for a ruler of some kind. (Svetlana, human rights activist, 
St Petersburg) 
This view coincides with the previously mentioned assumption that the idea of ‘human 
rights’ was alien to the Soviet system. It also indicates that for some human rights activists 
there is a very clear and strict definition of human rights which is confined to the civil and 
political and which does not include more ‘mundane’ but widely-felt issues relating to 
people’s standard of living. It thus seems clear that there is to some extent a lack of consensus 
amongst what some respondents called the ‘old-school,’ dissident-led human rights 
organisations over the meaning of social and economic rights and, even though almost all 
acknowledged that such ‘everyday’ rights were of greater interest to the public, not all saw 
this as a positive or desirable situation. Even where such organisations were able to pinpoint 
concrete violations of social or economic rights and were engaged to some degree in 
addressing such violations, the vast majority of their work continued to focus on more 
‘liberal’ rights issues.  
 
Despite Nadya’s apparent conviction that social and economic rights were of the utmost 
importance and her work on trade union rights, it is worth noting that in the annual report for 
2010 compiled by the organisation she is chiefly involved with, the St Petersburg Human 
Rights Council, the vast majority of the report focuses on issues relating to violations of the 
right to life, media freedom and human dignity, with the only issue mentioned which relates 
to economic and social rights being ‘the right to social security,’ which is relegated to a small 
section at the report’s end.73 The Council’s report for 2011, which is the most recent 
available, makes no mention of economic or social rights issues whatsoever.74 Where the 
human rights NGO in Ryazan is concerned, much of its work related to conducting historical 
research on victims of the Stalinist repression in Russia, and there appeared to be a lack of 
consensus between the two colleagues interviewed over the importance of their work on 
social rights. While Dmitry was directly involved in this project and keen to highlight its 
importance, Tanya did not seem very interested in discussing it and preferred talking about 
the work she had done on issues such as media freedom with their international partners.  
                                                          
73 ‘Doklad o polozhenii del c pravami cheloveka v Sankt-Peterburge v 2010 godu’ [in Russian], St Petersburg 
Human Rights Council 2011, http://www.hrcspb.ru/UserFiles/File/pravo_2010_int_2.pdf 
74 ‘Doklad o polozhenii del c pravami cheloveka v Sankt-Peterburge v 2011 godu’ [in Russian], St Petersburg 
Human Rights Council 2012, available at http://www.hrcspb.ru/page/page16.html  
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4.5   Human rights NGOs: consigned to the margins? 
This leads to an issue which was raised time and again by a range of representatives of more 
socially-oriented NGOs, academia and even some human rights NGOs themselves, namely 
the idea that the ‘old-school’ human rights NGOs of the kind represented in this study had 
become increasingly isolated and alienated from society at large in part due to their decision, 
or at least their perceived decision, to focus on more ‘abstract’ civil and political rights issues 
over those connected to economic and social rights. This issue merits further examination 
since, as Chapter 7 will discuss in more detail, such NGOs continue to dominate EU lobbying 
and funding networks yet appear to have largely failed to engage the public’s attention 
(Klitsounova 2008). A number of respondents highlighted the legacy of the involvement of 
many veteran human rights activists in the Soviet-era dissident movement, pointing to how 
this has influenced both their understandings of what human rights stand for and their 
approach towards pursuing their goals in the post-Soviet period.  One respondent argued that 
social rights had become discredited in the eyes of some of these human rights activists due 
to their perceived links to the Soviet regime, leading to divisions between those civil society 
actors working on civil and political rights campaigns and those involved in more socially-
oriented work:  
Social rights are still seen as being left-wing or Communist. That’s been the 
agenda since the Cold War, when it was based on bourgeois rights as being 
liberal and Soviet rights as being economic. And it’s stayed that way ever since. 
When people start working on social and economic rights...this division is 
damaging. There’s no need to separate them in this way, it does no good if you 
do, but nevertheless people, including human rights activists, continue to do so. 
(Pavel, academic, St Petersburg) 
This links back to an issue first raised in Chapter 1, namely the idea that economic and social 
rights are frequently seen as more ‘politicized’ than civil and political rights and that their 
association with left-wing ideologies is sometimes used as an argument against their 
universal applicability. In the Russian context, given the primacy of economic and social 
rights and the role of the state in the official Soviet discourse on ‘rights,’ it is perhaps hardly 
surprising that, as previously mentioned, during the late Soviet and post-Soviet period human 
rights activists adopted and to a large extent have continued to adopt a more classically 
‘liberal’ discourse of human rights which sees the role of the state as more limited in relation 
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to human rights.  
 
In addition, Lipset and Dobson (1972:152) point out that this particular group of activists 
came to see themselves as being both ‘the conscience of the nation’ and as constituting an 
educated elite which was isolated within society during the late Soviet period, thus setting 
themselves both apart from and, in some respects, above the rest of society. Mendelson and 
Gerber (2007:51) argue that this elitist approach has continued well into the post-Soviet 
period and claim that post-Soviet human rights groups target ‘…their own group members, 
not potentially sympathetic constituents who might be mobilized. Purity and principle take 
precedence over strategy and action.’ Often, however, keeping to this approach was seen by 
those operating outside the close-knit community of human rights NGOs as having negative 
consequences for their ability to connect with the public in the contemporary context and to 
understand the public’s conception of rights, particularly when combined with the fact that 
many of these former dissidents were perceived as continuing to form some sort of exclusive 
clique. According to one respondent, for example, who ran a much more socially-oriented 
NGO working on children’s welfare issues: 
It’s the old Sakharov75 band, they all know each other and they’ve all known each 
other for hundreds of years. Part of it is the way that rights discourse is used here 
and so much of it comes out of that old school, the language and the actions of the 
dissidents fighting against the big power, but that big power is no longer there. 
And no matter what you think about Putin he is not the Soviet Union, he is not 
the Communist Party, he is not all of that old stuff. They’re incredibly defensive, 
very ‘why can’t you understand?’ and it’s partly because the world has changed 
and they haven’t, that’s what it is unfortunately, and maybe what they do and the 
way they do it just isn’t needed any more. (Nadezhda, children’s charity manager, 
St Petersburg) 
As Chapters 5 and 7 will examine in more detail, there was a clear perception amongst 
respondents representing more socially-oriented NGOs of the type Nadezhda worked for that, 
while the ‘old-school’ human rights activists spent their time railing against the authorities 
                                                          
75 Andrei Sakharov was a leading Soviet dissident and human rights activist who in 1975 was awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize. See for example ‘Personality and Destiny of Andrei Sakharov,’ The Andrei Sakharov 
Museum and Public Center, http://www.sakharov-center.ru/museum/expositions/english/sakharov-personality-
destiny/  
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but garnering little public or media attention, they simply ‘got on with things’ in terms of 
trying to meet the needs of those they were committed to supporting. The idea that a large 
part of the problem for these human rights activists was the type of rights discourse they 
employed was one which was shared by a number of other respondents, including one who 
was well-acquainted with several prominent human rights activists in St Petersburg and 
elsewhere: 
Human rights activists and workers don’t speak the same language...human rights 
has become an intellectual amusement for the small, educated middle-class which 
is kept within the walls of our institutes, universities and cultured society. As a 
result, it rarely gets beyond the limits of this community. The problem is that 
where defending human rights is concerned we have already created a kind of 
professional elite of top managers. (Pavel, academic, St Petersburg) 
This criticism of the type of discourse employed by human rights activists in Russia raises the 
question of how international human rights concepts are ‘translated’ into local contexts 
(Merry 2006). While the type of rights discourse utilised by some Russian human rights 
activists is undoubtedly influenced by any experience they may have had of dissident activity 
during the Soviet period, it is also shaped by the aims and objectives of those international 
donors such as the EU and USAID which have funded human rights and other civil society 
projects in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, something which will be 
explored in more detail in Chapter 5. Bruno (1998: 171), for example, talks of the ‘complex 
system of patronage, social relations and survival strategies’ which developed between 
international donors and Russian civil society actors who were the recipients of aid in the 
early to mid-1990s, several of whom continue to be so. Bruno argues that, rather than being a 
one-way street in which ‘Western’ values and methods of working were simply transmitted to 
the Russian context, this relationship was in fact frequently exploited or manipulated by 
Russian aid recipients. Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, in terms of human rights 
norms specifically many human rights activists looked to international human rights NGOs 
and Western governments and foundations for support and guidance during the late Soviet 
period, and arguably have continued to do so, partly because there has been so little domestic 
private or public funding for human rights activities during the 1990s and 2000s.  
 
According to Merry (2006), who has explored the role that local activists play in transmitting 
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international human rights norms to more local contexts, these ‘translators’ of global human 
rights concepts benefit from their mastery of the discourse on rights employed by donors and 
thus become recipients of their funding, but must also frame this discourse in a way that is 
acceptable to the local community. As a result, ‘...translators work within established 
discursive fields that constrain the repertoire of ideas and practices available to them...as they 
scramble for funds, they need to select issues that international donors are interested in...and 
connect these agendas to problems that interest local populations’ (Merry 2006:40-42).  
Naturally this is no easy task for human rights activists in Russia, particularly given that, as 
Chapter 5 will discuss further, the political context in which they must operate has hardly 
been conducive to their ability to carry out their aims and objectives.  
 
Nevertheless, it appears that, while they may indeed have become adept at replicating the 
rights discourse employed by international donors and human rights NGOs which tend to 
emphasise civil and political rights, they have been far less successful in framing their 
campaigns in ways which do indeed resonate with local agendas. As Klitsounova (2008: 5) 
points out, ‘they are unlikely to succeed in reaching the Russian public and becoming a 
catalyst for human rights policy change unless they manage to convert their claims and 
agendas into messages that resonate with norms that are already widely accepted by 
Russians.’ 
 
What is less clear is the extent to which this apparent lack of success has been intentional or 
not. Several of the academics interviewed for this study expressed the view that human rights 
activists were motivated by quite rigid ideological concerns and values: 
 
Our human rights activists are not oriented towards society in terms of their 
agenda. This lack of a social agenda is a problem for me, you have to put money 
towards improvements, education...There are some very strong fundamentalist 
tendencies in our human rights community. I would say it’s a kind of liberal 
fundamentalism. (Pavel, academic, St Petersburg) 
Several saw this ideological rigidity as putting human rights activists at odds with what 
mattered to the wider public and thus making their activities increasingly irrelevant: 
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The mistake made by some of our human rights activists is that they focus their 
attention on this group of rights which, from the perspective of the hierarchy of 
needs which the average Russian citizen has, are in the very last place. So 
concentrating on this category and avoiding or ignoring problems which affect 
the average Russian man on the street on a daily basis allows the majority of 
Russians to become alienated from the human rights movement. They focus their 
attention on electoral and individual rights and freedoms such as the right to 
protest and demonstrate, the right to express one’s opinion, freedom of 
conscience and so on. Human rights activists must choose: they can defend only 
those ideals which mean something to them, in which case most of the public will 
not be on board, or they can include some element of rational populism in their 
plans and calculations. (Andrey, academic, St Petersburg) 
This view is interesting because it again raises the issue of a divide between the ‘abstract’ 
concerns of human rights NGOs and the more ‘everyday’ concerns of the average ‘man on 
the street,’ but also posits the idea of a ‘hierarchy of rights’ or needs existing in Russia which 
may differ from those in place elsewhere. This view that focusing on civil and political rights 
only led to isolation from the mainstream of public opinion was also shared by another 
respondent: 
These [human rights] groups are oriented towards political and civil rights, and so 
they find themselves in isolation. And to some extent it’s self-isolation. This 
came about because of tradition, they’d been working on political rights since the 
Soviet period. But the fact remains that these organisations are isolated. Groups 
such as the Soldiers’ Mothers,76 for example, are connected to problems such as 
political rights, individual freedoms and civil rights. But because the issues they 
work on have a specific social resonance and they affect a large number of people 
they have achieved much greater popularity and authority with the public. 
                                                          
76 The Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers of Russia is a national NGO with branches in most of Russia’s regions 
which was set up in 1989 to defend the rights of conscripts and others serving in the Russian military 
(http://ksmrus.ru/). Military service is compulsory in Russia for men aged 18-27 but poor living conditions and 
abuse of new recruits are rife in the armed forces. For further details see ‘How to Dodge the Draft in Russia,’ 
Marina Kamenev, Time, March 30th 2009, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1888238,00.html; ‘Hazing on rise in Russian armed forces,’ 
RIA Novosti, 27th July 2010, available at http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20100727/159963922.html  
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Memorial and Citizens’ Watch77 and the Moscow Helsinki Group exist in their 
own world. (Vadim, academic, St Petersburg) 
In some respects this criticism of the ‘old-school’ human rights NGOs may not be entirely 
fair: from 2009 to 2011, for example, Citizens’ Watch ran a project entitled ‘Strengthening 
Access to Justice for the Poor in the Russian Federation’ which set up 10 legal aid centres in 
the Leningrad and Perm regions.78 Support was targeted at the poorest and most vulnerable 
groups in the participating regions including the disabled, war veterans and other pensioners, 
children, the unemployed and the homeless. In addition, the commentary by Lev Ponomarev  
on ‘the destruction of the social state in the Russian Federation’ cited previously indicates 
that there is some interest in economic and social rights issues on the part of even these 
activists and organisations. Yet once again it comes down to an inability or unwillingness to 
draw attention to this work in the same way that campaigns focusing on civil and political 
rights issues are publicised.  
In terms of how respondents who represented more socially-oriented NGOs perceived the 
approach taken by their more explicitly human rights-focused colleagues, several highlighted 
what they saw as the negative stance towards any interaction with local or federal 
government often taken by human rights activists which contrasted with their own need to 
cooperate with the local authorities in order to resolve various social problems and their 
desire to ‘get things done’: 
 The human rights activists always talk about the system’s failures, but I’m trying 
to get results…they’re always able to talk about how bad things are: ok, we don’t 
have an infrastructure, there’s a lack of access to this and that. But you can talk 
about concrete things, how you would resolve them if you were doing it. Just to 
say that everything is bad when even in this bad situation you can find laws, 
mechanisms, steps and so on which could actually help to resolve the 
issue…because our organisation operates in the social sphere I cannot ignore the 
authorities like the human rights activists do, I have to work with them, I ask 
them for help. (Anya, NGO manager, St Petersburg) 
                                                          
77 Citizens’ Watch (Grazhdanskii Kontrol’) is a St Petersburg-based NGO which describes its mission as 
‘bringing the Russian legislation related to human rights and the practice of its application closer to international 
legal standards’ (http://www.citwatch.org/en/). It is headed by veteran human rights activist Boris Pustyntsev. 
78 For further details see ‘Strenthening Access to Justice for the Poor in the Russian Federation, Citizens’ Watch, 
http://www.citwatch.org/en/projects/1/.  
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They’re just banging on the table and shouting at the government about how 
rubbish they are without gathering an evidence base, without  proving, showing, 
demonstrating – and without offering constructive suggestions that are also 
backed by evidence, there’s no reason why the government should listen to them. 
(Nadezhda, children’s charity manager, St Petersburg) 
In some respects a lack of willingness on the part of some human rights activists to engage 
with institutions representing the state is not entirely surprising given that so much of the 
dissident movement was predicated on opposition to the authorities and their discourse on 
what ‘rights’ and legality should mean. As Horvath (2005:84) points out, ‘the characteristic 
dissident notion of legality…was founded upon the citizen and his rights, not upon the 
prerogatives of the state.’ The idea of a division between the ‘old-school’ human rights 
organisations and the more socially-oriented NGOs working with the wider community and 
the authorities to try to effect change was also raised by a human rights activist, who made it 
clear that in her view human rights NGOs and ‘social’ NGOs were operating in separate 
spheres: 
Social organisations are a different sphere, they work directly with various social 
groups such as children and families and so on. They offer an open service for 
immediate rights, working with vulnerable groups. Everyone does their own 
thing. (Lyuda, human rights activist, St Petersburg) 
In this particular instance the respondent is again making reference to the concept of 
‘immediate’ or ‘everyday’ rights which relate to social organisations, as opposed to the 
presumably more distant or abstract set of rights promoted by her type of human rights NGO. 
Yet drawing such a distinction reinforces the idea that this more ‘social’ work may have a 
rights aspect to it but is not the same as the ‘human rights’ work being carried out by Lyuda 
and her colleagues. In this sense it may only serve to reinforce the self-isolation of this type 
of organisation and to reinforce barriers between those organisations identifying themselves 
as human rights groups and those engaging in more socially-oriented work which 
nevertheless can have a strong rights component to it.  
4.6   Conclusions 
This chapter has sought to explore an area of human rights research which has received 
relatively little previous attention but is nevertheless fundamental to the aims and objectives 
112 
 
of this study, namely the ways in which the respondents involved in this project and to some 
extent the wider Russian public construct the meaning of economic and social rights, and the 
influence of the Soviet-era culture of rights on these constructions. It has also sought to 
explore some of the differences in these constructions and subsequent variations in methods 
of working and the choice of discourse employed which exist between some of the longer-
standing Russian human rights NGOs and those which engage in more directly ‘social’ work 
in the community. One of the key findings has been that, while there is widespread 
recognition amongst both types of organisation that economic and social rights are of 
considerable importance to the wider public, there is a far lesser degree of consensus on the 
meaning and importance of these rights when it comes to the positions taken by some of 
those NGOs which identify themselves explicitly as ‘rights-defending’ [pravozashitnye] 
organisations. This is not to say that representatives of such organisations did not support the 
idea of economic and social rights as worthy and important. Indeed, several of the human 
rights activists interviewed had themselves worked on projects which could be seen as 
directly linked to the promotion of these rights. Yet in terms of where such rights stood in 
within the overall ‘hierarchy’ of human rights, they frequently seemed to struggle to give 
them the kind of prominence which these rights appear to occupy in Russian society outside 
the relatively small community of human rights activists. This has clear implications in terms 
of their ability to garner public support for or interest in their campaigns, but also for the 
EU’s strategy towards promoting human rights in Russia since it maintains such close links 
with these organisations. This theme will be returned to in Chapter 7, but first Chapter 5 will 
examine in more detail conceptualisations of the role of the State in relation to economic and 
social rights, and the relationship between the types of Russian NGO which are the focus of 
this study and the institutions of the Russian state. 
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Chapter Five 
The State, rights and civil society in Russia 
 
5.1   Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine in greater detail two themes which first emerged in 
the preceding chapters, namely the ways in which the Russian and EU respondents involved 
in this study conceptualise the role of the State in guaranteeing economic and social rights; 
and the ways in which civil society actors such as human rights and more socially oriented 
NGOs view interaction with State structures such as local government and state-supported 
structures such as the institution of the regional human rights ombudsman.  The chapter 
demonstrates that there appears be some degree of consensus amongst the various Russian, 
EU and Member State respondents and institutions regarding the role of the State in 
guaranteeing economic and social rights both in Russia specifically and in a more abstract 
context.  
 
Yet, where cooperation with explicitly or implicitly state-sponsored institutions is concerned, 
opinion regarding the merits of such cooperation is divided amongst representatives of 
different groups operating within Russia’s civil society sector, between the separate groups of 
Russian and EU/Member State respondents, and amongst the EU and Member State 
representatives interviewed. Where the approach taken by human rights NGOs and those 
engaged in more explicitly ‘social’ work is concerned, this lack of consensus on relations 
with the State is particularly marked: socially oriented NGOs generally adopt a highly 
pragmatic and cooperative position on engagement with local authorities and other State 
bodies, with human rights NGOs tending to take a more oppositional stance.  
The chapter begins with a discussion of some of the perceptions of the State’s obligations in 
guaranteeing economic and social rights as expressed by various respondents representing a 
range of Russian civil society organisations. This discussion is situated in the context of both 
the influence of the centrality of the State in the lives of its citizens in the Soviet period and 
of more recent government social policy which has attempted in part to re-position the State 
as the key provider of social services. The chapter then goes on to engage with some of the 
theoretical debates surrounding the relationship between the State and civil society, before 
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applying some of these theories to the approaches taken by various human rights and 
socially-oriented NGOs towards engagement or non-engagement with the State. 
5.2    The role of the State in securing economic and social rights in Russia 
Prior to exploring the ways in which various respondents conceptualised the role of the State 
in securing economic and social rights, it is worth reiterating that the concept of ‘the State’ as 
some form of unitary actor or singular idea is a highly problematic one. Scholars such as 
Kapferer (2005) and Migdal and Schlichte (2005) have warned against over-emphasising the 
autonomy and coherence of the State as an actor, and highlight instead the blurred boundaries 
between state and society, and the diversity and complexity of the practices and processes 
that constitute ‘the State.’ For the purposes of this study, however, the focus is on how the 
State is perceived, rather than attempting to investigate what constitutes the State: as Migdal 
and Schlichte (2005: 15) point out, both state actors and non-state actors “see’ the state in a 
particular way; they have a mental picture of it as an integral unit, a way of conceiving what 
it is about and in which kind of affairs it plays or should play a role.’ This is certainly true 
where economic and social rights are concerned, since various Russian respondents appeared 
to see the State as the key actor when it comes to guaranteeing such rights or providing social 
services, and emphasised its central place in the public’s conception of the relationship 
between state and society: 
Here we have above all a sense of collective solidarity, that means the state, 
society, in the Soviet period it meant the party and as a result we have values such 
as solidarity and collectivism. (Andrey, academic, St Petersburg) 
The question of social and economic rights rests on the Soviet legacy, and the 
idea that the state must provide everything that’s necessary. People make a 
connection between these perceptions and paying taxes, so it’s perfectly possible 
not to pay taxes but still make demands on the state. People hide their income 
from the government, but at the same time they demand certain guarantees from 
the state. (Pavel, academic, St Petersburg) 
Yet it was not simply the Russian respondents who saw the role of the State as crucial in 
guaranteeing economic and social rights. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, in rhetorical 
terms at least certain EU institutions appear to see the State’s role as being of particular 
relevance to the realisation of ‘group’  or collective rights such as fundamental social rights: 
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Fundamental social rights…mean rights to which the individual citizen is entitled, 
which he can exercise only in his relationship with other human beings as a 
member of a group and which can be made effective only if the State acts to 
safeguard the individual's environment...in contrast to civil rights and liberties, 
this means that it is not freedom from the State that is achieved, but freedom with 
the State's help. (European Parliament Working Paper: Fundamental Social 
Rights in Europe 2000) 
Guaranteeing an individual’s social rights thus requires the State to take concrete, although in 
this case unspecified, action to protect its citizens and help them to achieve ‘freedom,’ albeit 
a different form of freedom from that offered by the realisation of civil and political rights 
and liberties. One EU Member State representative went even further than this particular 
statement in linking not just economic and social rights, but human rights as a more general 
concept very clearly to the actions of the State which, in her view, requires Russian human 
rights NGOs to engage more with State structures in order to effect change: 
Human rights are about the state’s responsibility, so if you’re a human rights 
activist what you want to do is influence the state to take some action.  So if I was 
a human rights activist of course on the one hand I could go out and demonstrate 
in favour of freedom of assembly or whatever, but I would also like to engage in 
political dialogue with the authorities,  be it the ombudsmen, federal ombudsman, 
be it the human rights council, be it whatever. These things have to happen on the 
national level, on the domestic level and that is how I see the role of human rights 
activists. (Christina, EU Member State diplomat, Moscow) 
It seems, therefore, that while there may be an overall lack of consensus amongst some of the 
Russian and EU/Member State respondents on both the meaning and importance of economic 
and social rights, there is at least a degree of agreement regarding the role played by the State 
in relation to such rights. Yet in a specifically Russian context the State’s role may be 
perceived as even more prominent given what several respondents referred to as the Soviet 
‘legacy’ of emphasising the centrality of the State in political and social life and on economic 
and social rights over civil and political rights. Indeed, the idea that this legacy continues to 
exert a major influence on public expectations of the State’s role is one that was raised on 
several occasions by the Russian respondents interviewed for this study, regardless of the 
type of organisation they represented.  
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In many ways this is perhaps not surprising: the Soviet Constitution of 197779 clearly placed 
economic and social rights such as the right to labour, healthcare and housing at the top of its 
‘hierarchy’ of rights, and enshrined the vital role of the State in guaranteeing such rights 
(Hawkesworth 1980; Dean 1980a), leading to the State assuming full responsibility for 
providing social services and benefits to Soviet citizens (Cook 2007a; Orenstein 2008). The 
collapse of Communism in Russia brought political and economic reforms which dismantled 
various welfare structures and introduced privatization, market mechanisms, decentralization 
and reductions in state subsidies and entitlements (Sajo 1996; Cook 2007a), a liberalising 
policy trend which largely continued during current President Putin’s first term from 2000-
2005 (Cook 2011). His reforms to the pension and social benefits systems indicate a high 
level of continuity with the reforms of the Yeltsin era (Hemment 2009) and, according to 
Cerami (2008:106), were aimed at introducing ‘a residual, neo-liberal-oriented model of 
welfare arrangement.’  
 
Such measures were very much in line with the trend in economic and social policies in 
various European countries from the early 1990s onwards to redefine the relationship 
between the State and the individual by emphasising personal rather than state responsibility 
for welfare provision (Soysal 2012; Dean 2007) since they attempted to re-allocate 
responsibility for welfare provision from the state to individuals and markets (Cook 2007a; 
Henry 2009). Many scholars argue, however, that, despite these changes in the formal role of 
the state in providing welfare, the wider Russian public continues to see the State as the first 
port of call for solving social problems. Crotty (2003), for example, claims that the 
population continues to rely on the State as a ‘caretaker,’ while Domrin (2003:201) argues 
that ‘...in the Russian interpretation...the state is responsible for maintaining social justice and 
approximately equal levels of material wealth for its citizens.’ This appears to be supported 
by polling data from 2010, which indicates that 77% of those surveyed thought that ‘the State 
should care more about its people,’ while only 12% believed that ‘people should act on their 
own initiative and take care of themselves.’80 Indeed, as mentioned in Chapter 4, in January 
2005 an attempt by the government to reduce the state’s obligations in the social sphere, by 
                                                          
79 See Appendix 6 for the text of the relevant Article of the 1977 Constitution 
80 ‘Kakoi printsip otnoshenii mezhdu gosurdarstvom i evo grazhdanami vy by lichno podderzhali?,’ Levada 
Centre, 2011, available at http://www.levada.ru/archive/gosudarstvo-i-obshchestvo/grazhdane-i-vlast/kakoi-
printsip-otnoshenii-mezhdu-gosudarstvom-i-  
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replacing various ‘in-kind’ social subsidies for housing, healthcare and transport dating from 
the Soviet era and paid to groups such as pensioners and the disabled with lower-value cash 
payments, led to the largest public demonstrations against the government in a decade 
(Buckley and Ostrovsky 2005; Wengle and Rasell 2008).  
These public expectations have not gone unnoticed by Russia’s power-brokers: from 2005 
onwards the then-Putin administration started to move away from a more explicitly market-
based social policy and tried to portray itself as a champion of social rights issues with the 
launch of a series of ‘national priority projects’ aimed at raising standards in four key policy 
areas: healthcare, housing, education and agriculture.81 Cook (2011:23) argues that these 
national projects and other policy initiatives were part of an attempt to re-introduce a statist 
model of welfare by providing the State with a more ‘activist and interventionist role’ in 
welfare provision. This attitude towards the State’s role in the lives of Russia’s citizens is not, 
however, one that has been held consistently by the presidential administration: in 2009 the 
then-incumbent Dmitriy Medvedev criticised what he described as the Russian public’s 
‘paternalistic attitudes,’ which he claimed were ‘widespread in our society:’ 
There seems to be a certain conviction that the State should solve every 
problem...the desire to ‘do something oneself,’ to achieve personal success step 
by step is not one of our national characteristics. That leads to a lack of initiative 
and new ideas, unresolved issues and a low level of public discussion.82 
Yet since Putin’s re-election as president in February 2012 his approach of flagging up his 
intentions to uphold social rights in order to appease public protests appears once again to be 
coming to the fore. This is demonstrated by a recent article written in response to large-scale 
political demonstrations across Russia in late 2011 and early 2012 protesting against electoral 
fraud committed during the country’s parliamentary elections in December 2011.83 While 
stating his commitment to ‘genuine democracy,’ Putin also claimed:  
                                                          
81 ‘Kak rozhdalis’ ideya natsionalnikh proektov?,’ Presidential Council on Implementing National Priority 
Projects and Demographic Policy, 16 March 2006, available at http://www.rost.ru/main/what/01/01.shtml  
82 ‘Rossiya, vperyod! Statya Dmitriya Medvedeva,’ Official Site of the President of Russia, 10 September 2009, 
available at http://президент.рф/news/5413  
83 See for example BBC News, ‘Moscow protest: Thousands rally against Vladimir Putin,’ 25 December 2011, 
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16324644; RIA Novosti, ‘Russians Rally as Putin Hints 
Reforms, Warns of Regime Change,’ 4 February 2012, available at 
http://en.rian.ru/society/20120204/171125937.html  
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In terms of which rights people consider to be their priorities, the right to 
employment (and with it the right to earn an income), the right to free healthcare 
and education for children are a long way ahead at the top of the list. Restoring 
and guaranteeing people these rights has been the key objective of the Russian 
state.84 
While in a meeting with Russia’s regional human rights ombudsmen in August 2012 Putin 
made clear his views on the role of the state in securing various rights by telling his audience 
that, 
The state is doing a great deal to protect the legitimate rights and interests of its 
citizens. In fact, this is the main goal of any state and executive authority at any 
level, be it municipal, regional or federal.85 
Interestingly, Putin makes a distinction here between his definition of ‘legitimate’ and, 
presumably, ‘illegitimate’ rights, implying that the state determines which rights are 
legitimate for its citizens and acts accordingly. He thus appears to be elevating economic and 
social rights to the position of ‘legitimate’ rights claims while civil and political rights issues 
as raised by those who participated in the protests such as the right to free and fair elections 
and even the very right to protest itself implicitly become ‘illegitimate.’ His decision to 
emphasise the centrality of the State’s role in guaranteeing economic and social rights may 
thus simply be a political ploy, and indeed critics have pointed to the failure of the national 
projects to achieve their stated goals.86 One respondent claimed that, 
The government understands that this game with economic and social rights, 
giving the impression that Russia is a social state, is all just a kind of populist 
stunt. (Pavel, academic, St Petersburg) 
This perception of the government’s agenda as being a highly cynical one was echoed by an 
EU Member State representative, who questioned whether economic and social rights issues 
                                                          
84 Vladimir Putin, ‘Democracy and the quality of government,’ Government of the Russian Federation, 6 
February 2012, available at http://www.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/18006/  
85 Vladimir Putin, ‘Meeting with regional human rights ombudspersons,’ Official site of the President of Russia, 
available at http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/4299 
86 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, ‘Zabitiye Natsproekti,’ 29 December 2009, available at 
http://www.ng.ru/economics/2009-12-29/1_nazprojects.html?mthree=1  
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were even ‘rights’ per se while also pointing to what he saw as an attempt by the authorities 
to ensure stability by focusing specifically on promoting these rights: 
The Russian authorities today seek to address most issues of economic and social 
rights, not necessarily because those are rights but because that is what the people 
want and they will maintain stability. (Thomas, EU Member State diplomat, 
Moscow) 
This view may help to explain the apparent reluctance of the EU and its individual Member 
States to engage in the explicit promotion of economic and social rights issues in their 
interactions with both government officials and civil society in Russia since it implies that 
such rights have become discredited in the eyes of the European donor community in Russia 
due to their co-optation by the Russian State. Yet, as discussed in the previous chapter, the 
continuing popularity of such rights amongst the wider Russian public and certain sectors of 
Russia’s civil society make this approach somewhat questionable. The Russian economist 
Yevgeniy Gontmakher has described this co-optation of economic and social rights as Putin’s 
‘new social contract’ with the population in exchange for ‘society’s political indifference.’87 
The extent to which this ‘social contract’ can continue to hold is as yet unclear given the 
recent political protests and the fall in Putin’s usually high popularity ratings in 2012.88 
Nevertheless, it represents a significant shift in the rhetoric on the State’s role in welfare 
provision and, as Henry (2009: 52) argues, ‘can be seen as representative of a new discourse 
on the nature of the state’s responsibilities to the public and, by implication, the source of 
state legitimacy.’ Where actual policy implications are concerned, one respondent sounded a 
cautiously positive note regarding the impact of such rhetoric on her sector of child welfare: 
Government policy [on child welfare] has changed over the last four or five years 
in the direction we want it to go and I don’t know to what extent that’s been due 
to organisations like ours getting our message across or to what extent it’s to do 
with the wider modernisation agenda of the Russian government or whether it’s 
to do with EU funding over the years which has been significant and which has 
                                                          
87 ‘Doktrina Putina-1,’ Polit.ru, 22 October 2012, available at 
http://www.polit.ru/article/2012/10/22/gontmakher/  
88 In August 2012 the Levada Center conducted a poll asking ‘do you have a favourable or unfavourable 
impression of Vladimir Putin?’ 48% said they had a favourable impression of him, compared to 60% in May 
2012 and 80% in April 2008. Data available at ‘V. Putin teryaet podderzhku i vliyaniye, vpechatleniye o nyom 
ykhuzhdayetsya,’ Levada Center, available at http://www.levada.ru/17-08-2012/vputin-teryaet-podderzhku-i-
vliyanie-vpechatlenie-o-nem-ukhudshaetsya  
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helped lots and lots of key decision-makers at the federal and regional levels to 
consider and think about other options but it’s all going in the right direction. 
(Nadezhda, children’s charity manager, St Petersburg) 
This view reflects the pragmatic stance taken by some socially-oriented NGOs, whereby the 
process by which change or reform happens appears to be less important than the final, 
practical outcome. While the true intentions of the government’s rhetoric may be unclear, 
based on some of the interviews conducted with this type of NGO it seems that it may to 
some extent be influencing policy development and this is borne out by the State’s increased 
efforts to engage with a certain category of NGOs, as will be discussed below. At the same 
time, it is important to keep sight of the gap which exists between official rhetoric on social 
policy and economic and social rights entitlements, and the actual policies being pursued. 
Rivkin-Fish (2010:714), for example, points to the dangers of treating ‘state claims as 
genuine intentions’ where Russia’s welfare regime is concerned and the broad range of 
ideological approaches informing welfare policy. The rhetoric reasserting the role of the State 
in the lives of its citizens and the importance of certain economic and social rights claims is 
in fact contradicted by two important factors.  
 
The first of these is that, despite measures such as the National Priority Projects which appear 
to bring back a ‘statist’ approach to social welfare, the liberalising reforms of Putin’s first 
term as president have not been undone. This has left Russia with a mixed system of welfare 
provision encompassing a public/private mix of healthcare services, a residual system of 
unemployment protection, a basic safety net of social assistance for the poorest in society and 
private markets in education and housing (Cerami 2008). The second factor is that even those 
policies which appear to explicitly re-position the state as the provider of certain social 
benefits may have an agenda which also conforms to a broadly or partially neoliberal 
approach.  
 
One example of this is the materinskiy kapital, or maternity capital, payment introduced in 
late 2006 which is awarded to women who have had their second or subsequent child since 1st 
January 2007.89 Part of an attempt to tackle Russia’s demographic crisis, this policy is highly 
selective and, as Rivkin-Fish (2010:717) points out, ‘largely circumscribed by pro-natalist 
                                                          
89 See ‘Informatsiya o materinskom (semyeinom) kapitale,’ Pensionniy Fond Rossiiskoi Federatsii, available at 
http://www.pfrf.ru/family_capital/  
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assumptions about women and the nature of the ‘family’.’ As a result, Hemment (2009:36) 
argues that such policies do not constitute a rejection of the earlier liberalising reforms but 
instead form part of a policy of ‘Soviet-style neoliberalism’ whereby social welfare issues 
and ‘socialist-sounding claims’ are emphasised in official rhetoric but not matched by actual 
policies aimed at improving welfare provision. This approach of selecting elements of 
neoliberal and more socialist political discourse and policy and combining them in a curious 
hybrid is indicative of the Putin regime’s broader strategy of attempting to be all things to all 
people, a strategy which Matza (2009:495) argues combines a mixture of ‘…individualist, 
patriotic, liberal, neoliberal, and socialist discourses of the self.’  
5.3    The State-civil society relationship in Russia 
One of the key ways in which this changing rhetoric on the State’s role in providing welfare 
has influenced state-society relations has been the increased level of attention paid by the 
Putin and Medvedev administrations to the question of the State’s interactions with civil 
society organisations working on social issues. Prior to examining the practical implications 
this move has had on cooperation between certain state institutions and both socially-oriented 
and human rights NGOs, it is important to consider the Russian State’s engagement with civil 
society on a more theoretical level. Scholars such as Hale (2002) and Domrin (2002) have 
contrasted what they see as the Russian government’s more ‘statist’ concept of relations with 
civil society with the more liberal model prevalent in certain Western countries which, 
broadly speaking, sees civil society as consisting of organisations which exist and operate 
independently of the State. Under this statist model, state and society are interdependent and 
cannot be separated into two constituent parts. As a result, non-state society is seen as 
completing the State rather than diminishing or challenging it. This formulation therefore 
gives the State a key role in the establishment and activities of civil society organisations: 
Hale (2002: 309) argues that within this model ‘the state’s role is to protect non-state society, 
ensuring its continued existence, as well as to protect the interests of the state itself, which is 
seen as the embodiment of the nation.’  
 
In several respects the argument that Russia’s government is pursuing this statist model in its 
relations with NGOs is borne out by various measures taken by the Putin and Medvedev 
administrations since 2005. One major new policy has been to increase the amount of state 
funding available for NGOs: from 2006 onwards the Kremlin has sponsored annual grant 
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competitions for NGOs which have largely focused on funding projects relating to health; 
youth; civil society development; socially disadvantaged groups; education; and culture 
(Henderson 2011). Although in 2010 human rights NGOs were added to the list of 
organisations eligible to receive government grants, the focus has very much been on 
assisting ‘socially-oriented NGOs’ (Kononova 2010). Richter (2009b:8) argues that this 
funding drive is part of the Kremlin’s policy of making Russian civil society a ‘coherent, 
ordered space where individuals assist the state in the interest of the whole.’ This policy has 
been replicated at a regional level for NGOs providing certain essential social services and 
has begun to replace funds provided by Western donors who until 2005 were the main 
sources of financing for Russia’s civil society organisations (McIntosh Sundstrom and 
Beznosova 2009). Yet, while endeavouring to create closer ties between the State and these 
‘socially-oriented’ NGOs, Putin in particular has shown a somewhat hostile attitude towards 
those NGOs which explicitly promote human rights and/or political aims and rely mostly on 
funding from abroad.  In May 2004 Putin (2004) used his annual address to the Federal 
Assembly to criticize such groups, saying that, 
 
 ...not all of the organisations are oriented towards standing up for people’s real 
interests. For some of them, the priority is to receive financing from influential 
foreign foundations. Others serve dubious group and commercial interests. 
 In 2006 new legislation on regulating domestic and foreign NGOs drew international 
criticism (RFERL 2006: 1; BBC News 2006) and prominent Russian human rights NGOs 
which receive foreign funding from abroad were accused of involvement in espionage 
(RFERL 2006: 1). In July 2012 Putin approved a new law forcing NGOs in receipt of funding 
from abroad and considered to be involved in political activity to register as ‘foreign agents’ 
and include this information in all promotional materials (BBC News 2012). Henderson 
(2011: 25) argues that this strategy is aimed at engaging and rewarding those NGOs who are 
seen as able to assist the State in delivering services, while alienating or ignoring those whose 
objectives are seen as running counter to those of the State: 'The Putin administration's 
strategy...has designed a complex of policies with which to select and encourage NGOs that 
are likely to support...national projects the Kremlin deems compelling and important. These 
policies reward the 'good' behaviour of NGOs that perform social services that can improve 
the social and economic well-being of the population.’ At the same time, this fits with the 
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neoliberal approach of shifting responsibility for providing social services from the state to 
third-sector, voluntary organisations (Salmenniemi 2010). 
These ties between the State, or state institutions, and more socially-oriented NGOs were 
mentioned frequently by respondents from organisations working in the social sector, who 
talked of their longstanding cooperation with local and sometimes federal authorities and the 
degree of input they had into social service delivery: 
We work quite closely with regional governments so we’ve got partnerships at 
the moment with the Leningrad Oblast authorities, with St Petersburg, various 
rayons [districts] of St Petersburg, and we work at the city level as well. We’ve 
also got discussions going on in Moscow and we have quite a lot of requests for 
support in developing services but also training and education from various 
regions which, depending on what funding we have and they have, we can either 
fulfil or not fulfil. (Nadezhda, children’s charity manager, St Petersburg) 
Another respondent pointed to the necessity of such collaboration for socially-oriented NGOs 
if they want to realise their aims, which refers back to the point raised in the previous chapter 
about such NGOs taking a pragmatic stance towards dealing with the authorities in order to 
‘get things done’: 
Because we have a lot of projects that are connected to social services...we have 
to maintain a more restrained position [than human rights NGOs] and try to 
cooperate with the authorities, find compromises and engage in dialogue. (Lydia, 
healthcare charity, St Petersburg) 
The application of the ‘statist’ model to relations with civil society is often seen in a negative 
light since it appears to imply the cooptation of civil society by the State and the subsequent 
diminishing of independence for civil society groups, with those deemed ‘undesirable’ or 
unhelpful in terms of realising the State’s goals ostracised or punished. McIntosh Sundstrom 
and Beznosova (2009), for example, argue that, unlike grants supplied by Western donors, 
State funding to civil society organisations is an attempt to control their political agendas 
while, according to Kononova (2010), Russian and international human rights groups see 
state support and state control as ‘different sides of the same coin.’ This attitude of suspicion 
towards interacting with State institutions on the part of Russian human rights groups was 
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highlighted by one respondent, a consul-general representing an EU Member State in Russia 
which has a long-standing programme for working with local NGOs: 
Relations between human rights NGOs and local officials are pretty bad. Some in 
the NGO community lack the skill of diplomacy, they can behave aggressively 
towards the other side. (Robert, EU Member State consul, St Petersburg) 
Another EU Member State representative appeared to support this attitude of distrust towards 
state involvement in civil society: 
They [the Russian government] associate liberal reforms with instability therefore 
they see the need for a strong state but over-control strangles the development of 
civil society. (Karl, political advisor to MEPs, European Parliament, Brussels) 
As will be discussed in further detail below, this attitude of distrust not only stands in stark 
contrast to the more cooperative stance taken by the socially-oriented NGOs who took part in 
this study, but also extends to relations with State-supported representatives who have a 
specific mandate for dealing with human rights issues such as the regional human rights 
ombudsmen. Yet it is not clear that any state involvement in funding or collaborating with 
civil society organisations must automatically be a dangerous move which compromises an 
NGO’s independence or forces it to adopt political objectives which it would not otherwise 
have done.  
 
As the respondents cited above noted, cooperation with the authorities is both a fact of life for 
socially-oriented NGOs and a potential means for them to influence policy development and 
practice in the social sector. In addition, even if the State’s support for a particular 
organisation does lead it to adopt certain aims or objectives in order to ensure that this 
support continues, this is surely no different from the effects of funding which comes from 
Western donors. Henderson (2002: 142) points out that prior to the Kremlin’s policy of 
providing funding to certain segments of civil society, Russian NGOs tailored their projects 
and agendas to meet what they believed to be the interests of potential Western donors rather 
than the Russian population since these donors were ‘the voice that mattered.’ As a result, it 
seems to be something of a double standard to assume that Western, including EU, financial 
support for NGOs is always benign and apolitical whereas grants from the Russian state must 
automatically have some sinister intent. It therefore seems possible that the emphasis on the 
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statist conceptualisation of state-civil society relations as the model that best represents 
current interactions between the Russian State and NGOs, and on the presumed negative 
consequences of this model, has been overstated. Kulmala (2011:55), for example, argues for 
the application of a ‘Nordic’ model to the Russian case since the norm in Nordic countries is 
for civil society organisations to receive full or partial state subsidies and ‘close collaboration 
between state authorities and civil society without destroying the autonomy of civil society is 
achievable.’  
The potentially positive impact of state involvement in the NGO sector on social sector 
reform was also raised by one respondent, who again pointed to its influence on the child 
welfare sector: 
We’ve worked quite closely alongside the National Foundation for Support of 
Children in Difficult Life Situations90 which is the big quango which was 
founded in 2008. The money is Russian government money and it’s quite a lot of 
money mainly for regional governments to carry out innovation programmes – so 
child welfare reform basically. It allows the region to experiment and innovate– 
it’s actually quite radical and interesting and in the children’s social sector it’s a 
really key player and it’s going to be quite interesting to see how it develops. 
They talk about all the things the human rights organisations should be talking 
about but this government quango talks about them – that 2,000 children a year 
are killed or abused in Russia and this isn’t acceptable and we’ve got to do 
something about it. And that’s good, they are doing something about it. 
(Nadezhda, children’s charity manager, St Petersburg) 
This respondent therefore makes clear that, at least where child welfare is concerned, she 
believes government-funded bodies are in fact proving to be far more effective in ‘getting 
things done’ and raising the important issues concerning children’s rights than the ‘old-
school’ human rights organisations which tend to take a dim view of cooperating with the 
authorities. 
 
It is, however, worth noting that where ‘everyday’ economic and social rights issues (Turbine 
2007) are concerned it is often those state structures such as the regional governor’s office 
                                                          
90 http://www.fond-detyam.ru/  
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and the regional and municipal parliaments and local authorities with which NGOs operating 
in this area must interact, rather than the federal government. While the socially-oriented 
NGOs operating in St Petersburg were broadly positive about their relations with the city and 
oblast [regional] authorities, in the case of Ryazan the situation was more complex. The 
Ryazan-based NGO involved in this study had traditionally focused much more on civil and 
political rights issues and had close ties to some of the larger and more longstanding human 
rights NGOs based in Moscow. Recently, however, it had initiated a programme asserting the 
rights of children leaving the care system in Ryazan Oblast [the federal subject which 
includes the city of Ryazan] to housing which the local authorities are legally obliged to 
provide. While the NGO’s employees highlighted the positive response to this campaign that 
they had received from many amongst the local population, they maintained that their actions 
had antagonised the region’s governor, Oleg Kovalev, who then set out to discredit their 
organisation and limit public access to information about their campaign: 
 
The governor ordered the local media not to publish any information provided by 
us, so effectively information from us and our organisation was censored. 
(Dmitriy, human rights activist, Ryazan) 
Then the local government press service said that we’d lost our minds and were 
demanding that they take apartments away from people who already had them, 
that we had just totally lost it. (Tanya, human rights activist, Ryazan) 
This indicates firstly that the apparent emphasis at the level of federal government on 
upholding economic and social rights has not necessarily filtered down unadulterated to the 
individual regions. This picture of regional diversity is confirmed by a report compiled in 
2010 by the Council of Europe, which runs a joint EU-Council of Europe programme on 
national human rights structures which in the Russian case includes the regional human rights 
ombudsmen.91 According to the report, which concerned the role of the human rights 
ombudsman in the defence of social rights during economic crisis,  
The current reality in Russia, as concerns the respect of social and economic 
rights, is characterised by a very diverse national legislation, the absence of a 
                                                          
91 ‘Joint European Union-Council of Europe Programme: setting up an active network of independent non-
judicial human rights structures,’ Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/commissioner/Activities/themes/nhrspeertopeer_en.asp  
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common benchmark and the different approach by each region according to 
budget availability. Thus, the respect for the rights of socially vulnerable people 
greatly varies in the Russian Federation. (Valenti 2010). 
It also indicates that, even where an NGO takes up an economic or social rights issue which 
is clearly of importance to the local population and is in line with what Putin apparently sees 
as a ‘legitimate’ rights claim, its efforts can potentially be stymied by opposition from 
regional power-brokers. This therefore makes it difficult to talk of any uniform approach 
towards economic and social rights on the part of ‘the State’ in Russia since there is a 
plurality of relevant state structures on both a federal and regional level which may have 
quite different objectives. 
5.4   Engagement v. non-engagement with State human rights structures: the case of 
the regional human rights ombudsman 
One example of a state structure towards which human rights and more socially-oriented 
NGOs appear to have somewhat different attitudes concerning engagement is the only State-
affiliated institution which works explicitly on human rights issues in Russia’s regions, 
namely the regional human rights ombudsmen and child human rights ombudsmen whose 
function was outlined in Section 4.2. Although these officials have a mandate to look at a 
wide range of human rights issues which is not restricted solely to those relating to economic 
and social rights, they are relevant to the purposes of this project because many of the NGOs 
interviewed for this study saw the ombudsmen as representatives of the State in some form 
and in either a positive or negative sense: 
Russia is the only country in the world that has set up both a federal and regional 
ombudsman structure, I think it’s very interesting and is a reflection of Russia’s 
split personality in terms of whether it is a kind of power vertical centrally-driven 
non-democracy or whether it’s actually trying to be a federation of locally-
governed local governments. I find the ombudsman function, the theoretical one, 
a good one and I think it can play a really important role in terms of children’s 
rights. (Nadezhda, children’s charity manager, St Petersburg) 
This is a bureaucrat, a state body which receives money from the government – a 
human rights activist becoming the ombudsman has not yet happened in St 
128 
 
Petersburg. So what can you say about effectiveness? The ombudsman will never 
go against the authorities. (Svetlana, human rights activist, St Petersburg) 
Putin himself inadvertently highlighted the confusion surrounding the degree of 
independence from the State enjoyed by the ombudsmen in a meeting with 60 of them in 
August 2012 by telling his audience on the one hand that, 
The work you do as agents who are totally independent of the state or municipal 
authorities takes on paramount importance. 
But at the same time calling the ombudsmen, 
...my direct allies in the protection of citizen’s interests and legal rights and this is 
the most important part of my work as well as the essence and objective of my 
whole work.92 
One of the EU respondents also highlighted the contested issue of the ombudsmen’ degree of 
operational independence, pointing out that the development of the institution has varied 
from region to region: 
Some of the [regional human rights ombudsmen] are very, very good indeed but 
others are way too beholden to the local governor or the local, regional 
authorities. So they can’t claim independence, they’re not independent, they’re 
not reporting independently  - so it’s very difficult to generalise about the 
regional ombudsmen – they’re so different in the way they operate. (Rachel, 
EEAS official, Brussels) 
As will be further discussed below, this view is very much in keeping with the view of 
several of the Russian human rights activists interviewed. 
Secondly, the small number of ombudsmen and their advisors interviewed for this study 
situated themselves very clearly as intermediaries between local authorities and local 
residents, and also appeared to see the bulk of their work in advising citizens and dealing 
with their complaints about the authorities as relating to economic and social rights issues: 
                                                          
92 ‘Meeting with regional human rights ombudspersons,’ Official site of the President of Russia, 16th August 
2012, available at http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/news/4299/print  
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The ombudsman is a middleman who deals with complaints made against the 
authorities. The immediate task in hand is making sure everyone has what they 
need and that they are not experiencing discomfort in their everyday lives. 
Politics and gay parades are not very interesting because obviously that is 
defending human rights but that’s a slightly different category, in my opinion 
there are much more important tasks at hand. In the first place that means water 
supply, gas, heating. Helping with social rights is more relevant to people. 
(Nikolai, regional human rights ombudsman) 
The main problems the [child human rights] ombudsman deals with are children’s 
housing rights, 31% of the complaints we get concern housing rights. The right of 
the child to health protection and medical care makes up only about 2% but for us 
this is a fundamental child right which ought to be in first place. The right of the 
child to education makes up 10% of complaints so that’s quite high. The main 
idea for us is that the ombudsman acts as an intermediary between the authorities 
and society, the ombudsman should be someone who can act as a bridge between 
the authorities and society and resolve problems with the bureaucracy. (Sergey, 
advisor to a regional child human rights ombudsman) 
This picture differs slightly to that provided by the work of Federal Human Rights 
Ombudsman Vladimir Lukin: according to Lukin’s annual report on the work of his office in 
2010-2011, the majority of complaints received (57.7%) concerned violations of civil rights 
such as the right to an effective legal defence and freedom of conscience, while social rights 
violations such as the right to housing and social security made up 25% and violations of 
economic rights such as the right to work and the right to own private property made up 
13.2% of the total complaints received.93 
 
While the number of complaints concerning violations of political rights such as the right to 
free association was extremely small (1.8%), in a meeting with then-President Dmitriy 
Medvedev in February 2012 Lukin pointed out that it was too early for his office to have 
received complaints relating to the major political protests then taking place in some of the 
                                                          
93 ‘Doklad Upolonomochennovo po pravam cheloveka v Rossiiskoi Federatsii za 2011,’ Office of the Federal 
Human Rights Ombudsman, available at http://www.ombudsmanrf.org/index.php/doklady/717-2011  
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country’s major cities.94 In contrast the regional ombudsmen and their aides seemed to see 
their role as very much focused on responding to citizens’ ‘everyday’ needs such as housing 
and health, and on attempting to ensure the smoother running of local social services. In part, 
this is a reflection of where they happen to be operating: those interviewed represented 
regions such including the cities of Moscow and St Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast rather 
than parts of Russia which have suffered extreme and often state-sponsored violence such as 
the republics of the North Caucasus, as one respondent pointed out: 
In the North Caucasus the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the federal forces are 
very powerful so most of the complaints [to the human rights ombudsmen] 
revolve around them. In other places the police are more civilized so instead 
issues such as utility costs, poor housing, benefits and the lack of pensions come 
first so the ombudsmen work on those. (Stanislav, academic, St Petersburg) 
This concentration on social issues appears to be both recognised and approved of by 
President Putin, who commented recently, 
The regional human rights ombudspersons give a significant amount of attention 
to social issues; I feel this is just as it should be. I do not think that issues of a 
political nature, issues of defending human rights in the broader sense of the 
word, should be viewed as secondary. But social issues should not be relegated to 
the background either. And the fact that you, as experts in defending human 
rights, are paying attention to those social aspects is very good, because frankly 
that’s the area where most people’s problems lie.95 
Unsurprisingly perhaps, not all respondents, including some representing EU institutions or 
Member States, agreed with this view: they attributed the ombudsmen’ focus on social and 
economic problems to their desire to avoid antagonising the authorities by raising issues more 
associated with civil and political rights issues such as freedom of speech: 
The ombudsmen are hamstrung in a sense, there are some things they can’t say or 
show or they don’t even want to. They try to avoid anything controversial. 
(Lyuda, human rights NGO, St Petersburg) 
                                                          
94 ‘Meeting with Russian Human Rights Ombudsman Vladimir Lukin,’ Official Site of the President of Russia, 
28th February 2012, available at http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/news/3485  
95 ‘Meeting with regional human rights ombudspersons,’ Official site of the President of Russia, 16th August 
2012, available at http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/news/4299/print  
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The local human rights ombudsman rarely deviates from the official line and just 
acts as window-dressing. (Robert, EU Member State diplomat, St Petersburg) 
This view was also shared by the human rights activists interviewed in Ryazan: although at 
the time of the interview in the summer of 2011 the regional authorities of Ryazan Oblast 
were still at the stage of debating the appointment of a regional human rights and child 
human rights ombudsman, these activists were convinced that the eventual appointees would 
be docile state functionaries rather than genuine experts on local human rights issues: 
It will only be former judges, prosecutors or representatives of law enforcement 
agencies who will meet the criteria. We’re afraid that they’ll put some 
‘convenient’ person in the post of ombudsman who won’t act in the interests of 
society - they’ll appoint someone who suits the authorities. And that’s not what 
an ombudsman should be. (Dmitriy, human rights activist, Ryazan) 
They’ll listen to whoever appoints them. That means the governor. The governor 
will appoint them, and our governor is not very good. (Tanya, human rights 
activist, Ryazan) 
This view proved to be somewhat prophetic: in August 2011 the region’s legislature 
approved the governor’s nomination of Aleksandr Grishko, a former police captain and high-
ranking prison service official as the local human rights ombudsman.96 In December 2011 the 
legislature approved the appointment to the post of child human rights ombudsman of 
Ekaterina Mukhina, a former representative of the United Russia party in the regional 
parliament and head of the regional Union of Rural Women, who promised to focus on the 
issues of child neglect, families with several children, and children with disabilities.97 
Regardless of their previous career history, however, the ombudsmen interviewed for this 
study would argue, and in fact did argue, that their role is to respond to the issues which local 
residents raise in their formal complaints to the ombudsman’s office, which as mentioned 
above tend for the most part to concern the delivery of social services. Whether or not people 
avoid raising civil and political rights violations with them because ‘they understand it’s 
pointless’ (interview with Aleksey, academic, St Petersburg), the fact remains that within 
                                                          
96 ‘Ryazan: Upolnomochennym po pravam cheloveka naznachen general FSIN,’ Prava Cheloveka v Rossii, 
www.hro.org/11720  
97 ‘V Ryazani poyavilsya upolnomochenniy po pravam rebyonka,’ Prava Cheloveka v Rossii, 
www.hro.org/12812  
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their fairly limited mandate they can only respond to the complaints that they receive.  
 
Nevertheless, it is clear that there is a major difference in the attitudes taken towards 
cooperating with the human rights and child human rights ombudsmen by those NGOs 
focusing on civil and political rights, and those working on social issues. For the most part, 
the human rights activists interviewed for this study were extremely negative about the role 
played by the ombudsmen and their potential to effect any real progress on human rights 
issues. One respondent, for example, made clear her belief that the regional human rights 
ombudsmen were just a ‘front’ put on by the authorities to give the impression that they cared 
about human rights issues: 
[The regional human rights ombudsman] is just an imitation of human rights 
work, a pretence at defending human rights which is put on by the government. 
(Nadya, human rights activist, St Petersburg) 
Another human rights activist took issue with their focus on economic and social issues 
because he questioned the validity of these rights when compared to what he saw as 
‘inalienable’ civil and political rights: 
For the most part the people who take up the post of human rights ombudsman in 
the regions are former bureaucrats who’ve worked for the state for 20-30 years. 
They prefer to deal with general things which are less obvious and painful like 
pensions being too small, salaries not being paid on time, the low rate of social 
benefits, the lack of children’s homes and poor conditions in old people’s 
homes...these are certain social rights that Russian citizens have but they hardly 
constitute an inalienable human right like the right to life, the right not to be 
tortured or detained illegally, the right to a private life. It’s these rights that for 
some reason our ombudsmen don’t like to deal with. The people who take up this 
role don’t have even the most basic knowledge of human rights. (Sergey, human 
rights NGO, Nizhniy Novgorod) 
This view indicates, however, that certain human rights groups might be out of step with 
public opinion on which rights and issues should be focused on by the regional ombudsmen 
and the State in general. It also points to a certain arrogance on the part of some human rights 
activists who assume that their understanding of what human rights mean is the correct 
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version and seem content to dismiss extensive social problems which affect large swathes of 
the Russian population as ‘less obvious and painful.’ Such a stance does, however, coincide 
with Henderson’s (2002: 142) argument that certain Russian NGOs such as the one this 
respondent represents which rely largely on Western donors for financial and moral support 
target these funders rather than the Russian population as ‘the voice that matters.’ 
Unfortunately this position can lead, and arguably has led, to certain organisations becoming 
alienated from the mainstream of public opinion and policymaking, becoming what Hemment 
(2004:215) calls ‘a professionalized realm of NGOs, inaccessible to most local groups and 
compromised by its links to a neoliberal vision of development.’ This sidelining of certain 
human rights organisations was raised by one representative of a socially-oriented NGO who 
claimed that, 
The government and the NGO community and the people who are getting on with 
things tend to just bypass them. (Nadezhda, children’s charity manager, St 
Petersburg) 
Again, this implies that human rights NGOs are either consciously or unconsciously isolating 
themselves from those people who are trying to ‘get things done’ and achieve concrete results 
which have an impact on people’s day-to-day lives. In contrast, those representing more 
socially-oriented NGOs were cautiously optimistic about cooperating with the regional 
human rights and child human rights ombudsmen, while stressing that much depended on the 
individual who took up the post and recognising the limitations of what they can do in 
practice: 
If you’re talking about cooperation with human rights organisations we actually 
work more closely with the Child Human Rights Ombudsman both for Russia 
and for St Petersburg. We work well with the ombudsmen, they have the right 
approach and are focused on defending children’s rights. In this case a lot 
depends on the ombudsman’s personal authority, and they can only act based on 
their authority. Despite the fact that they are called ombudsmen, they don’t have 
sufficient powers to bring about changes in the activities of our social structures. 
So an ombudsman can be involved in a particular problem, they can support our 
work as we have asked them to do, but in reality there is little they can do to help. 
(Lydia, healthcare NGO manager, St Petersburg) 
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I think that as it is at the moment in Russia absolutely everything, too much, 
depends on the individual who’s in the position and their background and their 
interests and their abilities. I really like the idea of the ombudsman, and I think it 
should and could develop in Russia into quite a useful and important instrument. 
They have a way of taking our advocacy points to an audience we would 
otherwise never reach and that’s a really important thing. (Nadezhda, children’s 
charity manager, St Petersburg) 
This more pragmatic stance was not, however, limited exclusively to the socially-oriented 
NGOs, but was also reflected by the Ryazan human rights NGO in terms of its campaign on 
housing rights, in spite of their recognition that their local ombudsman might well prove to be 
simply an apparatchik: 
As soon as a human rights ombudsman and child rights ombudsman are 
appointed in our region we will immediately try to work with these bodies to 
resolve certain problems. Ideally where our work is concerned, we don’t want 
more people to come to us or for there to be more of this work: we want the local 
authorities to operate effectively. If the child rights ombudsman works hard then 
it’s not important whether or not he’s some protégé of the authorities or a former 
police official. So long as he works hard then that will be great. And the same 
goes for the human rights ombudsman. (Dmitriy, human rights activist, Ryazan) 
This indicates that, where social rights issues related to state provision of social services are 
concerned, some NGOs recognise the necessity of cooperating with state structures to 
whatever degree they reasonably can since ultimately such problems can only be resolved by 
the state. In general, therefore, the consensus from both these respondents and the academics 
specialising in human rights who were interviewed for this study was that, although there 
were certain problems with the role of the regional ombudsmen it was still better to have 
them than not: 
On the federal level the human rights ombudsmen can do something, on the 
regional level –  it’s a long story, it all depends on the political regime in place 
because in some places where there’s a more liberal-democratic regime and 
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where the people who come in are up to the job they do good things. (Pavel, 
academic, St Petersburg) 
They certainly haven’t lived up to expectations but it’s better to have them than 
not to have them. (Andrey, academic, St Petersburg) 
Interestingly, this stance was similar to the one taken by several of EU Member State 
representatives, who also pointed to the importance of the existence of the institution, while 
again recognising its limitations: 
I’ve met with the St Petersburg Human Rights Ombudsman and Child Human 
Rights Ombudsman: they are quite influential, they have a lot of resources and 
staff but there are constraints on them as well. It’s very important to have contact 
with them even if it doesn’t lead to much. We need to support them and work 
with them on projects which coincide with our aims. (Frieda, EU Member State 
diplomat, St Petersburg) 
One EU respondent who had met Yekaterinburg’s Human Rights Ombudsman, a woman who 
even several of the human rights activists interviewed recognised as being a very active and 
positive representative of the institution,98 also pointed out that the ombudsman’s work 
reflected the concerns of the local population: 
The human rights ombudsmen from Lukin99 down see themselves as someone 
people appeal to rather than taking an active role themselves but there is a clear 
role for the human rights ombudsmen and they do good work.  People in the 
regions are more willing to talk about economic and social rights, the 
Yekaterinburg Human Rights Ombudsman says she focuses on economic and 
social rights because that’s what people care about. (John, Member State 
diplomat, Moscow) 
In addition, some of the EU respondents were again critical of the categorical stance taken by 
some human rights NGOs towards cooperation with the authorities: 
                                                          
98 Interview with Sergey, human rights activist, Nizhniy Novgorod; and Nadya, human rights activist, St 
Petersburg 
99 Russia’s current Federal Human Rights Ombudsman 
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Many human rights NGOs have been around for many years, they always have to 
be in opposition to the authorities and won’t change. They need to be open to a 
degree of contact with the authorities. (Frieda, EU Member State diplomat, St 
Petersburg) 
The fact that some of these respondents appear to be advocating a softening of the stance 
taken by some ‘old-school’ human rights groups towards engagement with State institutions 
is important in two respects: firstly, it implies that certain European funders would like to see, 
at least on some level, a more flexible and less intransigent strategy from some of the groups 
they finance. Secondly, it indicates that, despite their apparent strategy of targeting Western 
donors as the ‘voice that matters’ when it comes to formulating their aims and objectives, 
these groups may be operating on an outdated basis which no longer appeals in quite the 
same way to EU and Member State donors. Indeed, McIntosh Sundstrom and Beznosova 
(2009: 24) point out that European funders of civil society projects in Russia have long 
emphasized ‘close engagement with partner governments through dialogue-driven planning 
and joint decision-making.’ Ultimately, continuing to pursue a policy of non-engagement 
could lead to such groups becoming even further marginalised than they already are. 
5.5   Conclusions 
This chapter has provided greater insight into the way in which the Russian respondents 
interviewed for this study conceptualise the role of the State in guaranteeing economic and 
social rights. It has situated these understandings in the context of a Soviet legacy of 
emphasizing social and economic rights over civil and political human rights, which 
continues to shape public expectations of what the State can and should provide. In addition, 
this has influenced the policy of the various presidential administrations since 2005 of 
reasserting the State’s primacy in relation to guaranteeing economic and social rights through 
social service provision on a rhetorical level while maintaining a broadly neoliberal model of 
social policy.  
 
This chapter has also explored the differing approaches taken by human rights and more 
socially oriented NGOs to engagement with various State structures and State-affiliated 
structures such as the regional human rights ombudsmen. Overall, while there is certainly a 
plurality of opinions regarding the merits and effectiveness of cooperating with the 
authorities, on a local level at least it seems apparent that socially-oriented NGOs generally 
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have a more pragmatic approach to cooperation with State structures in order to influence 
government policy and practice. This position is to some extent shared by some of the 
European donors who fund some of the projects of socially-oriented NGOs as well as those 
of the more ‘traditional,’ long-standing Russian human rights groups. Yet it appears that, 
while the longer-established Russian human rights organisations choose to stick to a policy of 
non-cooperation and often dismiss outright the suggestion that they engage with the 
authorities, they run the risk of making themselves increasingly irrelevant to the values and 
concerns of the wider Russian public and, potentially, alienating some of those donors who 
provide them with a financial lifeline. 
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Chapter Six 
The EU's Insitutional Conceptualisation of Economic and Social Rights 
 
6.1   Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the way in which the Russian respondents interviewed for 
this study conceptualised economic and social rights and the role of the State, and the 
potential marginalisation of those human rights NGOs which focus largely on civil and 
political rights issues in Russia. The purpose of this chapter is to explore how economic and 
social rights are constructed in the discourse of various EU institutions, using data drawn 
from official EU documents on internal and external human rights policy and from interviews 
with representatives of the EU and some of its individual Member States with responsibility 
for human rights policy which were conducted in Brussels, Moscow and St Petersburg. It will 
demonstrate that, despite a rhetorical commitment at the official level to promoting economic 
and social rights on an equal basis to civil and political rights in the EU’s internal and 
external relations, those representing EU institutions and Member States in the context of 
relations with Russia often expressed conflicting views on the importance of such rights and 
the need for the EU to promote these rights in its civil society initiatives in Russia and its 
political engagement with the Russian leadership. As will be further discussed in Chapter 7, 
this lack of consensus on the importance and relevance of such rights has important 
implications for the coherence and effectiveness of the EU’s policy on human rights in Russia 
given the importance of economic and social rights to the Russian public which was widely 
acknowledged by the respondents involved in this study.  
6.2   Internal EU constructions of economic and social rights 
Prior to examining the discourse on economic and social rights in the context of the Union’s 
external relations, it is important to explore how such rights are understood and expressed 
within the EU’s internal policy on human rights governing its own Member States since the 
way in which the EU perceives and portrays its own values will arguably have an impact on 
its external approach towards countries such as Russia. Indeed, according to Alston and 
Weiler (1999: 8), the internal and external dimensions of the EU’s human rights policy are 
‘two sides of the same coin.’ It is worth noting that the development of EU policy on human 
rights in general is a relatively recent phenomenon, given that the original European 
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Community was aimed at restoring Western Europe’s economic standing and promoting 
economic growth and competition (Hansen and Schierup 2005). It was the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) in 1992 which, while transforming the European Community into the 
European Union, first affirmed the new Union’s commitment to human rights and 
fundamental freedoms alongside peace, liberty, democracy and the rule of law as its founding 
principles in its Article 6. These principles were reiterated in relation to both internal and 
external relations and given new legal force in the subsequent Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 
and the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 (Alston and Weiler 1999; Tocci 2008). While the concept of 
‘human rights’ is used in the treaties in a broad and generally undefined sense, economic and 
social rights have not simply been ignored. In the Preamble to the Treaty of Amsterdam, for 
example, the Union’s Member States affirm their “attachment to fundamental rights as 
defined in the European Social Charter…and in the 1989 Community Charter of the 
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers” (de Witte 2001: 158).  
 
In addition, in 2000 the European Council adopted a Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU. While four of the Charter’s six chapters focus on civil and political rights grouped under 
dignity, freedoms, citizen’s rights and justice, two chapters cover certain economic and social 
rights relating to employment, access to medical care and social security, and non-
discrimination under the headings of equality and solidarity (Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the EU 2000). The Charter’s inclusion of such rights is significant since, while the civil 
and political rights reaffirmed by the Charter are already enshrined in the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to which all of the Union’s Member States are 
signatories, the Convention does not explicitly cover economic and social rights (Defeis 
2007), making the Charter in some respects more progressive in terms of the breadth of rights 
it aims to uphold.  
Where more specific legal mechanisms are concerned, the European Court of Human Rights 
in Strasbourg has traditionally been seen as the most important actor in terms of ruling on 
cases concerning human rights violations both in the Union’s Member States and in non-
Member States which are members of the Council of Europe such as those from the former 
Soviet bloc. Yet Douglas-Scott (2006) and Defeis (2007) point to the critical role played by 
the EU’s own European Court of Justice in Luxembourg in handing down rulings which have 
important implications for the development of human rights case law within the Union. 
Douglas-Scott (2006: 630) highlights the fact that there is a frequent overlap in jurisdiction 
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between the two courts, with cases involving the same State being heard in both, while Defeis 
(2007: 1108) claims that ‘it is the ECJ that has been instrumental in integrating human rights 
into the fabric of the Union’ by ruling in several cases that human rights, which the ECJ 
prefers to refer to as fundamental rights, are effectively enshrined in Community law and 
therefore protected by the Court. This is all the more important given that the EU itself has 
not yet acceded to the ECHR, although it is legally obliged to under the terms of the Lisbon 
Treaty and is currently in the process of doing so.100  
 
Where economic and social rights more specifically are concerned, the ECJ has also taken 
some important steps. Defeis (2007: 1112) points to the fact that the ECJ has had 
considerable impact with its decisions in cases involving issues of equality and non-
discrimination since the 1970s, even claiming that ‘the ECJ expanded the equality principle 
into a general equality rights between men and women which exists at the core of EU law.’ 
The fact remains, however, that the ECJ is not designed and was never intended to be a 
human rights court in the same way that the European Court of Human Rights is, with the 
result that the majority of cases it hears relate to issues concerning economic integration and 
as yet relatively few concern human rights in general or economic and social rights more 
specifically, although this is likely to change given the fact that the Lisbon Treaty has 
invested the ECJ with greater powers to legislate on fundamental rights. Most cases 
concerning violations of such rights in EU Member States tend therefore to be taken as 
collective complaints to the European Committee of Social Rights, a body within the Council 
of Europe with responsibility for advising states on how to bring their domestic legislation 
into line with the European Social Charter101 but whose resolutions on these collective 
complaints are not legally binding and therefore dependent on the willingness of the state in 
question to implement the Committee’s recommendations.102  
 
Nevertheless, on a rhetorical level at least the Union appears to be all too conscious of its 
perceived ‘spiritual and moral heritage’ where the promotion of human rights and human 
dignity are concerned (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2000: 8). In 
                                                          
100 For further details see ‘EU accession to the European Convention on Human Rights,’ Council of Europe, 
http://www.coe.int/web/coe-portal/what-we-do/human-rights/eu-accession-to-the-convention 
101 For further details see ‘European Social Charter,’ Council of Europe, available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/035.htm  
102 For further details see ‘European Committee of Social Rights,’ Council of Europe, available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/ECSR/ECSRdefault_en.asp  
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terms of public opinion, this apparent belief in the existence of specific European values with 
an emphasis on human rights appears to be shared by the populations of the EU’s Member 
States: a EuroBarometer poll of the EU27 from 2012 indicates that, when asked which values 
best represent the EU, 35% chose human rights, coming just behind peace (39%) and 
democracy (37%).103 In addition to the legal mechanisms mentioned above, several different 
institutions are heavily involved in formulating the Union’s internal and external approach 
towards human rights in general and economic and social rights more specifically and the 
discourse they utilise to formulate their concept of economic and social rights is therefore 
worthy of analysis. These institutions can include the Commission, the Council of the EU, the 
European Parliament, the European Council, a monitoring body such as the European Agency 
for Fundamental Rights, and consultative bodies such as the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions.  
 
In terms of official statements on human rights, the European Parliament, the Union’s only 
directly elected body, has been particularly outspoken and is often perceived to be taking an 
‘activist’ stance on such issues in both internal and external relations (European Inter-
University for Human Rights and Democratisation 2006: 7). Where economic and social 
rights are concerned, long before the Union proclaimed the internal Charter of Fundamental 
Rights in 2000, the Parliament made its official position on the importance of these rights 
clear in some of its formal resolutions. In its Declaration of Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms of 1989, for example, several key economic and social rights such as the right to 
social welfare, education and collective social rights were included alongside a more 
extensive list of civil and political rights such as the right to life, freedom of association and 
expression, and the prohibition of the death penalty.104 These rights were further elaborated 
upon a few years later: 
 
The European Parliament considers that economic, social, trade union and 
cultural rights should be respected and that the right to work, housing, education, 
social protection and culture in particular should be recognized as fundamental 
rights. [The Parliament] urges the Member States to take decisive action in the 
                                                          
103 See ‘Standard Eurobarometer 77: The Values of Europeans,’ Spring 2012, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb77/eb77_value_en.pdf  
104 See ‘Resolution adopting the Declaration of fundamental rights and freedoms,’ European Parliament, 1989, 
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/docs/pdf/a2_0003_89_en_en.pdf 
142 
 
following fields: the right to work, the right to social security, the right to 
protection against poverty and social exclusion, the right to housing and other 
social rights. [The Parliament] advocates the drawing up at Community level of 
instruments laying down minimum guarantees in respect of income, social 
protection, and the right to medical treatment and housing as an essential 
prerequisite for ensuring a quality of life consistent with human dignity. 
(European Parliament Resolution 1996) 
In 2000 an internal document provided further detail on the Parliament’s concept of social 
rights: 
Fundamental social rights…mean rights to which the individual citizen is entitled, 
which he can exercise only in his relationship with other human beings as a 
member of a group and which can be made effective only if the State acts to 
safeguard the individual's environment. Social rights are a necessary complement 
to civil rights and liberties, since the latter cannot be enjoyed without a minimum 
of social security. In contrast to civil rights and liberties, this means that it is not 
freedom from the State that is achieved, but freedom with the State's help. These 
are, then, fundamental rights in the form of entitlements. Although this would 
appear at first glance to indicate that they can be distinguished from the classical 
civil rights and liberties and the general principle of equality, there is 
considerable overlap. (European Parliament Working Paper: Fundamental Social 
Rights in Europe 2000) 
This statement is important in two respects: firstly, it sets out a position in which social rights 
are ‘group’ or collective rights which are inextricably linked to the State and can only be 
realised ‘with the State’s help.’ This coincides with what Hertel and Minkler (2007: 9) see as 
a tendency on the part of both states and international organisations to see civil and political 
rights as ‘negative’ rights, in that they merely require a state to refrain from interfering with 
an individual’s liberty, whereas economic and social rights are seen as ‘positive’ since they 
‘obligate government and others to actually provide something to an individual.’ Secondly, 
the idea that social rights are a ‘necessary complement’ to civil and political rights recognises 
the importance of such rights while falling short of acknowledging them as being equal to 
civil and political rights and liberties. As will be discussed below, this view is reflected by 
several of the EU representatives interviewed for this study. 
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Many of the economic and social rights highlighted by the 1996 parliamentary resolution did 
ultimately make their way into the Charter of Fundamental Rights in December 2000, where, 
as discussed earlier, they fell under the heading of ‘solidarity’ (Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union 2000). Yet, judging by the working paper cited above, just a 
few months earlier that year the Parliament had not been confident that this would necessarily 
be the case and in fact appeared somewhat pessimistic about the prospects for upholding 
these rights at Union level given the diversity of approaches to such rights taken by the 
individual Member States: 
It remains to be seen how far social rights will form part of an EU bill of rights 
since, unlike the classical liberal civil rights and liberties recognised in all 
constitutions, social rights are not regarded as fundamental rights in all Member 
States…Owing to the liberal basic attitude in Austria and the United Kingdom, 
for example, there are no constitutional social rights in these countries. The 
Benelux countries, France and the Scandinavian countries have fundamental 
social rights in the form of individual rights, policy clauses or provisions defining 
the state's objectives, but tend to be restrained when it comes to detail, leaving 
this to ordinary legislation. The southern European countries all have extensive 
bills of rights, which also include detailed fundamental social rights…however, 
they are not as a rule enforceable rights but instructions to the legislature to make 
them effective. (European Parliament Working Paper: Fundamental Social Rights 
in Europe 2000) 
 
This document makes clear some of the challenges facing any attempt to formulate a coherent 
Union-level position on economic and social rights as fundamental rights since there appears 
to be little consensus amongst the Member States as to just how ‘fundamental’ these rights 
should be. One of the principal challenges in this area has been the fact that Member State 
governments reserve the right to opt out of certain aspects of EU treaties with which they 
disagree, including those relating to fundamental rights in general and to economic and social 
rights issues more specifically.105  The UK has particular form in this respect, having been 
the only one of the then-12 Member States to opt out of adopting the Community Charter of 
Fundamental Social Rights for Workers in 1989 and the adoption of the Protocol on Social 
                                                          
105 For further details see ‘Opt-out,’ Eurofound, 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/optout.htm  
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Policy at the Maastricht summit in 1991 which expanded on this Charter’s provisions, 
although this decision was later reversed at the Amsterdam summit in 1997 (Hansen and 
Schierup 2005). It also negotiated a partial opt-out from the Charter on Fundamental Rights 
of 2000, as did Poland.106  This state of affairs not only poses practical problems in terms of 
ensuring fundamental rights are upheld by all the Member States on an equal basis, but also 
reflects a degree of ambivalence on the part of individual states within the Union on the 
importance of economic and social rights and whether they can even be defined as ‘human 
rights.’ This issue was also raised by one of the respondents interviewed for this study, a 
diplomat working as a political officer at the British Embassy in Moscow: 
 
The debate over differing social models in Europe makes economic and social 
rights stuff more controversial – so the UK might agree with the Scandinavians 
on civil and political rights but not on taxation or social welfare and so on. (John, 
EU Member State diplomat, Moscow) 
 
This appears to indicate that attitudes towards both the welfare state and economic and social 
rights remain very much divided on a national level. Several commentators have linked this 
firstly to historical differences between what are sometimes categorised as the liberal, 
Continental and Scandinavian models of welfare and social rights protection in Europe 
(Katragoulos 1996) or,  according to Esping-Anderson’s (1990) famous typology, the liberal, 
conservative-corporatist and social democratic systems of welfare; and secondly to the fact 
that certain political and economic theories dominant in Western thinking see economic and 
social rights either as being out with the remit and control of the state, or even as 
compromising the freedoms inherent in civil and political rights. According to Gavison 
(2003: 24), for example, ‘many Western theories of political justice and liberalism make civil 
and political rights a necessary component of the liberal, democratic state, but do not include 
social and economic benefits in the order of rights…some such theories present the taxation 
required for efforts of redistribution seeking to address social and economic concerns as a 
violation of civil and political rights, specifically the right to liberty and property.’ The shift 
towards a more neoliberal approach in economic and social policy and politics more 
generally on the part of various Western European and non-European states including the UK 
                                                          
106 For further details see ‘Poland to join UK in EU rights charter opt-out,’ EU Observer, 7th Sept 2007, 
available at http://euobserver.com/18/24723  
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and US from the late 1970s onwards (Mudge 2008) and those former Communist states in 
Central and Eastern Europe who aspired to begin the EU accession process in the early 1990s 
(Bohle and Greskovits 2007) has also had important implications for the way in which a 
whole range of economic and social rights are perceived and upheld at both national and EU 
level. A further important factor has been that a number of social democratic parties who 
came to power in various EU Member States in the late 1990s also maintained to varying 
degrees certain aspects of neoliberal political and economic approaches (Hansen and 
Schierup 2005).  
 
Arguably this ‘turn’ towards neoliberalism has led to a fundamental and lasting change in 
expectations of what the State can and should provide in terms of social security and 
employment. According to Katragoulos (1996: 312), the dominant trend has for some time 
been ‘a reduction of the public sector, the curtailment of social benefits and the abandonment 
of the goal of full employment in favour of economic efficiency and flexibility in the labour 
market,’ while Gamble (2001: 132) argues that the neoliberal approach maintains that ‘as 
many costs as possible should be shifted from the state and back on to individuals, and 
markets, particularly labour markets, should be made as flexible as possible.’ This is 
particularly the case given the current dominance of ‘austerity’ measures involving cutbacks 
in funding for social provision in a number of European countries in the wake of the 2008 
global financial crisis. This has led to a situation where, according to Farnsworth and Irving 
(2012:134), ‘…the neoliberal model of the small state combined with individual 
responsibility for welfare provision is coming to be seen as the only ‘realistic’ option.’ This 
has, however, led to fears that austerity measures will lead to a rollback of economic and 
social rights in certain EU Member States. In 2011 separate reports by the UN’s Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for 
Human Rights expressed concern over the effect budget cuts were having on the social rights 
of vulnerable groups in Greece and Ireland.107 In 2012 the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary 
Assembly issued a resolution expressing its fears over the impact of austerity programmes on 
social rights standards and warning that, 
 
                                                          
107 ‘Greek austerity measures could violate human rights, UN expert says,’ UN News Centre, 30th June 2011, 
available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=38901&Cr=auster#.UZ0CxsrrSSo; ‘Report by 
Thomas Hammarberg, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, following his visit to Ireland 
from 1 to 2 June 2011,’ Commissioner for Human Rights, 15th September 2011, available at 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1831077  
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…the restrictive approaches currently pursued, predominantly based on budgetary 
cuts in social expenditure, may not reach their objective of consolidating public 
budgets, but risk further deepening the crisis and undermining social rights as 
they mainly affect lower income classes and the most vulnerable categories of the 
population.108 
  
The resolution called instead for the welfare state to be strengthened and the European social 
model protected in the face of ‘“unbridled” economic liberalism.’109 The context of austerity 
may help to explain why, in terms of contemporary EU policymaking on human rights, there 
seems to be a tendency to see issues concerning economic and social rights as practical 
problems relating to the areas of social policy or social work rather than ‘classical’ human 
rights with corresponding entitlements, an approach reflected by one respondent working for 
the European Parliament: 
 
The Council of the European Union for a long time couldn’t officially work on 
human rights inside the EU, it was the Council of Europe that did that so that’s 
why we don’t label a lot of the social work that we do human rights. Even in our 
hearings [at the Parliament] there’s a lot of let’s say housing, jobs so no, they will 
rarely call them economic and social rights but yes, they’ll be addressing the 
practical issues…even though we don’t have an EU model we have a common 
baseline that’s respected in EU directives on what we have as social policy so 
yes, we don’t have the same position for everyone on the minimum wage but on a 
lot of other, say, housing issues we have a sort of minimum common denominator 
which makes a sort of European model. (Anna, human rights researcher, 
European Parliament) 
 
It is also worth noting that, while several key economic and social rights were in fact 
included in the final Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2000, the failure of all the Member 
States to ratify the Treaty of Lisbon until December 2009 meant that none of the rights 
outlined by the Charter became legally binding until that point. As a result, at present it is 
                                                          
108 ‘Resolution 1884: Austerity measures – a danger for democracy and social rights,’ Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe, 26th June 2012, available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewPDF.asp?FileID=18916&Language=en  
109 Ibid 
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somewhat difficult to assess the impact it will have on the EU’s internal human rights 
strategy. Nevertheless, the thematic areas outlined by the European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights (FRA), an EU advisory body set up in 2007 to monitor implementation 
of the rights outlined by the Charter at both EU and Member State level, provide some 
indication of where the priorities lie. While the issues of access to justice; child rights; LGBT 
rights; minorities; people with disabilities; racism and xenophobia; and the Roma and 
Traveller communities constitute the FRA’s ‘themes,’ there is no mention of monitoring 
economic and social rights issues as ‘fundamental’ rights.110 Overall, then, it appears that, 
while on a rhetorical level economic and social rights are proclaimed to be fundamental rights 
belonging to all EU citizens, to some extent there is a lack of internal consensus at Member 
State and EU level on their true meaning and importance. 
 
6.3   Understandings of human rights in the EU’s external relations policy 
Having examined the manner in which economic and social rights are conceptualised within 
the EU’s internal human rights strategy, attention now turns to the Union’s external strategy 
on human rights promotion, the extent to which economic and social rights are integrated into 
this approach and the degree to which the Union sees itself as acting as a ‘normative power’ 
in this area. Once again, on a general rhetorical level it appears that the EU has a strong 
commitment to upholding economic and social as well as civil and political rights in its 
external relations policy. In policy documents released by various EU institutions which 
mention the place of human rights in the Union’s external relations strategy, the importance 
of human rights as a defining value for the EU is reiterated. The European External Action 
Service (EEAS), for example, the new body which took over from the European Commission 
in late 2009 in overseeing the implementation of the EU’s external policies and strategies 
around the world, refers to clauses from the Treaty on European Union as amended in 2009 
to emphasise respect for human rights as a fundamental principle for the EU: 
If it is true that our values and principles define who we are, the EU’s identity is clear: 
“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights...These values 
are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-
                                                          
110 For further details see ‘The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights,’ available at 
http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/home/home_en.htm  
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discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and 
men prevail.”(Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union). Beyond this, the EU 
has a vocation to bring the same values to its external relations. “The Union’s 
action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have 
inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to 
advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and 
indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human 
dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of 
the United Nations Charter and international law” (Article 21 of the Treaty on 
European Union). (EEAS Report on Human Rights in the World 2010) 
The use of the word ‘vocation’ here is interesting because it implies that the Union is some 
sort of ‘moral crusader’ when it comes to promoting human rights on the world stage. This 
notion is also emphasised in a recent statement by the EU’s High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton: 
Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is at the core of the 
European Union. The protection and promotion of human rights is a silver thread 
running through all EU action both at home and abroad. On human rights and 
democracy, the EU must be principled when it comes to the norms and values it 
seeks to uphold, creative in the ways it does so, and absolutely determined to 
achieve concrete results. The EU promotes human rights inside and outside its 
borders on the basis that human rights are indispensable both for individual 
dignity and social justice. (High Representative of the European Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2011) 
It seems clear from these statements that the EU has a very strong self-identification as a 
defender of human rights around the world and confidence in its ability to promote these 
norms in its relations with non-Member State countries. There appears, however, to be some 
official recognition of the fact that the intention to make human rights a ‘silver thread’ 
running through the EU’s external relations policy has not yet come to fruition and has in fact 
been hampered by the inconsistencies in its internal approach to human rights at a time when 
the EU is trying to promote human rights externally: 
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The EU is extremely serious about delivering on its pledges. This is vital when it 
comes to the EU’s credibility on the world stage. Increasingly the EU is subject to 
scrutiny by others, who question its record on human rights. It is a defining 
characteristic of the EU. (EEAS Report on Human Rights in the World 2010) 
 
There is…the perception that the EU’s statements on human rights and 
democracy are not always fully matched by its external or internal policies. The 
EU’s internal human rights record has come under increasing scrutiny. The EU 
has not always been as effective or as joined-up as it might have been. The task in 
hand is to ensure the clarity, coherence, and effectiveness of policy, by being 
smarter and more strategic... The EU should commit itself to promoting and 
protecting freedom, dignity, equality and justice for all as a key foreign policy 
priority. (EU High Representative Joint Communication to EP 2011) 
 
This awareness of the fact that a lack of coherence and clarity in internal attitudes towards 
human rights policy and the resultant criticism has an impact on the Union’s external 
approach was shared by one of the EU respondents:  
 
We’re not allowed to have a human rights-based approach because what we do is 
called an internal market. Now we’re starting to have a new Charter on 
Fundamental Rights but it’s really new and you’ve seen in the press whenever the 
EU starts to talk about the Roma it gets bashed on the head so we have no interest 
in talking about what we do inside Europe on human rights. We progressively 
will have more and more of that but it’s not in the culture to say what we do in 
Europe on human rights. I think progressively we’ll get there as we get more 
confident about what we do in Europe but no, it definitely would be better 
accepted, it would be taken more seriously, and it would have more value-added 
[impact]. (Anna, human rights researcher, European Parliament) 
 
This view underlines the fact that in many ways the EU’s strategy on human rights as a whole 
remains in a fairly nascent form and may not be meeting the lofty goals set for it in the 
Union’s official statements on the issue. In addition, it points to a certain defensiveness on 
the part of the Union and its individual Member States when it comes to discussing internal 
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problems with human rights violations which may compromise its ability to promote human 
rights internationally and in relation to Russia particularly, a point this respondent then 
elaborated upon: 
 
The problem is our Member States don’t like us to talk about what goes on in 
Member States when we have dialogues with third countries and that is a huge 
weakness because the EU has no mandate to work on human rights. So it’s very 
difficult for us to go to these dialogues and the Russians would say ‘so what 
about prisons inside the EU, what is the EU doing?’ and the EU would say ‘oh, 
no, we can’t talk about that because it’s not our mandate’ and they’d be like ‘well 
why are we talking to you about ours?’… it’s extremely difficult in these 
dialogues to refer to what we do internally because it’s not an area where we have 
a mandate because our Member States get angry with us if we raise the way they 
do things. So it’s been difficult to raise the EU model. (Anna, human rights 
researcher, European Parliament) 
 
One interesting aspect of the view expressed by this respondent is that, despite the apparent 
obstacles created by Member States when it comes to discussing human rights issues with 
third countries, she appears to believe that there is nevertheless an ‘EU model’ for 
approaching human rights which could be raised if they would allow it. What is less clear is 
precisely what this model of human rights promotion consists of: again, this seems to refer 
back to the ‘vague notion that the EU is ‘doing good’ in the world’ (Sjursen 2006:170) 
encompassed by the normative power Europe concept. Regardless of whether the obstructive 
stance on the part of some Member States mentioned by this respondent is due to 
defensiveness over any discussion of their internal human rights record or a fear of being 
‘bashed on the head’ in public, it undoubtedly leaves the EU open to accusations of ‘double 
standards’ from countries such as Russia which themselves face criticism from the Union of 
their domestic human rights record. It also hinders the Union’s ability to fulfil its ‘vocation’ 
of promoting its perceived internal values of human rights in its external relations since it 
compromises its ability to lead by example. One possible solution some respondents 
highlighted as a way of tackling the lack of coherence in the Union’s external human rights 
policy was the idea of ‘mainstreaming’ human rights throughout the EU’s overall external 
relations policy, rather than treating the issue as a separate theme only to be discussed at very 
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specific meetings or events. This idea reflects the earlier concept of a ‘silver thread’ of human 
rights running through EU external relations policy: 
 
The main answer I’ve tried to give is mainstreaming, so it’s like making sure that 
human rights arise at summit level, to raise it in political dialogue meetings, or 
high-level meetings on visa dialogue, it’s just put a bit of human rights 
everywhere and make sure that there is no human rights in a box side-lined 
somewhere, that’s one thing, it’s also showing the message that you are consistent 
with your concerns. (Anton, EEAS official, Brussels) 
 
If we had a more common line, or a common line at a higher level, let’s put it that 
way – if we had even a common line on internal energy policy then it would free 
the EU’s hands to talk in a strengthened way about any number of issues 
including energy but also including human rights. If human rights policy is 
hermetically sealed then it can’t play a role in the dynamics of linkages, trade-
offs. It has to be part of the mix otherwise it’s out of the game. (Rachel, human 
rights advisor, EEAS) 
 
These same respondents also expressed frustration, however, that the idea of ‘mainstreaming’ 
was, at best, being taken up extremely slowly at an official level. Some respondents 
expressed the more cynical yet fairly prevalent view that the whole idea of promoting human 
rights in the EU’s foreign policy was not as important as issues surrounding trade and energy 
negotiations, particularly where large and oil-rich countries such as Russia are concerned: 
 
Business trumps human rights and EU businesspeople are not interested in human 
rights. (Neil, European affairs think-tank analyst, Brussels) 
 
There are some Member States where with Russia they would have an interest in 
just keeping human rights out of discussions. (Anton, EEAS official, Brussels) 
 
This view may not be entirely fair since, as will be discussed in further detail in the following 
chapter, in practical as well as rhetorical terms the EU does appear to have a commitment to 
promoting human rights in its relations with Russia through longstanding project funding 
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programmes such as the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights.111 
Nevertheless, the views expressed by these respondents highlight the level of concern over 
the perceived inconsistencies in the EU’s internal and external strategy on promoting human 
rights and a degree of frustration at the extent to which the Union is in some respects 
hamstrung by its need to respect the often differing agendas of its individual Member States.  
It also points to the fact that, rather than operating in a vacuum, human rights issues in EU-
Russia relations must also interact with other factors which are important in that relationship, 
be that trade, energy or visa questions.  
 
6.4   Constructions of economic and social rights in the EU’s external relations with 
Russia 
 
Despite the possible inconsistencies in the Union’s general approach towards human rights, 
when it comes to understandings of economic and social rights specifically the EU’s 
institutions appear to be at pains to stress the indivisibility of these rights and civil and 
political rights in its external policies: 
 
The EU attaches the same importance to economic, social and cultural rights as it 
does to civil and political rights. As is the case for political and civil rights issues, 
the EU also raises economic, social and cultural rights during EU human rights 
dialogues and consultations with non-EU countries, as well as during meetings 
with relevant civil society groups. (European External Action Service)  
 
All human rights – civil, political, economic, social and cultural – are universal in 
nature, valid for everyone, everywhere… the EU should reaffirm its commitment 
to the universality, indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights – civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural. (High Representative of the European 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2011) 
 
Despite this seeming commitment to the universality and indivisibility of rights, however, in 
practice it appears that there is some recognition that economic and social rights come second 
                                                          
111 For further details see ‘Civil Society Dialogue: Overview,’ Delegation of the European Union to Russia, 
available at http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/eu_russia/civil_society_dialogue/overview/index_en.htm  
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to civil and political rights in both EU thinking and actual policy. The European Economic 
and Social Committee (EESC), for example, has called for greater emphasis on these rights in 
the Union’s external policies on human rights and civil society development, particularly in 
the context of the global economic crisis: 
 
The EESC calls for economic, social and cultural rights to be given greater 
importance in the European Union’s policies. Due to the financial and economic 
crisis, this priority has now become more urgent than ever.  The EESC considers 
that as protagonists of the social dialogue, social partners must be seen as 
indispensable players and partners of the EU and must be fully integrated into the 
political dialogue. The EESC stresses the importance of protecting work and the 
associated rights set out by the International Labour Organisation core 
conventions (right to work, right to organise and collective bargaining, non-
discrimination at work, outlawing of child and forced labour). (European 
Economic and Social Committee 2009) 
 
Several of the EU and Member State representatives interviewed for this study also expressed 
the view that these rights were not seen by the EU as being on the same level as ‘classical’ 
civil and political rights and were therefore of less interest when it came to discussions on 
human rights with Russia and other third countries: 
 
Economic and social rights come far down the EU agenda, the EU could and 
should do more on economic and social rights…there is less EU clarity and 
consensus about economic and social rights despite the stuff in the Treaties. 
(John, EU Member State diplomat, Moscow) 
 
We still have a rather classic definition of human rights...there is perhaps a need 
to modernise the approach because our too traditional definition of our human 
rights is not always a vehicle for ensuring that you facilitate your dialogue with 
the authorities here [in Russia]. I wouldn’t say that our approach to human rights 
definitely does not need a substantial change - our rhetoric, as we started off with 
the conservative definition [of human rights], we need to work on this, broaden 
the understanding, diversify this image a bit and accept that human rights 
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research has a broader definition… as we have so many topics to go over in the 
classic definition I see that that space has not been made in the political agenda 
but I do see that we could win by broadening perhaps sometimes that 
understanding of human rights and that it could give perhaps some more allies on 
the authority side here. (Matthew, EU Delegation official, Moscow) 
 
The idea that the EU is choosing to make economic and social rights a lesser priority and that 
its definition of what ‘human rights’ mean might be too narrow relates back to the idea first 
raised in Chapter 1 that economic and social rights, and indeed ‘human rights’ in general, 
remain a contested area open to multiple different interpretations and emphases. Various EU 
and Member State respondents also acknowledged that insisting on a somewhat narrow 
definition of human rights could be counterproductive in terms of the EU’s policy towards 
Russia given the importance of such rights to the Russian public at large discussed in the 
previous chapters and the possibility that Russian government officials might be more willing 
to discuss such issues: 
 
There is always at least one topic if not two or three on economic, social and 
cultural rights [during the human rights consultations] and these are of course the 
ones where you can usually get a little more traction with the Russian side: the 
rights of women, education, health issues – these are issues where there’s real 
common ground with Russia and where I think we could do a lot more than we do 
currently. (Rachel, human rights advisor, EEAS) 
 
There is definitely more public support [in Russia] for social rights issues than 
traditional human rights issues. Even in the big cities, people feel social problems 
are closer to their own lives e.g. health, children etc. (Katya, Netherlands 
Consulate, St Petersburg) 
 
One respondent highlighted the fact that the EU essentially chooses to disregard such 
attitudes by choosing to concentrate on civil and political rights problems: 
 
155 
 
There’s more focus [by the EU] on political than socio-economic rights issues but there is 
more appetite for economic and social issues in the [Russian] regions than for our distant 
political concerns (John, British diplomat, Moscow) 
Again, this appears to suggest that the EU may be deliberately downgrading economic and 
social rights issues within its own ‘hierarchy of rights,’ regardless of what might be 
appropriate or effective in the Russian context. It also suggests a certain assumption on the 
part of the Union that its ‘EU model’ of human rights is both the ‘best’ approach and the most 
suitable in relation to Russia, regardless of what the wider public might actually prioritise. 
Another respondent indicated that there was indeed an overall tendency within the Union’s 
human rights policy towards third countries to focus on civil and political rights, but that 
there was also a division between the individual Member States when it came to discussing 
economic and social rights in the EU’s official consultations with Russia. This reflects the 
internal lack of consensus on the meaning and importance of such rights discussed earlier:  
 
There are always certain items that are on the agenda, the ‘evergreens,’ that 
include the usual suspects of political and civil rights, human rights 
defenders…We do talk as well about economic, social and cultural rights, 
probably there’s less of an emphasis on this than on the civil and political rights 
but I wouldn’t characterise this as being isolated to the Russian case, I would say 
that this is overall a problem of balance in our human rights consultations and 
dialogues, we do tend to focus more on the first Convention112 rather than the 
second. There are certain Member States which have pushed very hard to include 
more economic, social and cultural rights. We acknowledge the importance and 
the indivisibility of applied rights but many Member States feel that we should be 
focusing on civil and political rights in Russia because that’s where there are 
glaring violations that we see. (Rachel, human rights advisor, EEAS) 
 
This point about the influence of individual Member States was also raised by another 
respondent, who highlighted the often troubled relationship between Russia and some of the 
                                                          
112 The ‘Convention’ the respondent is referring to here is the UN’s International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights of 1966. That same year the UN’s original Universal Declaration of Human Rights was divided 
into this Covenant and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. For further details 
see ‘The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,’ available at 
http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cpr.html 
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newer EU Member States from Central and Eastern Europe as a potential obstacle in 
discussing economic and social rights issues: 
 
I think it also reflects what a lot of Member States want, they think emphasis 
should be put on [civil and political rights], especially given the legacy, the 
historical legacy of some of them where you know the situation.113(Anton, EEAS 
official, Brussels) 
 
If, however, it is the case that ‘at least one’ if not more topics related to economic and social 
rights always make it on to the agenda of the biannual EU-Russia Human Rights 
Consultations, then this is not reflected in recent official accounts of the discussions, which 
indicate that all of the issues raised are connected to civil and political rights issues: 
 
Both sides discussed at length the worrying situation of civil society in the 
Russian Federation, in particular the wave of restrictive legislation, the recent 
checks conducted on the basis of the “foreign agents” law and the ongoing court 
cases… The EU raised a number of specific human rights issues in the Russian 
Federation, enquired about the impact of Russia's efforts to fight against torture 
and to foster the independence of the judiciary in light of the recent visit of the 
UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers. The EU 
asked Russia to ensure that defence lawyers are able to work freely, in particular 
in the Northern Caucasus. The EU also called on Russia to refrain from adopting 
a federal legislation on ‘homosexual propaganda,’ which it believed could 
increase discrimination and violence against LGBTI individuals. (Council of the 
European Union May 2013) 
 
The EU and Russia focussed in particular on the working of civil society [and] 
rule of law, as well as cooperation in international fora and the fight against 
discrimination… Regarding the Northern Caucasus, the EU touched on the issues 
of abductions and enforced disappearances, forced evictions and women's rights. 
(Council of the European Union November 2011) 
                                                          
113 The respondent is referring to EU Member States such as the Baltic countries which were part of the Soviet 
Union until 1991 and Poland which was one of the Warsaw Pact countries until 1989. 
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This apparent failure to raise economic and social rights issues is not necessarily entirely 
down to the EU’s reluctance to discuss them: some respondents maintained that the Russian 
government representatives party to discussions with the EU on human rights issues either 
showed little interest in human rights in general or had not shown any particular desire to 
discuss economic and social rights issues more specifically: 
 
It is difficult for us to know what the Russians are interested in because they 
refuse to play an active part even in the backseat… they’re honestly not interested 
in human rights, they want energy cooperation...They were apparently interested 
in citizenship issues but no, to my knowledge they’re not interested in talking 
about economic and social rights that I’m aware of. (Anna, human rights 
researcher, European Parliament) 
Another respondent contrasted the Russian approach with that of China, which he claimed 
tends to emphasise economic and social rights in its own human rights discussions with the 
EU: 
Russia particularly likes to raise issues of racism and hate crime so there’s a 
feature more politically on that. It’s a recent thing, there is space to change but 
probably also it’s not a request that we get from the Russian side, on the contrary 
we see it with China for example, China was very much pushing to get social and 
economic rights on the agenda so we were always trying to do it. (Anton, EEAS 
official, Brussels) 
Yet several respondents who are responsible for implementing the human rights policies of 
individual Member States in Russia expressed opinions on the validity of promoting 
economic and social rights which appear to be reflected in the Union’s official stance on such 
matters and might therefore explain the EU’s apparent reluctance to raise them in its 
discussions with Russia. Some, for example, seemed to see economic and social rights as 
‘budgetary’ issues which should be taken care of solely by the State rather than becoming a 
focus for international concern or intervention. Where Russia is concerned, they felt this was 
something the State could easily afford to do: 
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The State has the money for social services, the [Russian] public is interested in 
social rights but not in human rights violations – we shouldn’t focus on things the 
government can afford to do. (Edith, EU Member State diplomat, Moscow) 
Political and civil rights are much more prevalent than economic and social 
rights. Economic and social rights are often to do with budgetary possibilities, 
and stuff like that. My feelings are the Russian authorities today seek to address 
most issues of economic and social rights, not necessarily because those are rights 
but because that is what the people want and they will maintain stability and the 
recent popularity for the authorities, whereas in some areas they actually strive to 
limit civil and political rights.  I think that is why the attention is primarily 
focused on that area. (Thomas, EU Member State diplomat, Moscow) 
These views both reassert the role of the state in relation to realising economic and social 
rights which was highlighted in Chapter 5, and again make the distinction between economic 
and social rights on the one hand, and ‘real’ human rights on the other, thus referring back to 
the highly contested nature of economic and social rights and the lack of consensus within the 
EU and amongst its Member States over the meaning and importance of these rights. One 
respondent further emphasised this by pointing to the perception on the part of some Member 
States that so-called ‘soft rights’ related to economic and social issues could distract from 
official discussions of civil and political rights, particularly when the time available for such 
discussions was so limited:  
The [human rights] Consultations are short, I mean you’re talking about two days 
every year, so there is probably also a fear that some ‘soft right’ as it could be 
seen could distract from the focus of the Consultations. Take for example China 
wanted to discuss pensioners’ rights or the right to health some years ago. (Anton, 
EEAS official, Brussels) 
This indicates that there is a degree of ambivalence towards promoting economic and social 
rights on both the official level of the EU Member States and on the part of some of those 
countries’ representatives working ‘on the ground’ on human rights issues in Russia. It also 
reflects the institutional approach discussed earlier whereby economic and social rights are 
seen as falling under the categories of social or economic policy or social work, rather than 
being defined as rights claims on a par with civil and political rights. As a result, despite the 
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Union’s pronounced commitment to the indivisibility of civil, political, economic and social 
rights, it seems a certain hierarchy of rights is already in place before the formal discussions 
with the Russian side have even begun. 
6.5   Conclusions 
This chapter has attempted to explore some of the ways in which human rights in general and 
economic and social rights in particular are constructed in official EU discourse on internal 
and external policy and by individual representatives of the Union and its Member States 
working in the area of human rights policy. Where both the internal and external context is 
concerned, a picture emerges of a lack of clarity and consensus in the Union’s conceptual 
aims and objectives when it comes to accepting and promoting economic and social rights as 
fundamental rights for EU citizens and as values to be promoted in the Union’s relations with 
third countries. Much of this can be attributed to the fact that there appears to be an internal 
divide between the different Member States in terms of desirable models of delivering 
welfare and consequently realising social rights, as well as a reluctance by Member States to 
have their internal human rights affairs raised in discussions with Russia and other external 
partners which leaves the Union open to accusations of double standards when it attempts to 
raise human rights violations with third countries such as Russia and China. As a result, 
despite the Union’s lofty and oft-stated commitment to upholding the universality and 
indivisibility of all human rights, it appears that ultimately this aim is not being realised and 
that there is a clear and longstanding emphasis on those rights which coincide with values 
that are perceived to be ‘liberal’ and are to some extent perhaps more compatible with 
neoliberal theories on the role of the state in providing access to welfare and the realisation of 
economic and social rights.  
 
As many involved in formulating EU and Member State policy on human rights recognise, 
however, maintaining a somewhat narrow classical definition of what human rights are at a 
time when many on the Russian side appear to define both the meaning and hierarchy of 
human rights somewhat differently poses a number of problems for the long-term impact of 
the Union’s policy and programmes in this area and undermines its efforts to portray itself as 
some form of international ‘moral arbiter’ where human rights are concerned. The extent to 
which this has an impact in practical policy terms will be further explored in the following 
chapter. 
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Chapter Seven 
The EU’s Promotion of Economic and Social Rights in Russia: Beyond Theory 
  
7.1   Introduction 
 
The previous chapter aimed to explore the way in which the EU conceptualises economic and 
social rights within the context of its internal and external relations policies. The purpose of 
this chapter is to examine the impact its interpretation of such rights has on its strategy 
towards promoting various rights in Russia by focusing on the EU’s interactions with human 
rights and social NGOs in Russia of the type discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 and the ways in 
which such NGOs respond to and view this policy. The data utilised has been drawn from 
interviews conducted with representatives of Russian human rights and social NGOs with 
experience of cooperating on projects with various EU institutions; Russian academics 
specialising in research on human rights issues; and representatives of the EU institutions and 
individual Member States with responsibility for implementing human rights projects in 
Russia. The chapter aims to demonstrate that the EU’s apparent emphasis on promoting one 
set of rights over another within its human rights policy towards Russia has resulted in a 
degree of incoherence and lack of clarity in its approach on the ground which compromises 
its ability to be an effective actor in this policy area and its interaction with certain sectors of 
Russian civil society. 
 
7.2   Funding human rights: the European Instrument for Democracy and Human 
Rights 
Prior to analysing the opinions expressed by various respondents on the impact of the EU’s 
policy initiatives in relation to human rights, it is important to provide some context to the 
types of policy instruments the EU has at its disposal when it comes to promoting human 
rights in its external relations with Russia. The two programmes most relevant for the 
purposes of this study are the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 
(EIDHR) of 2006 (previously the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights from 
2000-2006), which focuses on working directly with NGOs in third countries to promote 
democratization, the rule of law, civil society development and human rights issues such as 
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the abolition of the death penalty;114 and the Institution Building Partnership Programme: 
Support to Civil Society and Local Initiatives (IBPP) which ran in Russia from 2002 to 2011 
and focused on working with state and non-state actors on social sector reform.115 In terms of 
the formal approach taken towards the promotion of various different rights by these policy 
instruments, the EIDHR is unsurprisingly the most explicitly rights-focused initiative and 
provides direct funding to Russian NGOs to work on micro and macro projects relating most 
recently to ‘promoting justice and rule of law; fostering a culture of human rights; promoting 
democratic processes; and advancing equality, tolerance and peace’ (Delegation of the EU to 
Russia 2012). Its most recent call for proposals in Russia in 2011 further elaborates on these 
themes by providing funding for projects aimed at: 
 
Consolidating civil society efforts to bring about legislative changes and to 
improve state policy on fundamental human rights issues, such as combating 
racism and xenophobia, prevention of torture and ill-treatment, promotion of the 
rule of law, democratic oversight, enhancing freedom of opinion, freedom of the 
press and freedom of assembly, promotion of electoral rights etc; Strengthening 
civil society and reinforcing the protection of human rights defenders; Enhancing 
inclusiveness and pluralism in society, protecting women's rights and the rights of 
minorities such as migrants, ethnic minorities, people living with AIDS, disabled 
people, LGBT people etc. (EIDHR 2011) 
 
It therefore seems apparent that, despite the rhetorical commitment on the part of the EU to 
the inclusion of economic and social rights within its programmes to promote universal 
human rights standards in its relations with third countries discussed in the previous chapter, 
in terms of the main human rights funding instrument employed in Russia there is a clear 
emphasis on covering issues relating to civil and political rights violations and discrimination 
against certain vulnerable groups. This is reflected by the EU Delegation to Russia’s own 
reporting on the implementation of the EIDHR: in 2011-2012, for example, the 9 new 
                                                          
114 For further details see ‘European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights,’ Development and 
Cooperation – EuropeAid, European Commission, 17 February 2012, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/eidhr_en.htm  
115 For further details see ‘Institution Building Partnership Programme (IBPP): Support to Civil Society and 
Local Initiatives,’ European External Action Service, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/eu_russia/tech_financial_cooperation/ibpp_civil_society/index_en.htm  
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projects awarded funding covered issues such as election monitoring, freedom of expression, 
defending human rights in the North Caucasus and protecting the rights of minorities and 
prisoners against discrimination (Delegation of the European Union to the Russian Federation 
2012). In 2010-2011, just two of the 14 new EIDHR projects launched concerned an issue 
relating to economic and social rights: a homeless charity in St Petersburg received a grant to 
‘improve access to free medical help for Russian citizens without registration’ and the Danish 
Refugee Council received funding to motivate internally displaced persons (IDPs) in 
Chechnya and Ingushetia to ‘establish a channel for asserting their rights to adequate living 
conditions’ by distributing materials on social rights and benefits to provide IDPs with 
‘increased knowledge of their humanitarian and socio-economic rights’ (Delegation of the 
European Union to the Russian Federation 2011:15).  
 
It is worth noting, however, that this is the only project in recent years which explicitly 
mentions social and economic rights and it applies only to two North Caucasus republics 
which, as a post-conflict zone, have very specific problems and living standards which do not 
necessarily apply to the same degree elsewhere in Russia. In 2009-2010, two out of 27 
projects funded concerned issues which could be seen as related to economic and social 
rights: a project entitled ‘Defending Social and Labour Rights: Raising Awareness and 
Promoting Self-Organisation Among Russian Teachers’ (Delegation of the European 
Commission to Russia 2010: 11) and one entitled ‘Providing Labour Migrants with Support 
and Assistance’ aimed at reducing labour exploitation in Moscow (Delegation of the 
European Commission to Russia 2009). One striking aspect of the projects funded is the fact 
that a relatively small number of Russian human rights NGOs often receive repeat grants: 
organisations such as the Youth Human Rights Movement,116 the Committee Against 
Torture,117 the Humanist Research and Methodology Centre,118 and two of the oldest Russian 
human rights NGOs – Memorial119 and the Moscow Helsinki Group120 - have all received a 
number of macro and micro grants for different projects since 2003. This is not to say that 
other, smaller and less well-known NGOs are unsuccessful in gaining funding, but, as will be 
further discussed below, the fact that the same organisations tend to dominate the funding 
                                                          
116 http://yhrm.org/eng/ 
117 http://www.pytkam.net/web/index.php?newlang=en 
118 www.humanist.ru  
119 www.memo.ru 
120 www.mhg.ru 
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process has become cause for concern amongst several of the Russian and EU respondents 
interviewed for this study. 
 
7.3   The EU and human rights NGOs: preaching to the converted? 
 
In terms of the response this approach to funding human rights activities received from the 
Russian respondents interviewed for this study, several with experience of working on EU-
funded projects either as grant-holders or consultants pointed out that the type of NGO most 
likely to receive support from the EU under the EIDHR programme was also the type least 
likely to have much impact in terms of public support or sympathy: 
 
The European Union is supporting people who in the eyes of the majority are 
completely marginal, they have no political support. The gay parades121 and so on 
– that’s all great, but it’s a very small group of people. From the point of view of 
the majority these are not relevant issues: people don’t understand problems 
which are not related to their lives. (Pavel, academic, St Petersburg) 
For Russians this kind of rights discourse is not theirs, it’s not how they see the 
world. I just found them [human rights NGOs] very dysfunctional actually. I 
understand where that’s come from, that sort of dissident, over-intellectualised 
approach but it’s increasingly in my view irrelevant and not helpful. (Nadezhda, 
children’s charity manager, St Petersburg) 
 Klitsounova (2008: 4) supports this contention, arguing that Russian human rights NGOs 
‘have not yet coalesced into a movement attracting a great deal of press coverage or public 
support: at present they are unlikely to be capable of dramatically shifting domestic 
incentives that define Russia’s current human rights policy. Human rights NGOs – their 
agendas, arguments and practices – do not engage many Russians.’ Some respondents 
representing more socially-oriented organisations criticised the EU’s emphasis on funding 
                                                          
121 Local authorities in Moscow and St Petersburg have consistently refused to grant permission to Russian 
LGBT activists wishing to hold Gay Pride marches in the two cities. See for example ‘Moscow Says No to May 
25 Gay Pride Parade,’RIA Novosti, 15th May 2013, available at 
http://www.en.ria.ru/russia/20130515/181167995/Moscow-Says-No-to-May-25-Gay-Pride-Parade.html; ‘Gay 
Parades Banned in Moscow for 100 Years,’ BBC.com, 17th August 2012, available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-19293465  
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civil and political rights projects, pointing out that there are a number of serious social 
problems in Russia which in their opinion require more urgent or at least greater attention: 
Those who represent European human rights organisations are unfortunately 
more interested in protecting political rights in Russia and throughout the world. 
We have quite a few problems in the housing sphere and the social sphere, and of 
course these need to be resolved above all. But the European Commission tries to 
make sure attention stays on the protection or lack of protection of political rights. 
(Sergey, advisor to a regional child human rights ombudsman). 
[Focusing on civil and political over economic and social rights] is a negative 
tendency, not just for the European Union but unfortunately for all donors. For 
some reason it’s become much less important for the majority of donors to 
provide social assistance, even though this is still very important for Russia. Their 
focus has shifted to human rights and legal activities which are not effective 
without real support for social assistance and there are a lot of people who need 
this type of service but can’t access it. (Lydia, healthcare charity, St Petersburg). 
One of the issues such views highlight is that, regardless of what the EU might be doing in 
practical policy terms in the social sphere in Russia which, as will be discussed below, can be 
significant, the perception amongst some Russian civil society and state-affiliated actors is 
that it is placing undue emphasis on civil and political rights and organising its funding 
accordingly. This also links back to an issue raised in Chapter 6, namely the idea that the EU 
is deciding what is ‘best’ for Russia where human rights are concerned according to its own 
definition of ‘human rights,’ rather than considering what might be both necessary and more 
appealing to a wider audience in Russia. In addition, representatives of the more socially-
oriented type of organisation contrasted what they saw as their approach of working with 
local authorities to achieve concrete results in the social sphere and ‘get things done’ with the 
more ‘oppositional’ stance of human rights NGOs such as the Moscow Helsinki Group and 
Memorial which are still dominated by figures from the Soviet dissident movement and 
which have been highly successful in obtaining funding from the EU:   
They [human rights activists] take a very categorical, even oppositional stance. In 
our country it’s quite difficult to operate and be effective if you take this stance. 
Because we have a lot of projects that are connected to social services, if we were 
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to join this opposition camp we would quickly lose the chance to get things done 
in this city. (Lydia, healthcare charity, St Petersburg) 
Those old-style groups have a very different understanding of what rights are, and 
a very different understanding of how to create change, how to facilitate change, 
how to have a normal constructive discussion with the government, how to 
discuss, how to talk to people in a normal way. The government and the NGO 
community and the people who are getting on with things tend to just bypass 
them. (Nadezhda, children’s charity manager, St Petersburg) 
This points to a problem which was also acknowledged by a number of EU and Member 
State representatives, namely that the EU and its Member States are in a sense ‘locked in’ to a 
small network of closely connected human rights NGOs in Russia which share its discourse 
on human rights but have largely been sidelined politically and appear to lack the ability to 
appeal to a wider and younger domestic audience and the desire to interact with local 
authorities: 
In terms of co-operation with local human rights groups we meet them quite 
regularly to know what is going on and have formal contacts with them.  It is a 
limited number of people of course engaged in this: that is not the problem, the 
cooperation. It’s more that there are not so many people involved in this. I think it 
is not their fault so much, it is more that this is not the priority which is the 
highest on the agenda of the Russian people at this particular moment in history. 
(Thomas, EU Member State diplomat, Moscow) 
While this respondent suggested that the human rights NGO community was not itself 
responsible for its apparent isolation, several other EU Member State respondents expressed 
frustration with what they saw as the somewhat dated or unhelpful attitudes and behaviour of 
some of the more established human rights activists who tend to dominate EU funding and 
lobbying networks: 
The most frustrating thing is preaching to the converted: it’s hard to get the 
authorities involved but some NGOs don’t even try. It’s mainly older people who 
are engaging with human rights. The human rights community is quite 
conservative, a bit rigid, has the attitude that ‘our method is best.’ (Edith, EU 
Member State diplomat, Moscow) 
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The human rights activists are wonderful people but they are locked in a certain 
position, dragging their historical luggage along with them. It’s not a human 
rights movement but a group of personalities who all know each other and have 
their own personal agendas and know where each other stands because of their 
degree of experience. It’s a closed shop with a hierarchy.  They need to be open 
to a degree of contact with the authorities. (Frieda, EU Member State diplomat, St 
Petersburg) 
To some extent, as various respondents acknowledged, this state of affairs has come about 
due to factors which may be beyond the control of the EU: several made reference to the fact 
that Russia is a huge country and that EU funding for human rights projects has diminished 
sharply since its high point in the early to mid-1990s. At present, for example, the EU 
Delegation to Russia has only one dedicated human rights officer and there are also issues of 
language and experience of the funding application process to contend with. As a result, there 
tends to be a bias in favour of those organisations which have staff able to communicate in 
English and meet the application requirements, as various respondents acknowledged: 
There is probably space to do more on social and economic rights but it is also the 
resources we have and the interaction we have with NGOs for example tends to 
focus mostly on civil and political rights rather than economic and social rights. 
… civil society is very much closed to the people who come to us basically or 
who are using resources to get organized or speak English and find out that 
maybe it might be worth lobbying the EU one way or another so yes it’s 
definitely part of the picture. We know it’s a certain part of civil society that we 
talk to. (Anton, EEAS official, Brussels) 
Inevitably, however, as one respondent pointed out, this can lead to the problem of ‘grant-
seeking,’ whereby NGOs approach the EU with potential projects which they feel are likely 
to mesh with what the EU is looking for and is likely to fund but which may not reflect the 
most urgent issues or at least those of most concern to the population of the country itself 
(interview with Frieda, EU Member State diplomat). This relates to an issue raised in Chapter 
4, namely the degree to which local NGOs act as ‘translators’ of international human rights 
norms in the domestic context and the extent to which they attempt to master the discourse on 
rights employed by their potential funders in order to improve their chances of working with 
them (Merry 2006). In addition, a number of Russian and EU respondents were critical of the 
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way in which the EU’s human rights agenda for Russia is determined and what they saw as a 
disconnect between policymaking in Brussels and the realities of life ‘on the ground’ in 
Russia: 
The [EU’s] agenda in Russia is not decided by Russian problems, how they are 
understood here, but how they are understood by the European Union. That’s the 
way it works – the agenda is transformed under pressure from the donors. It’s 
very obvious how European standards clash with the reality of life in 
Russia....nothing is getting done. (Pavel, academic, St Petersburg) 
The EU puts the individual rights of numerous different groups first in its 
dialogue with Russia, and social and economic rights, which are more significant 
for the population as a whole, end up coming last. (Vadim, academic, St 
Petersburg) 
There should be more emphasis on economic and social rights issues. The EU 
tends to focus on freedom of speech and assembly but what is the result? The 
press for example reaches only a very small audience – there are more long-term 
results with social issues and it’s better for the long-term development of Russia 
in political terms as well as social. (Frieda, Member State diplomat, St 
Petersburg) 
 
Such opinions serve to highlight a fundamental problem with the EU’s strategy on human 
rights in Russia which was raised in the previous chapter, namely that it is attempting to 
promote a certain somewhat narrow vision of human rights in Russia via cooperation with a 
small and closely-connected network of human rights NGOs which may not resonate with the 
wider, more ‘everyday’ concerns of both Russian civil society and the Russian public.  
 
7.4   ‘Rights’ projects v. ‘social’ projects: a false divide? 
Where the promotion of economic and social rights specifically is concerned, focusing only 
on the type of projects funded under the EIDHR is to some extent misleading since the EU 
has in fact funded a number of projects which relate to the realisation of economic and social 
rights by promoting access to healthcare and other social services and children’s rights under 
its separate Institution Building Partnership Programme: Support to Civil Society and Local 
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Initiatives programme in Russia. Although this programme ended in 2011, similar work will 
continue under the new Non-State Actors and Local Authorities in Development 
Programme.122 While this particular programme had a much greater focus on social projects 
and working with social NGOs as partners, in contrast to the EIDHR this instrument did not 
take an explicitly rights-based approach, although children’s rights have emerged as a more 
prominent theme and the project descriptions often talk of ensuring their ‘equal life chances’ 
(European Union Delegation to Russia 2009). It also worked with state as well as non-state 
actors by encouraging networking and joint projects between NGOs and local authorities 
working on various issues affecting the social sector. In 2006, for example, projects covered 
issues such as the de-institutionalisation of child welfare services; tackling homelessness 
amongst adults and adolescents; supporting adults and children with disabilities; and civil 
society development (Delegation of the European Commission to Russia 2006). Following 
evaluation of the programme’s results the decision was then taken to focus exclusively on the 
social sector, with the 2007 and 2008 calls for proposals focusing on Children, Women and 
Youth and the 2009 call limited to Child Welfare and Disability.123 
 
In contrast to the criticism of the EIDHR made by numerous different respondents, several of 
those who represented Russian social NGOs and had received funding for various projects 
under the IBPP scheme were full of praise for the programme, particularly for its emphasis on 
working in concert with local authorities who are the key actors with whom the social NGOs 
interviewed said they must engage in order to effect change: 
They have a very clear focus on children and child protection and on disability, 
and women and gender. But within that framework there’s a lot of flexibility so 
you can sit down with your partners and come up with your own solutions that 
meet what’s going on on the ground. I think they have quite a rights-based 
approach. And they tend to talk about children’s rights – equal life chances is the 
term that they’ve used quite a lot over the last 10 years or so and you can fit a 
                                                          
122 For further details see ‘Non-state actors and local authorities in development,’ European Commission, 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/dci/non_state_actors_en.htm  
123 123 For further details see ‘Institution Building Partnership Programme (IBPP): Support to Civil Society and 
Local Initiatives,’ European External Action Service, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/eu_russia/tech_financial_cooperation/ibpp_civil_society/index_en.htm  
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rights-based agenda into that quite easily. (Nadezhda, children’s charity manager, 
St Petersburg) 
[The EU] takes a very balanced approach, they don’t go to extremes. If you go to 
extremes, you risk falling out with the Russian authorities and in my opinion 
that’s not very effective. So I like that they take a moderate approach with human 
rights. Because our government likes to say we have a strong state which can 
provide this assistance itself, but, based on our experience of working in this 
field, we can see that unfortunately the clients which we try to hand over to the 
state social services are refused support and end up back with us anyway. (Lydia, 
healthcare charity, St Petersburg) 
This again highlights the contradiction between the rhetoric of a ‘strong state’ taking an 
active role in welfare provision which is utilised by the authorities and the reality of the 
limited services available to vulnerable groups. Where this type of socially-oriented NGO 
was concerned, the approach taken by the IBPP scheme appeared to resonate much more 
strongly with their previously mentioned desire to ‘get things done’ than that taken by the 
EIDHR programme which works only with non-state actors. Yet at the same time the 
apparent reluctance to employ the language of economic and social rights in relation to such 
projects, except where those relating to children are concerned, is significant since, in 
contrast to the projects funded by the EIDHR, it gives the impression that projects focused on 
issues surrounding health, education, and social services are either charitable endeavours or 
part of an attempt to promote good governance rather than rights entitlements.  
 
In addition, after 2006 the decision to reorient the IBPP programme away from projects 
which concerned wider issues such as access to healthcare and towards those which focus 
exclusively on issues affecting children and teenagers is also important in the context of 
economic and social rights. Although the IBPP tends to be fairly clear about using ‘rights’ 
language in relation to children and young people, as one respondent who works in the 
children’s social sector in Russia pointed out, ‘children have no power. Adults have a certain 
amount of power so they can do things with their rights that children can’t, or at least up until 
a certain point in their lives they tend not to’ (Nadezhda, children’s charity manager, St 
Petersburg). The same respondent also highlighted the fact that, despite the commitment the 
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EU appears to have to advocating children’s rights, projects concerning such rights are still 
funded under the ‘social’ funding stream rather than the ‘human rights’ stream of the EIDHR: 
I think there’s this artificial split about what’s rights and what’s social. We have 
applied to the EIDHR instrument before and never got it, and I think it’s because 
somewhere in the system they think of organisations like us as social, and 
therefore we are IBPP-type organisations and no matter what we apply for in a 
rights instrument we’re unlikely to get it. My sense is that they’ve put more 
money into social-type programmes than they have into rights-type programmes 
over the last 10 years or so, and that when they talk about civil society they mean 
our type of civil society as much as they do the rights and political-type civil 
society, the social services and setting up of things around education, health, 
social work etc. (Nadezhda, children’s charity manager, St Petersburg) 
As this respondent indicates, there is a contradiction in that projects funded under the IBPP 
were always ‘macro’ projects in that the grants made were rarely for less than 150,000 Euro 
and were often up to 1 Million Euro, whereas micro projects funded by the EIDHR can only 
be for between 30,000 and 150,000 Euro124 and, although in theory the macro grants can also 
go from 150,000 to 1 Million Euro, in practice this happens rarely. In 2012, for example, only 
one out of nine new EIDHR projects received a macro grant (Delegation of the European 
Union to the Russian Federation 2012). This indicates that the EU appears to have a greater 
financial commitment at least to supporting ‘social’ projects than human rights projects, 
while at the same time maintaining the ‘artificial split’ between them mentioned by the 
respondent quoted above. Yet it is not clear that such a divide is either necessary or 
constructive, and several respondents felt that the EU could do a great deal more where 
economic and social rights were concerned, although they did not necessarily see this 
happening in the near future: 
If it is easier to co-operate in areas of social and economic rights, I think we 
should co-operate in this area, but then co-operation should be based on some 
level of equality. But if the Russians are prepared to engage in some kind of co-
                                                          
124 For further details see ‘European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights,’ Development and 
Cooperation – EuropeAid, European Commission, 17 February 2012, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/eidhr_en.htm  
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operation on an equal basis then I think we should do that, and the more the 
better. (Thomas, Member State diplomat, Moscow) 
 
In principle we could build bridges from economic rights into human rights. But 
this is not taking place, somehow everybody remains in his isolated focus. 
(Matthew, EU official, Moscow) 
 
Ultimately the decision up until now to maintain this split between the two types of project 
and essentially between the two sets of rights only serves to perpetuate the idea that the EU 
pursues one rule for its own citizens by highlighting economic and social rights within its 
section on ‘solidarity’ in the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the EU 2000) and another for those who live outside its borders. This idea was raised by 
one respondent who pointed out the contradictions inherent in such an approach: 
 
The EU should emphasise its ideology on human rights in relation to the 
protection of human rights in Russia, it should rely on the basis it created in its 
act on fundamental rights in the EU in 2000 which was constructed as 
fundamental values relating to solidarity which are guaranteed equally by social, 
political and economic rights. This means the EU is contradicting its own 
approach which it has proclaimed for all EU citizens – that there are values which 
are underpinned to an equal degree by a varied spectrum of rights. If the EU were 
to take the same strategy in relation to Russia which it takes with its own citizens 
then that would be one thing, if not then...(Vadim, academic, St Petersburg) 
According to this respondent, therefore, the EU in fact already has a type of ‘blueprint’ for 
promoting economic and social rights in the form of its Charter of Fundamental Rights, but is 
making a conscious and flawed decision not to use this as a framework in its relations with 
countries outside the Union.  
7.5   The EU’s institutional structure: an ‘outspoken’ Parliament v. the more 
pragmatic Commission? 
 
Having examined the key policy initiatives concerning human rights and social issues in 
Russia, it is important to consider other factors which influence the EU’s policymaking 
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process in this context. The process of formulating EU policy and deciding which issues are 
to be priorities for its human rights programmes in third countries is clearly a highly complex 
one. On the one hand the new European External Action Service (formerly European 
Commission and European Council) is now the main bureaucratic structure responsible for 
the practical task of implementing funding initiatives such as the EIDHR and the IBPP. On 
the other hand, various members of the European Parliament have proven to be outspoken 
critics of Russia’s human rights record and have made efforts to raise a variety of such issues 
in their capacity as members of various parliamentary committees such as the Sub-Committee 
on Human Rights125 and the EU-Russia Parliamentary Cooperation Committee126 by passing 
resolutions which criticise the Russian government on a more formal level. Most recently 
such resolutions have condemned Russia for local legislation which discriminates against the 
LGBT community,127 the lack of progress in solving the murders of reporter Anna 
Politkovskaya and human rights activist Nataliya Estemirova,128 and the violation of the right 
to peaceful assembly and the perceived lack of political pluralism during and after the 
parliamentary elections in Russia in December 2011 and the presidential elections in March 
2012.129  
 
This is significant given the high level of contact which exists between the Committees and 
representatives of the Commission who attend Committee meetings and brief their members 
regularly before and after official visits to Russia and occasions such as the EU-Russia 
                                                          
125 For further details see ‘European Parliament/Committees/Human 
Rights,’http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/droi/home.html  
126 See ‘European Parliament/Delegations/Russia,’ http://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/d-
ru/home.html  
127 ‘The European Parliament strongly condemns Russia’s LGBT censorship laws,’ European Parliament’s 
Intergroup on LGBT Rights, 16th February 2012 http://www.lgbt-ep.eu/press-releases/the-european-parliament-
strongly-condemns-russias-lgbt-censorship-laws  
 128 ‘European Parliament Joint Motion for a Resolution on the rule of law in Russia,’ 16th February 2011, 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/49040436/EU-Parliament-s-Resolution-on-the-Rule-of-Law-in-Russia. The Russian 
journalist Anna Politkovskaya was murdered in Moscow in 2006. The subsequent police investigation has been 
dogged by accusations of incompetence and failure to find those responsible. For further details see ‘Russian ex-
policeman charged over killing of journalist Anna Politkovskaya,’ Daily Telegraph, 17 July 2012, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/9404823/Russian-ex-policeman-charged-over-
killing-of-journalist-Anna-Politkovskaya.html.  Nataliya Estemirova was a Russian human rights activist who 
was murdered in Chechnya in 2009. The case remains unsolved. For further details see ‘Russian activist found 
murdered,’ BBC News, 15 July 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/8152351.stm  
129‘ European Parliament resolution on the upcoming presidential election in Russia,’ European Parliament, 14th 
March 2012 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=P7-RC-2012-
0052&language=EN  
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Human Rights Consultations (Neuhold 2001; interviews with Anna, human rights researcher, 
European Parliament and Anton, EEAS official). Yet, as a number of EU respondents 
acknowledged, where this criticism is concerned there is a clear bias in favour of civil and 
political rights issues such as free elections, freedom of speech and high-profile individual 
cases such as those of the jailed former oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovskiy130 and banker 
Sergey Magnitskiy, who died in controversial circumstances while being held in pre-trial 
detention in Moscow in 2009 (Rettman 2012): 
 
The most important human rights issues for the European Parliament include the    
Khodorkovskiy case because it is a symbol of many things in Russia and he has a 
strong lobby in Brussels. (Karl, political adviser, European Parliament, Brussels) 
 
[Where Russia is concerned] we raise the eternal human rights problems of 
freedom of the press and freedom of speech, the detention of human rights 
activists, right-wing extremism, attitudes to immigrants especially from the 
Southern Caucasus, young men in the army, the Khodorkovskiy case. (Kurt, 
MEP, Strasbourg) 
 
In some respects the decision to focus on these issues is unsurprising: cases such as those of 
Khodorkovskiy and Magnitskiy have attracted considerable international media and political 
attention in recent years and, as one respondent pointed out, MEPs tend to prefer to focus on 
the more ‘newsworthy’cases: 
 
Parliamentarians will say they’re interested in shocking things – people getting 
killed, people getting jailed so long-term structural work…not so headline-
grabbing, right? (Anna, human rights researcher, European Parliament, Brussels) 
 
Another respondent highlighted the fact that MEPs often have their own particular interests 
and contacts when it comes to determining which human rights issues to focus on in terms of 
debates, resolutions and meetings of the Parliament’s Sub-Committee on Human Rights and 
the EU-Russia Parliamentary Cooperation Committee: 
                                                          
130 ‘Mikhail Khodorkovsky case: European Court faults Russia,’ BBC News, 31 May 2011 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-
13600198  
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It is hard to control MEPs sometimes: most are not specialists and many have 
their own agendas. There is much more interest in civil and political rights issues 
from MEPs. (Karl, political adviser, European Parliament, Brussels) 
 
A related issue which was raised repeatedly by the EU respondents was the fact that MEPs 
from countries such as the Baltic States and Poland which had experienced repression and 
occupation during the Soviet period are in many respects setting the agenda, or at least 
attempting to, where the Parliament’s work on human rights in Russia is concerned: 
 
The problem is on our side – some of my Baltic colleagues, some of the Polish 
colleagues, they have their own very special and personal experiences [with 
Russia] and we have to take this into account on the one hand, on the other hand 
our duty is not to look back but forward and they are very few but one is enough 
to destroy the atmosphere in a discussion and this is not very helpful. (Johannes, 
MEP, Strasbourg) 
 
There’s definitely been a spike of interest in Russia since the new Member States 
joined, so it’s definitely under this legislature that there’s been real, increasing 
interest in the work of the Parliament on Russia. And it also means that within the 
Parliament it’s a majority of MEPs from these countries that tend to lead the 
debates on Russia and it tends also to be based on the fact that their countries 
were occupied by Russia so there’s a whole specific background there. (Anna, 
human rights researcher, European Parliament) 
 
Clearly, however, this has the potential to skew the debate on human rights issues in Russia 
in two directions: firstly towards civil and political rights issues, and secondly to specific 
issues within that sub-set of rights which are of particular interest to MEPs from the newer 
Member States. In addition, there are other factors at play which can affect which cases and 
issues parliamentarians choose to raise both publically and in their more private discussions 
with their Russian counterparts. Several respondents mentioned that MEPs tended to have 
contact with those Russian human rights NGOs such as Memorial which have a high profile 
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internationally, English-speaking members of staff, and the means to travel to Brussels and 
lobby both individual members of parliament and groups or committees of MEPs: 
 
How do things make it onto our agenda? It depends on lobbying by our members, 
it depends on lobbying by NGOs. We can’t pay guests to come to the Sub-
Committee [on Human Rights] so sometimes it depends on who’s in town that we 
can take advantage of. They [MEPs] are very interested in the Khodorkovskiy 
case, that’s a case I would say of very good lobbying, the Magnitskiy issue - 
that’s also a case of good lobbying. We at the Parliament are entirely dependent 
on people coming to us and publicizing their problems, on people willing to come 
and express themselves in an eloquent, Westernized way, summarising things in 
sound-bites. (Anna, human rights researcher, European Parliament, Brussels) 
 
As mentioned previously, however, such NGOs tend to dominate the EU Delegation to 
Russia’s network of contacts within the country itself and are also frequent beneficiaries of 
the EU’s funding initiatives. It could therefore be argued that one particular sub-division of 
Russian civil society is capable of exerting considerable influence on the EU’s policymaking 
process regarding human rights in Russia from both Moscow and Brussels. Again this raises 
questions concerning the potential skewing of the EU’s agenda on human rights towards 
issues which are clearly seen as important by this particular section of civil society but may 
ultimately only reflect the interests of a relatively small ‘elite’ of Russian human rights 
activists. The same respondent also highlighted the fact that parliamentarians will tend to 
raise issues such as the Magnitskiy and Khodorkovskiy cases which concern the violation of 
an individual’s rights and are perhaps easier to relate to or understand than more complex, 
long-term issues surrounding economic and social rights such as health and housing: 
 
Trying to discuss housing – it’s a very complex policy, you would need a whole 
day – it’s much easier to raise individuals getting jailed or tortured to be honest. It 
would be a different exercise to really go into structural issues on how you 
develop a housing policy and a budget. To be honest the work of the Parliament 
isn’t necessarily to reach out to Russia, it is to put pressure on the EU institutions 
to take things into account. So we use a language that the EU institutions 
understand. Our job here is to hit on the head of the EU so we try and keep that 
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simple and clear and loud and vulgar and blunt. (Anna, human rights researcher, 
European Parliament, Brussels) 
 
This is an important point since it implies that MEPs raise certain issues to influence 
policymaking by internal EU institutions such as the Commission and now the External 
Action Service, rather than trying to effect actual change in Russia itself. It is hard to trace 
the direct influence of the Parliament’s resolutions and other discussions on human rights in 
Russia on the Commission/External Action Service’s funding initiatives on human rights and 
its dialogues with Russian officials on human rights. Some respondents representing the 
External Action Service appeared, however, to highlight some of the same considerations 
regarding the ‘newsworthiness’ of certain human rights cases and the success of certain 
Russian NGOs in lobbying for their interests in Brussels and Moscow which were raised by 
advisors to the Parliament: 
 
The human rights issues that we follow are the ones that are high in the news, we 
can’t follow every individual case but when someone like Politkovskaya gets 
killed or Estemirova, or Khodorkovskiy – when we have to produce statements 
that’s what we follow. (Nathalie, EEAS official, Brussels) 
 
Russian human rights NGOs are very well-integrated, they’re in constant contact 
with the embassies and Delegation in Moscow so we’re well-aware of the things 
that they would like to see on the agenda and we consult them, this is part of how 
the EU works on human rights, that we talk early and often with NGOs. (Rachel, 
EEAS official, Brussels) 
 
In terms of the issues which the EEAS respondents highlighted as being particularly 
prominent in the EU’s policy strategy on human rights in Russia, there was considerable 
overlap with those mentioned by several of the parliamentary officials: 
 
Human rights defenders is certainly an issue, the situation in the North Caucasus, 
the rule of law and obviously law enforcement bodies and the criminal justice 
system. Then of course we have the issues of freedom of association, we also 
touch on freedom of religion and belief, Russia particularly likes to raise issues of 
177 
 
racism and hate crime so there’s a feature more politically on that. We have 
raised in the past the issue of torture for example, the difficult situation in prisons 
or the army so it is very wide. (Anton, EEAS official, Brussels) 
 
Yet at the same time, and perhaps unsurprisingly, respondents from the EEAS appeared to 
take a more measured and perhaps pragmatic view of the process of formulating policy on 
human rights than some of those MEPs who have shown willingness to speak out on what 
they see as major rights violations in Russia. Several pointed out that the EU should be more 
flexible in its approach when it comes to discussing human rights issues with Russia at 
meetings such as the regular EU-Russia Human Rights Consultations and implementing 
policy on the ground. Indeed one respondent claimed that this was already beginning to take 
place with the adoption of a more ‘tailor-made’ approach: 
 
This approach towards human rights, if you don’t give it a title of human rights it 
seems already more acceptable. I don’t see any problem with that, we should do it 
far more.  If we would rename our consultations, find another name for it. We 
should not be so conservative on that terminology. Before there was more a 
policy all over the world where you get an instruction from the Directorate saying 
‘this month you will deal with the rights of the child and next month it is a week 
against homophobia and now we will work on LGBT people.’  Headquarters 
[Brussels] somehow has adapted that approach and said we’ll let you, the EU, 
develop a local implementation strategy for how you will deal with human rights 
defenders and what is your local strategy on this and I foresee that this kind of 
approach will be how we will try to assist here in Russia so it is more a tailor-
made approach for the major topics. (Matthew, EU Delegation official, Moscow) 
 
Where economic and social rights are concerned, however, it is not clear whether this more 
‘tailor-made’ approach will have much effect: this same respondent acknowledged that the 
topics most likely to receive attention and project funding were, 
 
...the rights of the child, domestic violence, we will get LGBT, we will get more 
requests to set up your modus operandi, how you will deal with all these specific 
issues. (Matthew, EU Delegation official, Moscow) 
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Other respondents were also keen to see a more pragmatic approach gain ground and to focus 
on more practical issues rather than ‘preaching’ to the Russian authorities about what the EU 
perceives to be their failings on certain human rights issues: 
 
We think one of the most important things would be to have other entities and 
agencies other than just the Foreign Ministry [at the Human Rights Consultations] 
so that we could talk to the people who are actually in charge of prison reform or 
setting up shelters for women who have undergone violence or who are in charge 
of orphanages. (Rachel, EEAS official, Brussels) 
 
There is a need to focus on practical issues e.g. prison reform, training of judges, 
cultural exchanges etc and to look at trade unions and striking rights, consumer 
rights, education and health. (Neil, think-tank analyst, Brussels) 
 
One of the respondents cited above also pointed out the need for those human rights NGOs 
with which the EU deals most regularly to have more realistic expectations of what such 
discussions can really achieve: 
 
Some will say the fact that we do have these consultations happening is already a 
result in itself.  Of course from a human rights activist’s position this is not 
satisfactory but that is the reality in which we relate and there is always a 
question about tempering certain expectations versus what we can do. For some 
people this leads to frustration, others are willing to see the limitations of the 
whole exercise but also the necessity nevertheless to maintain it. (Matthew, EU 
Delegation official, Moscow) 
 
Once again, however, the issue of individual Member States having strong yet conflicting 
views on the manner in which the EU conducts its human rights strategy vis-a-vis Russia 
serves to prevent any real consensus emerging, despite the apparently more open and 
pragmatic approach taken by those responsible for implementing the EU’s actual policies. 
Several respondents representing Member States which run their own human rights projects 
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in Russia were critical of what they saw as the EU’s lack of willingness to raise the human 
rights issues which they felt to be of particular concern in the right manner: 
 
Perhaps we as the West have not really found the right tone in our criticism and if 
we become more outspoken we should find a way to frame that so that it becomes 
more difficult for those that we criticise, in other words the political leadership of 
Russia, to frame our criticism as some kind of aggressive Western arrogance. The 
other problem is on the Brussels side because the people who set the framework 
for these kinds of dialogues are mostly interested in ticking off various boxes 
rather than getting anything done. I think the European Parliament somehow fills 
the void that we have left by toning down our values rhetoric, I think in that sense 
it is good but I feel overall the more vocal critics have to be a little bit careful so 
they don’t come just across as Russia-haters. (Thomas, Member State diplomat, 
Moscow) 
 
The EU Delegation is worried about offending people: they should be aware of 
the power they have. The Human Rights Consultations need to be integrated into 
the wider political agenda: human rights issues have to be raised at a political 
level. The EU forgets how powerful its voice is. A teaching approach does get 
people’s backs up but it has to be done. (John, Member State diplomat, Moscow) 
 
This illustrates one of the difficulties for the EU in terms of the differing expectations of its 
individual Member States. It also poses a problem for the EU in that Member States tend to 
criticise its approach for being ineffectual while at the same time letting the EU raise some of 
the trickier issues on its own in its political dialogue with Russia in order to avoid 
compromising their individual bilateral relations with Russia. Perhaps understandably, some 
of the EU respondents expressed resentment at this tactic and the fact that it might give the 
impression that Member States did not have the same concerns over Russia’s human rights 
record: 
 
For the Member States it now seems ‘the EU will play the bad guy because they 
will be dealing with human rights, we in our diplomatic relations with the country 
can quietly focus on our trade relations.’ You will see a difference of course on 
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human rights if you have a Scandinavian country, particularly Sweden. I think 
they will still maintain this.  There is co-ordination but somehow Member States 
still find it difficult to be fully transparent on this. (Matthew, EU Delegation 
official, Moscow) 
 
I know this concern that the Delegation has, and again it’s not only in Moscow 
but that the EU would be the bad guy passing nasty messages to third countries 
and it’s again with China they were very clever in saying ‘well you mention these 
human rights concerns but nobody else told us that you had concerns on human 
rights,’ that’s also why for the last round of the [Human Rights] Consultations we 
invited Member States in Brussels to sit at the Consultations as observers and we 
had a few States to show that it was not only the EEAS but that Member States 
had an interest and were supportive of the process. (Anton, EEAS official, 
Brussels) 
Again, however, this gives the impression of a lack of consensus at both the Member State 
level and the EU level in terms of the approach the Union should be taking regarding its 
strategy of promoting human rights in Russia and highlights the problem the Union appears 
to face of trying to balance Member States’ and NGOs’ high expectations of what it can and 
should achieve with what in practical terms is actually possible. One of the Russian 
respondents pointed out that this lack of consensus hinders policymaking and cautioned the 
Union against falling into the trap of taking a very inflexible stance on human rights: 
There’s an internal split in Europe which means that there is simply no policy on 
Russia. I would advise taking small steps and gradually widening the areas being 
discussed because this very dogmatic approach which is there now started with 
the dialogue in the 1990s when various slogans were put forward about needing 
to protect and uphold human rights and so on. That’s true, but it doesn’t work in a 
real political situation, and can even be counter-productive. One shouldn’t have 
such big expectations – if something is going to change in Russia then it will 
change because of internal factors, not because of EU policy. In theory the EU is 
taking the right approach, democracy and political rights are very important and 
we should strive to achieve them, but there’s no need to make this a direct aim 
because at the moment it’s not achievable. (Vadim, academic, St Petersburg) 
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This view raises the question of the extent to which the EU is ‘stuck’ using a certain modus 
operandi which relies heavily on a small network of human rights NGOs and may have been 
more relevant during the immediate post-Soviet period but is failing to have much effect in 
the contemporary period. It also highlights the fact that, rightly or wrongly, the EU is seen by 
some to be employing a very ‘dogmatic’ and narrow approach to human rights which does 
not fully take into account Russia’s domestic political context.  
7.6   Conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter has been to examine some of the more practical aspects of EU 
policymaking on human rights in Russia in order to complement the preceding chapter on the 
Union’s conceptualisations of various human rights, particularly economic and social rights. 
It seems clear from both the EU Delegation to Russia’s own reporting on the projects it funds 
in cooperation with Russian civil society and the interviews conducted with representatives of 
Russian civil society and academia and of the various EU institutions and Member States 
that, where Russia is concerned, the EU’s human rights strategy retains a somewhat narrow 
focus on mostly civil and political rights issues. While the Union has provided and is likely to 
continue to provide substantial and well-received funding for more socially-oriented projects, 
it largely avoids framing such projects in rights terms, thus potentially reducing issues such 
as access to healthcare and housing to charitable or governance initiatives rather than areas 
where Russians have specific rights entitlements. This stands in stark contrast to the clear 
emphasis on the universality of human rights and the importance of international human 
rights law where the Union’s funding for what it defines as its human rights projects under 
the EIDHR is concerned. This division is reinforced by the close relationship a number of 
prominent Russian human rights NGOs appear to enjoy with both the Delegation in Moscow 
and the European Parliament and Commission in Brussels.  
 
At the same time, a number of the EU representatives interviewed were critical of this 
situation and of the high expectations these NGOs appear to have of the Union’s ability to 
promote the issues they see as important. Nevertheless, ultimately the EU’s main source of 
information and cooperation on human rights issues and projects seems to be a relatively 
small section of Russian civil society with its own agenda to promote, meaning that, while 
some social NGOs enjoy a fruitful and positive relationship with the Delegation in terms of 
receiving funding, they are effectively shut out of the lobbying network when it comes to 
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discussing human rights issues with both the Commission and members of the European 
Parliament. This can be explained in part by the fact that they do not have the advantage of 
the same resources and profile as some of the more internationally-recognised human rights 
organisations. Nevertheless, the end result is that those interested in promoting civil and 
political rights issues appear to enjoy much greater political and public support from the 
various EU institutions than those aiming to resolve economic and social rights issues which 
resonate far more with the wider Russian public. This helps to contribute to the perception 
that the EU has a very clear and narrow definition of the ‘hierarchy of rights,’ despite the fact 
that its contribution to schemes in Russia which directly or indirectly promote the improved 
observation of economic and social rights has been significant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
183 
 
Chapter 8 
Conclusions and discussion 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This thesis has explored the important yet contested position occupied by economic and 
social rights within the broader concept of contemporary human rights, and the way in which 
the contested status of these rights influences the interaction between the EU and Russia in 
relation to human rights commitments and violations. It has also examined this category of 
human rights within the framework of the European human rights system and the role that 
understandings of these rights play within EU and Russian policy processes in institutional 
and political contexts. This study has situated the varying conceptualisations of economic and 
social rights in their historical contexts, and demonstrated that, despite the rhetoric of the 
indivisibility of all human rights, the application of this particular set of rights continues to be 
uneven, conditional and dependent upon the political will of both national governments and 
international organisations such as the EU for their effective implementation. It has shown 
this through an analysis of Russian and EU official and unofficial EU discourse on economic 
and social rights.  This thesis has argued that the lack of clarity and commitment 
demonstrated by the EU in terms of the implementation of economic and social rights has 
negative consequences for the Union’s ability to achieve its apparent aim of improving 
Russia’s human rights record, as well as its ability to influence longer-term social 
development there. It also undermines any attempt by the EU to act as a ‘normative power’ in 
terms of promoting its vision of human rights norms in its relations with non-Member States, 
which highlights the limitations of applying this highly idealistic concept to the EU’s actions 
in the area of human rights promotion. 
The thesis makes the following five contributions: 
• Conceptually, it contributes to a better understanding of the under-explored area of 
economic and social rights within rights-based literature and the ways in which these 
rights are contested within the broader concept of ‘human rights’ and within certain 
political contexts such as the growth of austerity in Europe. 
• Empirically, it allows for greater insight into understandings of both economic and 
social rights and human rights more generally in the Russian context, including the 
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ways in which these understandings are interpreted and used by the Russian 
authorities. This in turn helps to illuminate the complex relationship that exists 
between the authorities and various sectors of Russian civil society.  
• From an EU perspective, the thesis contributes insights into the gaps that exist 
between the EU’s rhetorical position on human rights and its practical implementation 
of policy in this area, including some of the problems caused by the EU’s structural 
set-up in terms of policy formulation and implementation. These gaps and problems 
arguably undermine the EU’s attempts to portray itself as a form of ‘moral arbiter’ 
when it comes to promoting human rights norms around the world. 
• The thesis also contributes to a more nuanced and broader understanding of the 
relationship between the EU and Russia where human rights are concerned, and  
allows certain policy recommendations to be put forward which could contribute to a 
more coherent and effective level of engagement between the two sides on a range of 
human rights issues. This could have a potentially positive effect on the more general 
relationship between the EU and Russia, which has at times been characterised by a 
degree of apparently mutual incomprehension. 
• Finally, on a broader theoretical level, the thesis critiques the idea of ‘normative 
power Europe’ in the context of the Union’s relations with Russia which has 
implications for the EU more widely in its relations with non-member states. It also 
contributes to a more detailed understanding of the development of ideas of human 
rights and the existence of an apparent ‘hierarchy of rights’ in the context of post-
socialism which can be applied beyond the case study of Russia used in this thesis to 
other post-Soviet states. The thesis demonstrates that failure to engage with these 
developments again has implications for the EU’s ability to act as a ‘normative 
power’ in its external relations policy with states both within and without the post-
Soviet space. 
 
8.2   The contested nature of economic and social rights within the concept of 
‘human rights’ 
One of the key claims that this thesis has made is that, despite the consistent claims of the 
indivisibility of all human rights in the major UN and European human rights treaties and the 
rhetoric on such rights used by the EU, the place which economic and social rights occupy in 
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the ‘hierarchy’ of international human rights norms remains contested. It has also argued that 
understandings of such rights are heavily influenced by the political context in which they 
come to be shaped and applied. The precarious position such rights currently occupy can 
partly be explained by the end of the Cold War, the collapse of Communist regimes which 
had strongly emphasised economic and social rights over civil and political rights and 
freedoms, and what Pieterse (2003:7) calls the ‘degrading’ of economic and social rights 
which were associated with socialist values and systems. Yet other factors have clearly 
contributed to this outcome, not least the simultaneous and subsequent flourishing of 
neoliberal ideologies which have held sway even under late 20th-century European 
governments led by social democratic parties who appeared to accept the necessity of labour 
market deregulation and adaptation to market forces (Mudge 2008). Unsurprisingly, this has 
had a profound effect on the policies and policy discourse utilised by the EU in relation to 
economic and social policy, leading to a vacillation between what appear to be explicitly 
neoliberal economic policy measures and attempts at mitigating the social effects of these by 
retaining those elements of the ‘European Social Model’ which can be reconciled with the 
market (Hansen and Schierup 2005).  
The fact that the neoliberal concept of human rights tends to paint economic and social rights 
claims as optional, an obstacle to the success of the market and not part of the wider concept 
of ‘human rights’ (O’Connell 2007) has led to a fundamental reimagining of the role of the 
State in relation to guaranteeing such rights. It has shifted the emphasis from state provision 
of various social services as a matter of right and entitlement to the individual responsibility 
of the person seeking to access these services, turning them into ‘market citizens’ (Pieterse 
2003:7). Economic and social rights have thus become subject to a highly conditional 
application which depends upon the ‘market citizen’ shouldering certain responsibilities and 
exhibiting certain behaviours deemed to be appropriate such as taking part in workfare 
schemes and job-seeking in order to access their ‘rights.’ The influence of some of this 
thinking could be seen in the views expressed by some of the respondents representing EU 
Member States who took part in this study and which were analysed in Chapter 6: namely, 
the fact that some of them did not see economic and social rights as ‘real’ rights per se, but as 
‘budgetary’ matters or ‘soft’ rights. The trend towards conditionality and a supposed balance 
of ‘rights and responsibilities’ has only been exacerbated during a period of economic crisis 
and the ascendancy of austerity policies based on welfare budget cuts in countries such as 
Greece, Ireland and the UK which, as MacLeavy (2011:3) argues, have become ‘shorthand 
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for an increasing focus on frugality, self-sufficiency and fiscal prudence.’ Yet increasing the 
degree of conditionality already inherent in the system and further restricting access to 
welfare provision for certain groups such as youth, women and the low-skilled which are the 
consequences of these austerity measures (MacLeavy 2011) risks a major rollback of 
economic and social rights entitlements in contemporary Europe.131  
 
It is not, however, simply in the context of the EU and its Member States that neoliberal 
ideologies and social policy approaches have found resonance and had an impact on the 
realisation of economic and social rights, as Chapter 5 highlighted and as will be further 
discussed below. In the post-Soviet context the Russian experience of market reform and 
liberalisation has been very different to that of the majority of EU Member States who were 
part of the Union before the Central and East European countries acceded. Yet this thesis has 
argued that where access to certain economic and social provisions are concerned, a broadly 
neoliberal approach of reducing free access to social services and a push towards increased 
self-reliance for welfare needs in practice has characterised the Putin and Medvedev 
administrations. This has, however, been ‘masked’ in recent years by the use of a political 
discourse which emphasises the state’s responsibility for the lives of its citizens and its 
commitment to upholding economic and social rights entitlements.   
 
This approach has been predicated on the broad support for economic and social rights issues 
which still exists in Russia, partly as a result of the Soviet era’s official emphasis on the 
primacy of the state in relation to welfare provision and of economic and social rights. It is 
also in large part due to the insecurity and sense of dislocation caused by the chaotic reform 
period of the 1990s under Yeltsin and the more explicitly neoliberal welfare reforms of 
Putin’s first term from 2000 to 2004 (Hemment 2009). As a result, while the discourse on the 
meaning and importance of such rights may be different in the Russian context to that of the 
                                                          
131 This situation has not gone unnoticed by NGOs and other organizations with an interest in human rights 
issues: in April 2013 Amnesty International passed a resolution condemning what it called the UK Coalition 
Government’s ‘regressive and lethal assault’ on the human rights of sick and disabled people by cutting access 
to health and housing benefits (see ‘2013 AGM Resolutions and Board Background Notes,’ Amnesty 
International UK, available at  
www.amnesty.org.uk/uploads/documents/doc_23021.pdf). In May 2013 the chairman of the Scottish Human 
Rights Commission highlighted the adverse impact of the UK government’s welfare reforms on the public’s 
human rights (see ‘Welfare reforms may breach rights,’ The Herald, 29th May 2013, available at 
http://www.heraldscotland.com/politics/political-news/welfare-reforms-may-breach-rights.21204106).  
On a wider international level, Oxfam has made the ‘right to economic justice’ and the ‘right to essential 
services’ two of its five main strategic aims for the period up to 2015 (see ‘Oxfam Strategic Steer 2012/13 – 
2014/15,’ Oxfam, available at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what-we-do/about-us/plans-reports-and-policies)  
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EU and its Member States, there is considerable overlap in terms of the approach taken to the 
practical realisation, or lack thereof, of these rights. Overall it seems that, rather than 
constituting clearly-defined and largely uncontested human rights norms along the lines of 
civil and political rights such as freedom of expression, the realisation of economic and social 
rights depends to a much greater extent on the political will of national governments and 
entities such as the EU, political will which in the contemporary European context appears to 
be somewhat lacking.  
 
8.3   Human rights and civil society in the Russian context 
The second major focus of this thesis has been an exploration of how economic and social 
rights are understood in the very specific context of post-Soviet Russia. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, it has also examined the extent to which what a number of Russian respondents 
called the ‘Soviet legacy’ of official rhetoric which emphasised a strong state and economic 
and social rights and provisions has influenced these understandings. While this ‘legacy’ has 
undoubtedly had considerable impact on the expectations of the State’s obligations with 
respect to economic and social rights which appear to endure in the contemporary period, 
various other factors must also be taken into account. These include the impact of the period 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 with its dismantling of large swathes of the 
previous system of welfare provision and more recent and unpopular welfare reforms such as 
the monetisation of certain benefits in 2004-05 and the increase in the rate of utilities in late 
2012 and early 2013, as detailed in Chapter 5. The Russian public generally continues to see 
a range of economic and social rights as the most important ‘human rights,’ even in the 
aftermath of recent post-election political protests.132 At the same time, there is also a sense 
that these rights are the least likely to be realised in practice and that certain groups such as 
children, the elderly and the disabled are most vulnerable to having these rights violated, as 
Chapter 4 discussed. As a result, public expectations of the State and its obligations in this 
sphere are not being met, regardless of the ‘active and interventionist’ rhetoric on the role of 
the state in welfare provision deployed by the authorities (Cook 2011:23) and its more 
                                                          
132 As mentioned in Chapter 1, a poll conducted in Russia in February 2013 indicated that only 4% of those 
surveyed expressed concern over restrictions on civil rights and democratic freedoms, while 68% saw rising 
prices as the main threat to the country and 52% cited the impoverishment of large sections of society (Interfax, 
21st March 2013, available at http://russialist.org/russians-greatest-worry-is-corruption-only-4-percent-worried-
about-rights-poll  
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proactive approach towards engaging with those NGOs which carry out social projects 
deemed to be ‘useful.’  
 
While the impact of the Soviet ‘legacy’ on public perceptions of human rights appears in 
some respects to have been significant, it has been no less profound in its influence on  the 
contemporary Russian human rights movement, many of whose NGOs continue to be run by 
former Soviet-era dissidents, as Chapters 4 and 5 detailed. These former dissidents have 
tended to subscribe to a more ‘liberal’ definition of human rights which favours the civil and 
political over the economic and social. This approach is more in line with their previous 
experience of struggling for civil and political liberties against the Soviet regime and of 
seeing themselves as an elite group separated from both mainstream public opinion and 
government policy (Lipset and Dobson 1972; Horvath 2005; Mendelson and Gerber 2007). It 
also overlaps with the neoliberal approach to human rights mentioned in Section 8.2 which 
privileges individual civil and political rights and freedoms over more collective economic 
and social rights. While some of the human rights activists interviewed as part of this study 
demonstrated a high degree of awareness of the meaning of economic and social rights and 
their importance to the wider public, the fact remains that these rights rarely become the 
subject of their campaigns and project activities. In some respects this is to be expected: 
international donors such as the EU provide a financial lifeline to Russian human rights 
NGOs and contacts between this type of NGO and the EU’s representatives working on 
Russia are close and extensive. As a result, it is hardly surprising that there should be overlap 
between their visions of what human rights mean, how they should be promoted and the place 
that economic and social rights occupy in the overall ‘hierarchy’ of rights.  
 
What is clear, however, is that rather than acting as effective ‘translators’ of human rights 
norms from the international to the local context (Merry 2006), these NGOs may enjoy an 
excellent relationship with their EU and Member State colleagues but have largely failed to 
establish a public support base or to promote issues which resonate with the wider 
population. They have also failed to find much common ground with other NGOs such as 
those working in the social sector who also took part in this study, and instead have created 
the impression amongst both third sector colleagues and several Member State 
representatives that they form an exclusive clique based on personal relationships dating back 
many years. As will be further discussed below, this acts as a serious obstacle to the EU’s 
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attempts to formulate a coherent and effective approach towards promoting human rights in 
Russia. Their approach also stands in striking contrast to that of the more socially-oriented 
NGOs who took part in this study and who work with vulnerable groups such as children, the 
elderly and the disabled to improve their access to essential services while not identifying 
themselves explicitly as ‘rights-defending’ [pravozashitniye] organisations. These 
organisations appeared to be much more embedded in the local community in terms of their 
success in attracting volunteers and financial sponsorship from local businesses, their focus 
on issues such as housing, healthcare and general living standards which resonate with a large 
proportion of the public, and their more pragmatic and cooperative stance on interacting with 
the local authorities. At the same time, these organisations are not as integrated into the EU’s 
network of civil society contacts as the ‘old-school’ human rights NGOs because the type of 
work they do may make a clear contribution to the realisation of their clients’ economic and 
social rights, but does not appear to fit as easily into the EU’s definition of the hierarchy of 
human rights.  
 
8.4    Problems within the EU’s structure and its strategy on promoting human rights 
Having outlined the initial conceptual and empirical contributions this study makes to the 
literature on human rights theory, understandings of human rights in the Russian context and 
the relationship between human rights and more socially-oriented NGOs in Russia and their 
relationship with the EU, attention now turns to the third main contribution of this thesis. One 
of the key issues it has examined is the way in which human rights in general and economic 
and social rights in particular are constructed in official EU discourse on internal and external 
policy and by individual representatives of the Union and its Member States working in the 
area of human rights. Where both the internal and external EU context is concerned, a picture 
has emerged from both the EU’s own policy documents and interviews with the EU, Member 
State and Russian respondents involved in this study of a lack of clarity and consensus in the 
Union’s conceptual aims and objectives when it comes to accepting and promoting economic 
and social rights as fundamental rights for EU citizens. This lack of clarity also extends to the 
EU’s position on economic and social rights as values to be promoted in its relations with 
third countries. Overall, despite the oft-repeated claims of the indivisibility of all human 
rights in its policy documents and treaties, there appears to be an emphasis on those rights 
which coincide with values that are perceived to be ‘liberal’ and are to some extent perhaps 
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more compatible with neoliberal theories on the role of the state in providing access to 
welfare and the realisation of economic and social rights. 
While this lack of consensus can partly be attributed to the influence of neoliberal policy 
approaches at the EU level and the consequent contestations surrounding the value and status 
of economic and social rights mentioned in Section 8.2, there are also more practical, 
structural explanations for this state of affairs. The first of these is the fact that, as various 
respondents pointed out, there is clearly a division between the different Member States over 
the merits and importance of promoting economic and social rights and the benefits of 
different welfare models which hinders the EU’s ability to establish a common position on 
promoting such rights in relation to third countries. There is also the problem of Member 
States’ reluctance to have their internal human rights records discussed with third countries, 
which leaves the EU open to accusations of hypocrisy when it tries to intervene in human 
rights matters in Russia. An additional factor is the presence of outspoken MEPs within the 
European Parliament who have an interest in Russian affairs, tend to emphasise civil and 
political rights over economic and social issues and concentrate on the most ‘newsworthy’ 
and controversial cases which suit their own agendas. Finally, any attempt by the Union to 
raise human rights issues of any kind in its dealings with Russia must compete with its more 
instrumental interests in areas such as trade and energy. All of this adds up to a picture of 
confusion, inconsistency and competing priorities which arguably compromise any attempt 
by the EU to act as a ‘normative power’ in promoting its vision of human rights norms 
outside its own borders.  
8.5   Understanding the EU-Russia interaction on human rights in practice 
It seems clear from both the EU Delegation to Russia’s own reporting on the projects it funds 
and the interviews conducted as part of this study that, where Russia is concerned, the EU’s 
human rights strategy retains a somewhat narrow focus on mostly civil and political rights 
issues. While the Union has provided and is likely to continue to provide substantial and 
well-received funding for more socially-oriented projects, it largely avoids framing such 
projects in rights terms, thus potentially reducing issues such as access to healthcare and 
housing to charitable or governance initiatives rather than areas where Russians have specific 
rights entitlements. This stands in stark contrast to the clear emphasis on the universality of 
human rights and the importance of international human rights law where the Union’s 
funding for what it defines as its human rights projects under the EIDHR is concerned. This 
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division is reinforced by the close relationship a number of prominent Russian human rights 
NGOs appear to enjoy with both the EU’s Delegation in Moscow and the European 
Parliament and Commission in Brussels. At the same time, a number of the EU 
representatives interviewed were critical of this situation and of the high expectations these 
NGOs appear to have of the Union’s ability to promote the issues they see as important. 
Nevertheless, ultimately the EU’s main source of information and cooperation on human 
rights issues and projects seems to be a relatively small section of Russian civil society with 
its own agenda to promote. This means that, while some social NGOs enjoy a fruitful and 
positive relationship with the Delegation in terms of receiving funding, they are effectively 
shut out of the lobbying network when it comes to discussing human rights issues with both 
the Commission and members of the European Parliament. This can be explained in part by 
the fact that they do not have the advantage of the same resources and profile as some of the 
more internationally-recognised human rights organisations. Nevertheless, the end result is 
greater political and public support from the various EU institutions for a particular type of 
Russian human rights NGO than for those aiming to resolve economic and social rights issues 
which resonate far more with the wider Russian public. This helps to contribute to the 
perception that the EU has a very clear and narrow definition of the ‘hierarchy of rights,’ 
despite the fact that its contribution to schemes in Russia which directly or indirectly promote 
the improved observation of economic and social rights has been significant. 
8.5   Critiquing ‘normative power Europe’ and the development of ideas of human 
rights in post-Soviet states 
Building on the empirical insights which this thesis has generated, it is possible to make a 
broader theoretical contribution to the question of whether this ‘normative power Europe’ 
concept has much validity in the context of both the EU’s relations with Russia where human 
rights are concerned, and in its relations with other non-Member States. It seems apparent 
that, despite the obvious desire of the Union to act as a normative power in promoting its 
vision of ‘European’ human rights norms alongside its other oft-proclaimed standards 
regarding democracy and the rule of law, it is largely failing to do so. By retaining a 
somewhat narrow definition of the meaning of ‘human rights’ and the order in which the 
‘hierarchy of rights’ should sit, with economic and social rights apparently relegated to the 
lower echelons of this hierarchy, the EU is precluding the possibility of a real dialogue on the 
meaning and implementation of human rights in its often difficult relations with non-Member 
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States such as Russia and China. While this thesis does not argue in favour of a culturally 
relativist approach which would imply that certain human rights norms only apply in certain 
contexts, it seems clear that a state’s domestic political, social and historical context will to 
some extent shape its perceptions of human rights. Indeed it seems apparent that, while the 
EU may lack consensus on the meaning and importance of economic and social rights, in the 
Russian case these rights are not contested and form part of what is in fact a very clear 
concept of ‘human rights.’ As a result, engaging with rather than ignoring or dismissing these 
perceptions would allow external partners to have more input into the supposed ‘dialogue’ on 
human rights that currently exists. Otherwise there is a danger that, as Sjursen (2006) and 
Diez (2005) have pointed out, the ‘normative power’ thesis will remain too close to how the 
EU perceives itself, or would like to perceive itself, as a champion of certain values which it 
itself defines, rather than reflecting its actual ability to transmit norms and standards outside 
its own borders. 
The fact that Russia appears to have a fairly definite ‘culture of rights’ also has important 
implications for the development of the ideas and practice of human rights in post-Soviet 
states. Given that all 15 of those republics which made up the Soviet Union were subject to 
its constitutional emphasis on economic and social over civil and political rights, it seems 
reasonable to suppose that such perceptions of rights may continue to have some currency in 
the successor states to these republics in the contemporary transition and post-transition 
period, with the obvious caveat that the three Baltic states which are now members of the EU 
have experience a somewhat different trajectory to the others. As a consequence, rather than 
acting as a largely untouched ‘site’ for the promotion of ‘European’ or ‘Western’ ideas of 
human rights, the post-Soviet region in fact represents a complex and contested field for the 
development of human rights norms, their implementation in practice, and for the continuing 
development of civil society in its various forms. Failing to take account of this will again 
impede the EU’s ability to act as any kind of ‘normative power.’ 
8.7    The way forward: policy recommendations and further research    
One of the clearest findings to emerge from this study is that, if the EU wishes to exert any 
real influence on the respect for and promotion of human rights in Russia, it needs to rethink 
its existing strategy of engaging primarily with a small group of Russian human rights NGOs 
on issues which fit a fairly narrow definition of ‘human rights.’ It should put greater emphasis 
on economic and social rights issues in its engagement with these organisations, those 
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involved in more directly socially relevant work, and its interactions with Russian officials 
during bilateral meetings such as the EU-Russia Human Rights Consultations. While this 
thesis does not argue that civil and political rights issues in Russia should in any way be 
dismissed from the EU’s agenda, it seems likely that a broader and more inclusive approach 
towards the definition of human rights which fully includes the economic and social 
alongside the civil and the political, could lead to a more fruitful dialogue and the potential 
for significant social and political development. This would constitute a step forward from 
the current position of mutual incomprehension and occasional distrust where human rights 
issues are concerned. It would also allow for more open dialogue on economic and social 
rights issues at a time when several EU Member States are facing challenges in this area in 
relation to austerity programmes and welfare reform, and could avoid the accusations of 
‘double standards’ from the Russian side which have dogged discussions on human rights in 
the past. 
In terms of future research agendas, this study points to wider questions concerning 
expectations of the State and the individual in relation to the provision of welfare and the 
realisation of human rights in both the post-Soviet and EU contexts, and the extent to which 
austerity measures during times of crisis can impact on human rights agendas. In addition, the 
contemporary context of this study means that the political landscape in Russia, the 
relationship between the state and civil society there and the EU-Russia relationship are 
constantly changing, particularly in the light of the ‘foreign agent’ law of 2012 which is 
currently being used against the type of ‘politically active’ NGO which the EU has close 
contacts with.133 As a result, further research is needed to track the development of the 
Russian domestic situation regarding human rights and civil society, and the impact this may 
have on EU-Russia relations both in general and in relation to human rights specifically. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
133 See ‘Russian NGOs fight ‘foreign agent’ status,’ Deutsche Welle, 2nd May 2013, available at 
http://www.dw.de/russian-ngos-fight-foreign-agent-status/a-16784923; ‘Russia’s oldest human rights group 
fights ‘foreign agent’ tag,’ Reuters, 24th May 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/24/us-
russia-memorial-idUSBRE94N06L20130524  
194 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
195 
 
References 
 
Aberbach and Rockman (2002) ‘Conducting and Coding Elite Interviews,’ PS: Political 
Science and Politics, Vol.35:4, pp.673-676 
 
Abrams, P (1988) ‘Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State (1977),’ Journal of Historical 
Sociology, Vol.1:1 
 
Aggestam, L (2008) ‘Introduction: ethical power Europe?,’ International Affairs, Vol.84:1, 
pp.1-11 
 
Alcock, P (1989) ‘Why citizenship and welfare rights offer new hope for new welfare in 
Britain,’ Critical Social Policy, Vol.9, pp.32-43 
 
Alston, P (1997) ‘Making Economic and Social Rights Count: A Strategy for the Future,’ The 
Political Quarterly, Vol.68:2, pp.188-195 
 
Alston, P and Weiler, J (1999) ‘An 'Ever Closer Union' in Need of a Human Rights Policy: 
The European Union and Human Rights’ in Alston, P et al (eds.) The EU and Human Rights, 
US: Oxford University Press 
 
BBC News (2012) ‘Russia: Controversial NGO Bill Becomes Law,’ 21 July 2012, available 
at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18938165  
 
Beetham, D (1995) ‘What Future for Economic and Social Rights?,’ Political Studies, Vol. 
XLIII, pp.41-60 
 
Berman, H (1996) ‘'The Struggle for Law in Post-Soviet Russia' in Sajo, A (ed.) Western 
Rights? Post-Communist Application, The Hague: Kluwer Law International 
 
Betts, P (2012) ‘Socialism, Social Rights and Human Rights: The Case of East Germany,’ 
Humanity, Vol.3:3, pp407-426 
 
Beznosova, O and McIntosh Sundstrom, L (2009) ‘Western Aid and the State-Society 
Balance in Novgorod and Khabarovsk,’ Problems of Post-Communism, 56:6, pp.21-35 
 
Bielefeldt, H (2000) ‘‘Western’ versus ‘Islamic’ Human Rights Conceptions? A Critique of 
Cultural Essentialism in the Discussion on Human Rights,’ Political Theory, Vol.28:1, pp.90-
121 
 
Birch, K and Mykhnenko, V (2009) ‘Varieties of neoliberalism? Restructuring in large 
industrially dependent regions across Western and Eastern Europe,’ Journal of Economic 
Geography, Vol.9, pp.355-380 
 
Bjorkdahl, A (2002) ‘Norms in International Relations: Some Conceptual and 
Methodological Reflections,’ Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol.15:1, pp.9-23 
 
Bloch, A and Schuster, L (2002) ‘Asylum and Welfare: Contemporary Debates,’ Critical 
Social Policy, Vol.22:3, pp.393-414 
196 
 
 
Bohle, D and Greskovits, B (2007) ‘Neoliberalism, Embedded Neoliberalism and 
Neocorporatism: Towards transnational capitalism in Central-Eastern Europe,’ West 
European Politics, Vol.30:3, pp.443-466 
 
van Boven, T (1982) ‘Distinguishing Criteria of Human Rights’ in Vasak, K (ed.) The 
International Dimensions of Human Rights, US:UNESCO 
 
Brade, I and Rudolph, R (2004) ‘Moscow, the global city? The position of the Russian capital 
within the European system of metropolitan areas,’ Area, Vol.36:1, pp.69-80 
 
Brown, C (1999) ‘Universal Human Rights: a critique’ in Dunne, T and Wheeler, N (eds.) 
Human Rights in Global Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Bruno, M (1998) ‘Playing the co-operation game: strategies around international aid in post-
socialist Russia’ in Bridger, S and Pine, F (eds.) Surviving Post-Socialism: Local strategies 
and regional responses in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, London: Routledge 
 
Bryman (2008) Social Research Methods, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Bucholtz, M (2000) ‘The Politics of Transcription,’ Journal of Pragmatics, Vol.32, pp.1439-
1465 
 
Buckley, N and Ostrovsky, A (2005) ‘Huge protests in Russia over benefits,’ Financial 
Times, 17th January 2005, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/93dba120-682c-11d9-
a11e-00000e2511c8.html#axzz28XEvuByz  
 
Bunch, C (1990) Women’s Rights as Human Rights: Toward a Re-Vision of Human Rights,’ 
Human Rights Quarterly, Vol.12:4, pp.486-498 
 
Burgess, R (1981) ‘Keeping a Research Diary,’ Cambridge Journal of Education 11:1, pp. 
75-83 
 
Caporaso, J (1996) ‘The European Union and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory or 
Post-Modern?,’ Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.43:1, pp.29-52 
 
Carothers, T and Barndt, W (2000) ‘Civil Society,’ Foreign Policy, Vol.117, pp.18-29 
 
Cassese, A (1990) Human Rights in a Changing World, Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press 
 
Cerami, A (2009) ‘Welfare State Developments in the Russian Federation: Oil-Led Social 
Policy and 'The Russian Miracle',’ Social Policy and Administration, Vol.43:2, pp.105-120 
 
Chan, S (2002) ‘Human Rights in China and the United States: Competing Visions and 
Discrepant Performances,’ Human Rights Quarterly, Vol.24:4, pp.1035-1053 
 
197 
 
Chandler, A (2013) ‘Citizenship, Social Rights and Judicial Review in Regime Transition: 
the case of Russia,’ Democratization, DOI:10.1080/13510347.2013.779255 
 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2000/ C 364/01 (2000), Official 
Journal of the European Communities, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf, last accessed 2nd April 2012 
 
Chebankova, E (2010) ‘Public and Private Cycles of Socio-Political Life in Putin’s Russia,’ 
Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol.26;2, pp.121-148 
 
Checkel, J (2005) ‘International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and 
Framework,’ International Organization, Vol.59: Fall 2005, pp.801-826 
 
Christiansen, T, Jorgensen, E and Wiener, A (1999) ‘The social construction of Europe,’ 
Journal of European Public Policy, Vol.6:4, pp.528-544 
 
Chugrov, S (2000) ‘Russian Foreign Policy and Human Rights: Conflicted Culture and 
Uncertain Policy’ in Forsythe, D (ed.) Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy, Japan: 
United Nations University Press  
 
Clancy, D (1999) ‘Answering the challenge of the universal declaration of human rights: The 
council of Europe and human rights,’ The International Journal of Human Rights, 3:3, 
pp.120-131 
 
Cook, L (2007a) ‘Negotiating Welfare in Postcommunist States,’ Comparative Politics, 40:1, 
pp.41-62 
 
Cook, L (2007b) Post-Communist Welfare States: Reform Politics in Russia and Eastern 
Europe, US: Cornell University Press 
 
Cook, L (2011) ‘Russia's Welfare Regime: The Shift Toward Statism’ in Jappinen, M, 
Kulmala, M and Saarinen, A (eds.) Gazing at Welfare, Gender and Agency in Post-socialist 
Countries, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing 
 
Council of the European Union (2011) ‘The European Union – Russian Federation human 
rights consultations,’ available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/121874.pdf, last 
accessed 16th March 2012 
 
Council of the European Union (2012) ‘EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human 
Rights and Democracy,’ available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/131181.pdf  
 
Council of the European Union (2013) ‘The European Union – Russian Federation human 
rights consultations,’ available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/137151.pdf  
 
Cox, R (1998) ‘The Consequences of Welfare Reform: How Conceptions of Social Rights are 
Changing,’ Journal of Social Policy, Vol.27:1, pp.1-16 
198 
 
Cranston, M (1983) ‘Are There Any Human Rights?’ Daedalus, Vol.112:4, pp.1-17 
 
Crotty, J (2003) ‘Managing civil society: democratisation and the environmental movement 
in a Russian region,’ Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 36, pp.489-508 
Daly, M (2006) ‘EU Social Policy after Lisbon,’ Journal of Common Market Studies, 
Vol.44:3, pp.461-481 
Dean, H (2004) The Ethics of Welfare: Human rights, dependency and responsibility, Bristol: 
The Policy Press 
 
Dean, H (2007) ‘Social Policy and Human Rights: Re-Thinking the Engagement,’ Social 
Policy and Society, Vol.7:1, pp.1-12 
 
Dean, M (1995) ‘Governing the Unemployed Self in an Active Society,’ Economy and 
Society, Vol.24:4, pp.559-583 
 
Dean, R (1980a) ‘Beyond Helsinki: The Soviet View of Human Rights in International Law,’ 
Virginia Journal of International Law, pp.55-96 
 
Dean, R (1980b) ‘Contacts with the West: The Dissidents’ View of Western Support for the 
Human Rights Movement in the Soviet Union,’ Human Rights Quarterly, Vol.2:1, pp47-65 
 
Delegation of the European Union to the Russian Federation (2012) ‘European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human Rights: Projects 2012,’ available at 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/documents/eu_russia/eidhr_2012_en.pdf  
 
Delegation of the European Union to the Russian Federation (2011) ‘European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human Rights: Projects 2011,’ available at 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/documents/eu_russia/civil_soc_projects_2011_en.pdf  
 
Delegation of the European Commission to Russia (2010) ‘Non-Governmental Organisations 
and the Defence of Human Rights in Russia,’ European Instrument for Democracy and 
Human Rights, available at 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/documents/eu_russia/part1_pages_01_17_en.pdf  
 
Delegation of the European Commission to Russia (2009) ‘European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human Rights: New Projects 2009,’ available at 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/eu_russia/civil_society_dialogue/overview/projects_p
artners/index_en.htm  
 
Delegation of the European Commission to Russia (2006) ‘The Institution Building 
Partnership Programme: Civil Society and Local Initiatives (IBPP) Project Summaries 2006,’ 
available at 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/documents/eu_russia/ibpp_summaries_cfp_2006_en.
pdf  
 
De Witte, B (2005) ‘The Trajectory of Fundamental Social Rights in the European Union’ in 
de Burca, G and de Witte, B (eds.) Social Rights in Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
199 
 
 
Defeis, E (2007) ‘Human Rights and the European Court of Justice: An Appraisal,’ Fordham 
International Law Journal, Vol.31:5, pp.1104-1117 
 
Diez, T (2005) ‘Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering 'Normative Power 
Europe,’ Millenium, Vol.33:3, pp.613-636 
 
Domrin, A (2003) ‘Ten Years Later: Society, 'Civil Society,' and the Russian State,’ The 
Russian Review, 63, pp.193-211 
 
Donnelly, J (1982) ‘Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-
Western Conceptions of HR,’ The American Political Science Review, Vol.76:2, pp. 303-316 
 
Donnelly, J ( 1998) International Human Rights, US: Westview Press  
 
Donnelly, J (2007a) ‘The West and Economic Rights’ in Hertel, S and Minkler, L (eds.) 
Economic Rights: Conceptual, Measurement and Policy Issues, New York: Cambridge 
University Press 
 
Donnelly, J (2007b) ‘The Relative Universality of Human Rights,’ Human Rights Quarterly, 
Vol.29, pp.281-306 
 
Douglas-Scott, S (2006) ‘A Tale of Two Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the Growing 
European Human Rights Acquis, Common Market Law Review, Vol.43, pp.629-665 
 
Duchene, F (1972) ‘Europe’s Role in World Peace’ in Mayne, R (ed.) Europe Tomorrow: 
Sixteen European Look Ahead, London:Fontana 
 
Duke, S (1999) ‘Consistency as an Issue in EU External Activities,’ European Institute of 
Public Administration Working Paper, available at http://aei.pitt.edu/542/1/99w06.pdf  
 
Dwyer, P (2004) ‘Creeping Conditionality in the UK: From Welfare Rights to Conditional 
Entitlements?,’ Canadian Journal of Sociology, Vol.29:2, pp.265-287 
 
Easter, G (2008) ‘The Russian State in the Time of Putin,’ Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol.24:3, 
pp.199-230 
 
Easton, S (2009) ‘The Prisoner’s Right to Vote and Civic Responsibility: Reaffirming the 
social contract?,’ Probation Journal, Vol.56:3, pp.224-237 
 
Eide, A (2001) ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights’ in Eide, A and 
Helgesen, J (eds.) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook, The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International 
 
Eide, A and Rosas, A (2001) ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Universal Challenge’ 
in Eide, A and Helgesen, J (eds.) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook, The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International 
 
200 
 
Englehart, N (2000) ‘Rights and Culture in the Asian Values Argument: The Rise and Fall of 
Confucian Ethics in Singapore,’ Human Rights Quarterly, Vol.22:2, pp.548-568 
 
Esping-Anderson, G (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Cambridge: Polity 
Press 
 
European Commission (2011) ‘European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 
Country-Based Support Scheme for Russia: Restricted Call for Proposals 2011,’ 
EuropeAid/130939/L/ACT/RU 
 
European Economic and Social Committee (2009) ‘Prioritising economic, social and cultural 
rights and social dialogue in EU external policies: Press Release Jan 2009,’ available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=CES/09/3&format=HTML&aged=
0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en , last accessed 16th March 2012 
 
European External Action Service (2010) ‘Human rights and democracy in the world: Report 
on EU action July 2008-December 2009,’ available at 
http://eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/docs/2010_hr_report_en.pdf , last accessed 16th March 
2012 
 
European Inter-University Centre for Human Rights and Democratisation (2006) Beyond 
Activism: The impact of the resolutions and other activities of the European Parliament in the 
field of human rights outside the European Union, Venice: European Inter-University Centre 
for Human Rights and Democratisation 
 
European Parliament (1996) ‘Resolution on respect for human rights in the European Union 
(1996),’ available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:51998IP0034:EN:HTML , last 
accessed 15th March 2012 
 
European Parliament Directorate General for Research (2000), ‘Working Paper: Fundamental 
Social Rights in Europe,’ available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/workingpapers/soci/pdf/104_en.pdf, last accessed 23rd March 
2012  
 
European Union Delegation to Russia (2009) ‘The Institution Building Partnership 
Programme: Civil Society and Local Initiatives (IBPP) Project Summaries 2009,’ available at 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/documents/page_content/projects_2009_compressed_
en.pdf  
 
Evans, A (2006) ‘Vladimir Putin’s Design for Civil Society’ in Evans, A; Henry, L and  
McIntosh-Sundstrom, L (eds.) Russian Civil Society: A Critical Assessment, 
London:M.E.Sharpe 
 
Falk, R (2008) ‘A Half-Century of Human Rights: Geopolitics and values,’ in Falk, R et 
al (eds.) Human rights: critical concepts in political science, Volume 1, UK: Routledge 
 
Fairclough, N (2003) Analysing Discourse, London: Routledge 
 
201 
 
Finnemore, M (1996) National Interests in International Society, US: Cornell University 
Press 
 
Farnsworth, K and Irving, Z (2012) ‘Varieties of crisis, varieties of austerity: social policy in 
challenging times,’ Journal of Poverty and Social Justice, 20:2, pp. 133-147 
 
Feldbrugge, F(1980) ‘The Soviet Human Rights Doctrine in the Crossfire Between Dissidents 
at Home and Critics Abroad,’ Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol.13 
Finnemore, M (1996) ‘Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's 
Institutionalism,’ International Organization, Vol.50:2, pp.325-347 
Forsberg, T and Herd, G (2005) ‘The EU, Human Rights and the Russo-Chechen Conflict,’ 
Political Science Quarterly, Vol.120:3, pp.455-478 
 
Foucault, M ‘Truth and Power’ in Faubion, J (ed.) (2001) Power / Michel Foucault, London : 
Allen Lane 
Fredman, S (2006) ‘Transformation or Dilution: Fundamental Rights in the EU Social 
Space,’ European Law Journal, Vol.12:1, pp.41-60 
 
Gamble, A (2001) ‘Neo-Liberalism,’ Capital and Class, Vol.25, pp.127-134 
 
Gatto, A (2005) ‘The Integration of Social Rights in the External Relations of the European 
Union’ in de Burca, G and de Witte, B (eds.) Social Rights in Europe, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
 
Gavison, R (2003) ‘On the Relationship between Civil and Political Rights, and Social and 
Economic Rights’ in Coicaud, J et al (eds) The Globalization of Human Rights, Japan: United 
Nations University Press 
 
Gearty, C (2011) ‘Against Judicial Enforcement’ in Gearty, C and Mantouvalou, V (eds.) 
Debating Social Rights, Oxford: Hart Publishing 
 
Giddens, A (1998) The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy, Cambridge: Polity 
Press 
 
Glen, C and Murgo, R (2007) ‘EU-China relations: balancing political challenges with 
economic opportunities,’ Asia Europe Journal, Vol.5, pp.331-344 
 
Glushkova, S (2006) Prava Cheloveka v Rossii, Moscow: Yurist 
 
Goering, C (2006) ‘Amnesty International and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in Bell, 
D and Coicaud, J-M (eds.) Ethics in Action: The Ethical Challenges of International Human 
Rights Nongovernmental Organizations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Gradskova, Y (2012) ‘Regional Ombudsmen, Human Rights and Women – Gender Aspects 
of the Social and Legal Transformation in North-West Russia (Based on Ombudsman 
Reports),’ The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review, Vol.39, pp.84-109 
202 
 
 
Griffin, J (2000) ‘Welfare Rights,’ The Journal of Ethics, Vol.4, pp.27-43 
 
Hale, H (2002) ‘Civil Society from Above? Statist and Liberal Models of State-Building in 
Russia,’ Demokratizatsiya, 10:3, pp.306-321 
 
Halliday, F (1987) ‘State and Society in International Relations; A Second Agenda,’ 
Millenium, Vol.16, pp.215-229 
 
Handler, J (2003) ‘Social Citizenship and Workfare in the US and Western Europe: From 
Status to Contract,’ Journal of European Social Policy, Vol.13, pp.229-243 
 
Hansen, P and Schierup, C-U (2005) ‘Still a European Social Model? From a Vision of a 
'Social Europe' to the EU Reality of Embedded Neo-liberalism,’ Centre for Ethnic and Urban 
Studies Occasional papers and reprints on ethnic studies, Vol.26 
 
Haukkala, H (2005) ‘The Relevance of Norms and Values in the EU's Russia Policy,’ Finnish 
Institute of International Affairs UPI Working Paper, Vol.52 
 
Haukkala, H (2008) ‘The European Union as a Regional Normative Hegemon: The Case of 
European Neighbourhood Policy,’ Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.60:9, pp.1601-1622 
 
Haukkala, H (2009) ‘Lost in Translation? Why the EU has failed to Influence Russia’s 
Development, Europe Asia Studies, Vol.61:10, pp.1757-1775 
 
Hawkesworth, M (1980) ‘Ideological Immunity: The Soviet Response to Human Rights 
Criticism,’ Universal Human Rights, Vol.2:1, pp.67-84 
 
Hemment, J (2004) ‘The Riddle of the Third Sector: Civil Society, International Aid, and 
NGOs in Russia,’ Anthropological Quarterly, 77:2, pp.215-241 
 
Hemment, J (2009) ‘Soviet-Style Neoliberalism? Nashi, Youth Voluntarism, and the 
Restructuring of Social Welfare in Russia,’ Problems of Post-Communism, Vol.56:6, pp.36-
50 
 
Henderson, S (2002) ‘Selling Civil Society: Western Aid and the Nongovernmental 
Organization Sector in Russia,’ Comparative Political Studies, 35:2, pp.139-167 
 
Henderson, S (2011) ‘Civil Society in Russia: State-Society Relations in the Post-Yeltsin 
Era,’ Problems of Post-Communism, 58:3, pp.11-27 
 
Henry, L (2009) ‘Redefining Citizenship in Russia: Political and Social Rights,’ Problems of 
Post-Communism, 56:6, pp.51-65 
 
Hertel, S and Minkler, L (2007) ‘Economic Rights: The Terrain’ in Hertel, S and Minkler, L 
(eds.) Economic Rights: Conceptual, Measurement and Policy Issues, New York: Cambridge 
University Press 
 
203 
 
High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (2011) 
‘Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Human Rights and 
Democracy at the Heart of EU External Action – Towards a More Effective Approach,’ 
available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0886:FIN:EN:PDF, last accessed 
23rd March 2012 
 
Holstein, J and Gubrium, J ‘Active Interviewing’ in Silverman, D (1997) Qualitative 
Research: Theory, Method and Practice, London: Sage Publications 
 
Horvath, P (2005) The Legacy of Soviet Dissent: Dissidents, democratisation and radical 
nationalism in Russia, Abingdon, UK: Routledge Curzon 
 
Hyde-Price, A (2006) ‘'Normative' power Europe: a realist critique,’ Journal of European 
Public Policy, 13:2, pp.217-234 
 
Ingram, J (2008) ‘What is a 'Right to Have Rights'? 3 Images of the Politics of Human 
Rights,’ American Political Science Review, Vol.102:4, pp.401-416 
 
Inoue, T (2003) ‘Human Rights and Asian Values’ in Coicaud, J et al (ed.) The Globalization 
of Human Rights, Japan: United Nations University Press 
 
Jackson, R (1999) ‘The War Over Children's Rights: And Justice for All? Equalizing the 
Rights of Children,’ Buffalo Human Rights Law Review, Vol.5, pp.223-251 
 
Janesick, V (1999) ‘A Journal About Journal Writing as a Qualitative Research Technique: 
History, Issues, and Reflections,’ Qualitative Inquiry, Vol.5:4, pp.505-524 
 
Javeline, D and Lindemann-Komarova, D (2010) ‘A Balanced Assessment of Russian Civil 
Society,’ Journal of International Affairs, Vol.63:2, pp.171-188 
 
Jenks, C W (1946) ‘The Five Economic and Social Rights,’ Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol.243, pp.40-46 
 
Jessop, B (2008) State Power, Cambridge: Polity Press 
 
Jordan, P (2003) ‘Russia's Accession to the Council of Europe and Compliance with Human 
Rights Norms,’ Demokratizatsiya, Vol.11:2, pp.281-296 
 
Juviler, P (1998) Freedom's Ordeal: The Struggle for Human Rights and Democracy in Post-
Soviet States, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 
 
Kapferer, B (2005) ‘Foreword’ in Krohn-Hansen, C and Nustad, K (eds.) State Formation: 
Anthropological Perspectives, London: Pluto Press 
 
Katragoulos, G (1996) ‘The Implementation of Social Rights in Europe,’ Columbia Journal 
of European Law, Vol.2, pp. 277-312 
 
Keep, J (1971) ‘Andrei Amalrik and “1984,”’ Russian Review, Vol.30:4, pp.335-345 
204 
 
 
Kerremans, B (1996) ‘Do Institutions Make a Difference? Non-Institutionalism, Neo-
Institutionalism, and the Logic of Common Decision-Making in the European Union,’ 
Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, Vol.9:2, pp.217-240 
 
Klausen, J (1995) ‘Social Rights Advocacy and State Building: T. H. Marshall in the Hands 
of Social Reformers,’ World Politics, Vol.47:2, pp.244-267 
 
Klitsounova, E (2008) ‘Promoting Human Rights in Russia by Supporting NGOs: How to 
Improve EU Strategies,’ CEPS Working Document No.287/April 2008 
 
Komen, J (2009) ‘Do Human Rights Still Matter in EU-Russia Relations?,’ Euro-Power, June 
2009 
 
Kononova, S (2010) ‘Money for the Needy,’ Russia Profile, January 2010, available at 
http://www.russiaprofile.org/politics/a1264450336.html  
 
Krieger, S (1996) ‘Beyond Subjectivity’ in Lareau, A and Schulz, J (eds.) Journeys Through 
Ethnography, US: Westview Press 
 
Kulmala, M (2011) ‘Russian State and Society in Interaction: An Ethnographic Approach,’ 
Laboraturium Russian Review of Social Research, 1, pp.51-83 
 
Kvale, S (1983) ‘The qualitative research interview: A phenomenological and a 
hermeneutical mode of understanding,’ Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, Vol.14, 
pp.171-196 
 
Landmann, T (2009) ‘Social Science Methods and Human Rights’ in Coomans, F; Grunfeld, 
F and Kamminga, M (eds.) Methods of Human Rights Research, Oxford; Insentia 
 
Lane, D (1984) ‘Human Rights Under State Socialism,’ Political Studies, Vol.3:3, pp.349-
368 
 
Leary, V (1994) ‘The Right to Health in International Human Rights Law,’ Health and 
Human Rights, 1:1, pp.24-56 
 
Lerch, M and Schwellnus, G (2006) ‘Normative by nature? The role of coherence in 
justifying the EU's external human rights policy,’ Journal of European Public Policy, 
Vol.13:2, pp.304-321 
 
Lipset, S and Dobson, R (1972) ‘The Intellectual as Critic and Rebel: With Special Reference 
to the United States and the Soviet Union,’ Daedalus, Vol.101:3, pp.137-198 
 
Lukin, A (2009) ‘Russia’s New Authoritarianism and the Post-Soviet Political Ideal,’ Post-
Soviet Affairs, Vol.25;1, pp.66-92 
 
Madsen, M (2007) ‘From Cold War Instrument to Supreme European Court: The European 
Court of Human Rights at the Crossroads of International and National Law and Politics,’ 
Law and Social Inquiry, Vol.32:1, pp.137-159 
205 
 
 
Makarychev, A (2008) ‘Politics, the State, and De-Politicization: Putin’s Project Reassessed,’ 
Problems of Post-Communism, Vol.55:5. Pp.62-71 
 
Manners, I (2002) ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’ Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Vol.40:2, pp.235-258 
 
Marsh, C and Payne, D (2007) ‘The Globalization of Human Rights and the Socialization of 
Human Rights Norms,’ Brigham Young Law Review, Issue 3, pp.665-687 
 
Marshall, T H and Bottomore, T (1992) Citizenship and Social Class, London:Pluto Press 
 
Matza, T (2009) ‘Moscow's Echo: Technologies of the Self, Publics, and Politics on the 
Russian Talk Show,’ Cultural Anthropology, Vol.24:3, pp.489-522 
 
Mauzy, D (1997) ‘The human rights and ‘Asian values’ debate in Southeast Asia: Trying to 
clarify the key issues,’ The Pacific Review, Vol.10:2, pp.210-236 
 
McIntosh Sundstrom, L (2005) ‘Foreign Assistance, International Norms, and NGO 
Development: Lessons from the Russian Campaign,’ International Organization, 59, pp.419-
449 
 
McIntosh Sundstrom, L and Beznosova, O (2009) ‘Western Aid and the State-Society 
Balance in Novgorod and Khabarovsk,’ Problems of Post-Communism, Vol.56:6, pp.21-35 
 
MacLeavy, J (2011) ‘A ‘New Politics’ of Austerity, Workfare and Gender? The UK coalition 
Government’s Welfare Reform Proposals,’ Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and 
Society, Vol.6:1, pp.1-13 
 
Mendelson, S and Gerber, T (2007) ‘Activist Culture and Transnational Diffusion: Social 
Marketing and HR Groups in Russia,’ Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol.23:1, pp.50-75 
 
Meron, T (1986) ‘On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights,’ The American Journal of 
International Law, Vol.80:1, pp.1-23 
 
Merry, S (2006) ‘Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the Middle,’ 
American Anthropologist, Vol.108:1, pp.38-51 
 
Michailova, S (2004) ‘Contextualising Fieldwork: Reflections on Conducting Research in 
Eastern Europe’ in Marschan-Piekkari, R and Welch, C (eds.) Handbook of Qualitative 
Research Methods for International Business, UK: Edward Elgar 
 
Migdal, J and Schlichte, K (2005) ‘Rethinking the State’ in Schlichte, K (ed.) The Dynamics 
of States: The Formation and Crises of State Domination 
 
Miller, J and Glassner, B ‘The ‘Inside’ and the ‘Outside’: Finding Realities in Interviews’ in 
Silverman, D (1997) Qualitative Research: Theory, Method and Practice, London: Sage 
Publications 
 
206 
 
Mitchell, T (1991) ‘The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics,’ 
American Political Science Review, Vol.85:1, pp.77-96 
 
Mohsin Hashim, S (2005) ‘Putin's Etatization project and limits to democratic reforms in 
Russia,’ Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol.38, pp.25-48 
 
Moyn, S (2010) The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History, Cambridge, Massachussets: 
Belknap Press 
 
Mudge, S (2008) ‘The State of the Art: What is neo-liberalism?, Socio-Economic Review, 
Vol.6, pp. 703-731 
 
Müller, M (2007) ‘What’s in a word? Problematizing translation between languages,’ Area, 
Vol.39:2, pp.206-213 
 
Mutua, M (1996) ‘The Ideology of Human Rights,’ Virginia Journal of International Law, 
Vol.36, pp.589-657 
 
Mutua, M (2007) ‘Standard Setting in Human Rights: Critique and Prognosis,’ Human Rights 
Quarterly Vol. 29, pp.547-630  
 
Nandy, A (2008) ‘Human Rights and Western Dominance’ in Falk, R et al (eds.) Human 
rights: critical concepts in political science, Volume 1, UK: Routledge 
 
Nathans, B (2011) ‘Soviet Rights-Talk in the Post-Stalin Era’ in Hoffman, S-L (ed.) Human 
Rights in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 
 
Nethercott, F (2007) Russian Legal Culture Before and After Communism, UK: Routledge 
 
Neuhold, C (2001) ‘The ‘Legislative Backbone’ keeping the Institution upright? The Role of 
European Parliament Committees in the EU Policy-Making Process,’ European Integration 
Online Papers, Vol.5, No.10 
 
Neyer, J (2003) ‘Discourse and Order in the EU: A Deliberative Approach to Multi-Level 
Governance,’ Journal of Common Market Studies (JCMS), Vol.41:4, pp.687-706 
 
Nozick, R (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia, Oxford: Blackwell 
 
Nuttall, S (2005) ‘Coherence and Consistency’ in International Relations and the European 
Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
O’Connell, P (2007) ‘On Reconciling Irreconcilables: Neo-liberal Globalisation and Human 
Rights,’ Human Rights Law Review, Vol.7:3, pp.483-509 
 
Okara, A (2007) ‘Sovereign Democracy: A New Russian Idea or a PR Project?’ Russia in 
Global Affairs, Vol.2 
 
207 
 
Oliver, D; Serovich, J; and Mason, T (2005) ‘Constraints and Opportunities with Interview 
Transcription: Towards Reflection in Qualitative Research,’ Social Force, Vol.84:2, pp.1273-
1289 
 
Ordzhonikidze, M (2008) ‘Western Values as Perceived by Russia,’ Sociological Research, 
Vol.47:5, pp.6-35 
 
Orenstein, M (2008) ‘Post-Communist Welfare States,’ Journal of Democracy, 19:4, pp.80-
94 
 
Paine, T (1996) Rights of Man, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions 
 
Panebianco, S (2006) ‘Promoting human rights and democracy in European Union relations 
with Russia and China’ in Lucarelli, S and Manners, I (eds.) Values and Principles in 
European Union Foreign Policy, UK:Routledge 
 
Paneyakh, E (2010) ‘Human Rights Discourse on Russia: Recipe for Failure,’ The EU-Russia 
Centre Review, Vol.16 
 
Phillips, N and Hardy, C (2002) Discourse Analysis: Investigating Processes of Social 
Construction, USA: Sage Publications 
 
Pieterse, M (2003) ‘Beyond the Welfare State: Globalisation of Neo-Liberal Culture and the 
Constitutional Protection of Social and Economic Rights in South Africa,’ Stellenbosch Law 
Review,Vol.14, pp.3-29 
 
Pollis, A (2008) ‘Cultural Relativism Revisited’ in Falk, R et al (eds.) Human rights: critical 
concepts in political science, Volume 1, UK: Routledge 
 
Ponomarev, L (2013) ‘Razgrom sotsialnovo gosurdarstvo v Rossiiskoi Federatsii,’ Za Prava 
Cheloveka, available at http://www.zaprava.ru/201302193860/glavnyie-novosti-
dnya/razgrom-soczialnogo-gosudarstva-v-rossijskoj-federaczii  
 
Putin, V (2004) ‘Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation,’ May 
26 2004, available at 
http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2004/05/26/1309_type70029type82912_71650.shtml 
 
Renteln, A (1990) International Human Rights: Universalism versus Relativism, California: 
Sage 
 
Rettman, A (2010) ‘EU-Russia human rights talks making little impact,’ EU Observer, 
available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/droi/dv/201/201102/201102
28_404euobserver_en.pdf  
 
RFERL (2006) ‘Russia: U.S. Official Says New NGO Law Part Of Anti-democratic Trend,’ 2 
February 2006, available at http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1065352.html  
 
208 
 
Richards, D (1996) ‘Elite Interviewing: Approaches and Pitfalls,’ Politics, Vol.16:3, pp.199-
204 
 
Richardson, J (2007) Analysing newspapers: an approach from critical discourse analysis, 
Basingstoke; New York : Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Richter, J (2009a) ‘Putin and the Public Chamber,’ Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol.25:1, pp.39-65 
 
Richter, J (2009b) ‘The Ministry of Civil Society? The Public Chambers in the Regions,’ 
Problems of Post-Communism, Vol:56:6, pp.7-20 
 
Risse, T and Sikkink, K (1999) ‘The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into 
Domestic Practices: Introduction’ in Risse, T; Ropp, S and Sikkink, K (eds.) The Power of 
Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press 
 
Rivkin-Fish, M (2010) ‘Pronatalism, Gender Politics, and the Renewal of Family Support in 
Russia: Toward a Feminist Antrhopology of 'Maternity Capital',’ Slavic Review, Vol.69:3, 
pp.701-724 
 
Rosas, A (2001) ‘ESC Rights in the External Relations of the EU’ in Eide, A and Helgesen, J 
(eds.) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook, The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International 
 
Roudik, P (2007) ‘Russian Federation: Children’s Rights: International Law and National 
Laws and Practice,’ Law Library of Congress, available at 
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/child-rights/russia.php 
 
Ruggie, J (1998) ‘What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social 
Constructivist Challenge,’ International Organisation, Vol.52:4, pp.855-885 
Saari, S (2006) ‘Human rights cooperation between Russia and European intergovernmental 
organisations: a one-way transference of norms or a mutual process of adaptation?,’ UPI 
Working Papers 54 (2006), available at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-
Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-
a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=19397 
 
Saari, S (2010) Promoting Human Rights and Democracy in Russia, Abingdon, UK: 
Routledge 
 
Said, A (1979) ‘Precept and Practice of Human Rights in Islam,’ Universal Human Rights, 
Vol.1:1, pp.63-80 
 
Sajo, A (1996) ‘Rights in Post-Communism,’ in Sajo, A (ed.) Western Rights? Post-
Communist Application, The Hague: Kluwer Law International 
 
Sakwa, R (2008) ‘Putin’s Leadership: Character and Consequences,’ Europe-Asia Studies, 
Vol.60:6, pp.879-897 
 
209 
 
Sales, R (2002) ‘The deserving and the undeserving? Refugees, asylum seekers and welfare 
in Britain, Critical Social Policy, Vol.22:3, pp.456-478 
 
Salmenniemi, S (2010) ‘Struggling for Citizenship: Civic Participation and the State in 
Russia,’ Demokratizatsiya, Vol.18:4, pp.309-328 
 
Schimmelfennig, F (2002) ‘Introduction: The Impact of International Organisations on the 
Central and East European States - Conceptual and Theoretical Issues’ in Norms and 
Nannies: The Impact of Int. Orgs. on the Central and East European States, Oxford: Rowman 
and Littlefield 
 
Schmidt, V (2004) ‘The European Union: Democratic Legitimacy in a Regional State?,’ 
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.42:5, pp.975-997 
 
Schmitter, P (1985) ‘Neo Corporatism and the State’ in Grant, W (ed.) The Political 
Economy of Corporatism, New York: St. Martin's. 
 
Sen, A (2008) ‘Human Rights and Asian Values in Falk, R et al (eds.) Human rights: critical 
concepts in political science, Volume 1, UK: Routledge 
 
Sjursen, H (2006) ‘What kind of power?,’ Journal of European Public Policy, Vol.13:2, 
pp.169-181 
 
Smith, H (2005) ‘The Russian Federation and the European Union: The Shadow of 
Chechnya,’ in Johnson, D and Robinson, P (eds.) Perspectives on EU-Russia Relations, 
Routledge 
 
Smith, K (2001) ‘The EU, human rights and relations with third countries: 'foreign policy' 
with an ethical dimension?’ in Smith, K and Light, M (eds.) Ethics and Foreign Policy, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Smith, K (2003a) European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, Polity Press: 
Cambridge 
 
Smith, K (2003b) ‘The European Union: A Distinctive Actor in International Relations,’ 
Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol.9:2, pp102-113 
 
Smith, M (2012) ‘Social Rights in the Soviet Dictatorship; The Constitutional Right to 
Welfare from Stalin to Brezhnev,’ Humanity, Vol.3:3, pp.385-406 
 
Smolar, A (1996) ‘From Opposition to Atomization,’ Journal of Democracy, Vol.7:1, pp.24-
38 
 
Soysal, Y (2012) ‘Citizenship, immigartion and the European social project: rights and 
obligations of individuality,’ The British Journal of Sociology, 63:1, pp.1-21 
 
Szyszczak, E (2001) ‘Protecting Social Rights in the EU’ in Eide, A and Helgesen, J (eds.) 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook, The Hague: Kluwer Law International 
 
210 
 
Temple, B and Young, A (2004) ‘Qualitative Research and Translation Dilemmas,’ 
Qualitative Research, Vol.4:2, pp.161-178 
 
Thomas, D (2005) ‘Human Rights Ideas, the Demise of Communism, and the End of the 
Cold War,’ Journal of Cold War Studies Vol.7 (2), Spring 2005 
Thomson, J (1995) ‘State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap between 
Theory and Empirical Research,’ International Studies Quarterly, Vol.39:2, pp.213-233 
Tocci, N (2008) ‘Profiling Normative Foreign Policy: The European Union and its Global 
Partners’ in Tocci, N et al (eds.) Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The European 
Union and its Global Partners, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies 
 
Toebes, B (2001) ‘The Right to Health’ in Eide, A; Krause, C and Rosas, A (eds.) Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook, The Hague: Kluwer Law International 
 
Tolz, V (1998) ‘Forging the Nation: National Identity and Nation Building in Post-
Communist Russia,’ Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No.6, pp.993-1022 
 
Turbine, V. (2007) 'Women's perceptions of human rights and rights-based approaches in 
everyday life: a case study from provincial Russia', Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of 
Glasgow. Available at: http://theses.gla.ac.uk/126/1/2007turbinephd.pdf  
 
Turbine, V (2012) ‘Locating Women's Human Rights in Post-Soviet Provincial Russia,’ 
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.64:10, pp.1847-1869 
 
Vasak, K (1977) ‘A 30-year struggle: the sustained efforts to give force of law to the UDHR,’ 
UNESCO Courier, Vol.11, pp.29-36 
 
Valenti, S (2010) ‘The Role of the Ombudsman in the Defence of Social Rights in Times of 
Economic Crisis,’ Workshop Debriefing Paper, Joint EU-Council of Europe Project, 
available at http://unipd-centrodirittiumani.it/en/pubblicazioni/The-role-of-the-ombudsman-
in-the-defence-of-social-rights-in-times-of-economic-crisis/952  
 
Wald, M (1979) ‘Children's Rights: A Framework for Analysis,’ University of California 
Davis Law Review, Vol.12, pp.255-282 
 
Walby, S (2003) ‘The Myth of the Nation-State: Theorizing Society and Polities in the 
Global Era,’ Sociology, Vol.37:3, pp.529-546 
 
Walters, W (1997) ‘The ‘active society’: new designs for social policy,’ Policy and Politics, 
Vol.25:3, pp.221-234 
 
Welch, C and Piekkari, R (2006) ‘Crossing Language Boundaries: Qualitative Interviewing 
in International Business,’ Management International Review, Vol.46:4, pp.417-437 
 
Wellman, C (1982) Welfare Rights, New Jersey: Rowmand and Allanheld 
 
211 
 
Wendt, A (1995) ‘Constructing International Politics,’ International Security, Vol.20:1, 
pp.71-81 
 
Wengle, S and Rasell, M (2008) The monetisation of L’goty: changing patterns of welfare 
politics and provision in Russia, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.60:5, pp. 739-756 
 
Wengraf, T (2001) Qualitative Research Interviewing, London: SAGE Publications 
 
Weston, B (2008) ‘Human rights’ in Falk, R et al (eds.) Human rights: critical concepts in 
political science, Volume 1, UK: Routledge 
 
Williams, A (2004) EU Human Rights Policies: A Study in Irony, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 
 
Wind, M (2008) ‘Post-National Citizenship in Europe: The EU as a Welfare Rights 
Generator,’ Columbia Journal of European Law, Vol.15, pp.239-264 
 
Yokota, Y (2008) ‘Reflections on the future of economic, social and cultural rights’ in Falk, 
R et al (eds.) Human rights: critical concepts in political science, Volume 2, UK: Routledge 
 
Youngs, R (2004) ‘Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU's External 
Identity,’ Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.42:2, pp.415-435 
 
Zielonka, J (2008) ‘Europe as a Global Actor: Empire by Example?,’ International Affairs, 
84:3, pp.471-484 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
212 
 
Appendix One 
 
Qualitative Interviews 
 
Interviews conducted in Strasbourg: 
 
1. Johannes, MEP, European Parliament: 16th June 2010 
2. Kurt, MEP, European Parliament: 21st June 2010 
 
Interviews conducted in Brussels: 
 
1.  Karl, political advisor to MEPs, European Parliament: 25th January 2011 
2. Rachel, European External Action Service official: 27th January 2011 
3. Nathalie, European External Action Service official: 27th January 2011 
4. Neil, head of a European affairs think-tank: 25th January 2011 
5. Anna, human rights researcher, European Parliament: 14th September 2011 
6. Anton, European External Action Service official, 13th September 2011 
 
Interviews conducted in Russia: 
 
EU and EU Member State Representatives: 
 
1. Katya, EU Member State diplomat, St Petersburg: 2nd March 2011 
2.  Robert, EU Member State consul, St Petersburg: 2nd March 2011 
3. Frieda, EU Member State diplomat, St Petersburg: 24th March 2011 
4. Christina, EU Member State diplomat, Moscow: 11th April 2011 
5. Thomas, EU Member State diplomat, Moscow: 11th April 2011 
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6. John, EU Member State diplomat, Moscow: 18th April 2011 
7. Edith, EU Member State diplomat, Moscow: 12th April 2011 
8. Matthew, representative of the EU Delegation to the Russian Federation, Moscow: 15th 
April 2011 
 
Social Sector NGOs: 
 
1. Anya, manager of an NGO working with the elderly and disabled, St Petersburg: 11th 
March 2011 
2. Nadezhda, children’s charity manager, St Petersburg: 22nd February 2011 
3. Lydia, healthcare NGO manager, St Petersburg: 5th April 2011 
4. Alisa, employee of an NGO promoting foster care, St Petersburg: 28th February 2011 
5. Yana, manager of an NGO promoting foster care, St Petersburg: 28th February 2011 
6. Marina, programme officer for an NGO promoting labour rights, Moscow: 14th April 2011 
 
Human Rights NGOs: 
 
1. Svetlana, human rights activist, St Petersburg: 18th February 2011 
2. Nadya, human rights activist, St Petersburg: 25th April 2011 
3. Lyuda, human rights activist, St Petersburg: 22nd March 2011 
4. Oleg, human rights activist, St Petersburg: 22nd March 2011 
5. Dmitriy, human rights activists, Ryazan: 13th June 2011 
6. Tanya, human rights activists, Ryazan: 13th June 2011 
7. Sergey, human rights activist, Nizhniy Novgorod: 7th June 2011 
 
Regional Human Rights/Child Human Rights Ombudsmen: 
 
1. Sergey, advisor to the St Petersburg Child Human Rights Ombudsman: 20th March 2011 
2. Nikolai, regional human rights ombudsman, Northwestern Federal District: 5th April 2011 
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3. Andrey, regional human rights ombudsman, Moscow Region: 14th April 2011 
 
Academics: 
1. Andrey, academic, St Petersburg: 20th May 2011 
2. Pavel. Academic, St Petersburg: 20th May 2011 
3. Stanislav, academic, St Petersburg: 26th May 2011 
4. Aleksey, academic, St Petersburg: 18th June 2011 
5. Vadim, academic, St Petersburg: 20th June 2011 
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Appendix Two 
 
Interview Consent Form (EU Respondents) 
 
My name is Eleanor Bindman and I am a doctoral student in the Department of Central and 
East European Studies at the University of Glasgow, UK. As part of my research I am 
interviewing a number of respondents to ascertain their views on the European Union’s 
policy on promoting human rights in Russia. Data from the interviews is likely to be used in 
my doctoral thesis and potentially in articles for publication in academic journals but your 
identity will be kept anonymous in all written work. By signing this form, you are giving 
consent for your interview responses to be used in this manner.  
Upon completion the thesis will be assessed by staff members within the Faculty of Law, 
Business and Social Sciences and external examiners. You will be entitled to a copy of the 
interview transcript should you wish to have one and I will email you copies of the final 
pieces of written work upon submission.  
By signing below you will be consenting to being interviewed: 
Name: 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Signature:  
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Please sign here if you consent to the interview being audio recorded: 
 
Signature: 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Following the interview, feedback or any other comments or questions will be very welcome and I 
can be contacted at e.bindman.1@research.gla.ac.uk. If you have any concerns about the nature or 
conduct of the research which you would prefer to discuss with someone else, please contact Dr John 
Francis McKernan, deputy ethics officer at the College of Social Sciences, University of Glasgow at 
john.mckernan@glasgow.ac.uk. 
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Appendix Three 
 
 Interview Consent Email Sent to Russian Respondents 
 
Translation from Russian: 
 
Dear _____________, 
 
I am a PhD student at the University of Glasgow in the UK and recently came to St 
Petersburg to carry out research at the European University here. My subject is the European 
Union’s policy on promoting human rights in Russia, particularly economic and social rights. 
While I am in St Petersburg I hope to conduct a number of interviews with representatives of 
non-governmental organisations. I have already heard much about your organisation and it 
would be extremely interesting for me to carry out a short, informal and completely 
confidential interview with you at a time which is convenient to you. If you require any 
further information from me please let me know and I hope that you will take part. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Eleanor Bindman 
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Appendix Four 
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
 
PREAMBLE 
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of 
the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, 
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have 
outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy 
freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest 
aspiration of the common people, 
Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion 
against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law, 
Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations, 
Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women 
and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, 
Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations, 
the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the 
full realization of this pledge, 
Now, Therefore THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY proclaims THIS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end 
that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall 
strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive 
measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and 
observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of 
territories under their jurisdiction. 
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Article 1. 
    All human beings are born free and equal in 
dignity and rights.They are endowed with 
reason and conscience and should act towards 
one another in a spirit of brotherhood. 
Article 2. 
    Everyone is entitled to all the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status. Furthermore, no 
distinction shall be made on the basis of the 
political, jurisdictional or international status 
of the country or territory to which a person 
belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-
self-governing or under any other limitation of 
sovereignty. 
Article 3. 
    Everyone has the right to life, liberty and 
security of person. 
Article 4. 
    No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; 
slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited 
in all their forms. 
Article 5. 
    No one shall be subjected to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. 
  
 
Article 6. 
    Everyone has the right to recognition 
everywhere as a person before the law. 
 Article 7. 
   All are equal before the law and are entitled 
without any discrimination to equal protection 
of the law. All are entitled to equal protection 
against any discrimination in violation of this 
Declaration and against any incitement to such 
discrimination. 
Article 8. 
    Everyone has the right to an effective 
remedy by the competent national tribunals for 
acts violating the fundamental rights granted 
him by the constitution or by law. 
Article 9. 
    No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, 
detention or exile. 
 Article 10. 
    Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair 
and public hearing by an independent and 
impartial tribunal, in the determination of his 
rights and obligations and of any criminal 
charge against him. 
Article 11. 
    (1) Everyone charged with a penal offence 
has the right to be presumed innocent until 
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proved guilty according to law in a public trial 
at which he has had all the guarantees 
necessary for his defence. 
    (2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal 
offence on account of any act or omission 
which did not constitute a penal offence, under 
national or international law, at the time when 
it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty 
be imposed than the one that was applicable at 
the time the penal offence was committed. 
Article 12. 
    No one shall be subjected to arbitrary 
interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his 
honour and reputation. Everyone has the right 
to the protection of the law against such 
interference or attacks. 
Article 13. 
    (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of 
movement and residence within the borders of 
each state. 
    (2) Everyone has the right to leave any 
country, including his own, and to return to his 
country. 
Article 14. 
    (1) Everyone has the right to seek and to 
enjoy in other countries asylum from 
persecution. 
    (2) This right may not be invoked in the 
case of prosecutions genuinely arising from 
non-political crimes or from acts contrary to 
the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations. 
 
Article 15. 
    (1) Everyone has the right to a nationality. 
    (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of 
his nationality nor denied the right to change 
his nationality. 
Article 16. 
    (1) Men and women of full age, without any 
limitation due to race, nationality or religion, 
have the right to marry and to found a family. 
They are entitled to equal rights as to 
marriage, during marriage and at its 
dissolution. 
    (2) Marriage shall be entered into only with 
the free and full consent of the intending 
spouses. 
    (3) The family is the natural and 
fundamental group unit of society and is 
entitled to protection by society and the State. 
Article 17. 
    (1) Everyone has the right to own property 
alone as well as in association with others. 
    (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of 
his property. 
 Article 18. 
    Everyone has the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion; this right 
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includes freedom to change his religion or 
belief, and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief in 
teaching, practice, worship and observance. 
 Article 19. 
    Everyone has the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression; this right includes 
freedom to hold opinions without interference 
and to seek, receive and impart information 
and ideas through any media and regardless of 
frontiers. 
Article 20. 
    (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of 
peaceful assembly and association. 
    (2) No one may be compelled to belong to 
an association. 
Article 21. 
    (1) Everyone has the right to take part in the 
government of his country, directly or through 
freely chosen representatives. 
    (2) Everyone has the right of equal access to 
public service in his country. 
    (3) The will of the people shall be the basis 
of the authority of government; this will shall 
be expressed in periodic and genuine elections 
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage 
and shall be held by secret vote or by 
equivalent free voting procedures. 
 Article 22. 
    Everyone, as a member of society, has the 
right to social security and is entitled to 
realization, through national effort and 
international co-operation and in accordance 
with the organization and resources of each 
State, of the economic, social and cultural 
rights indispensable for his dignity and the free 
development of his personality. 
Article 23. 
    (1) Everyone has the right to work, to free 
choice of employment, to just and favourable 
conditions of work and to protection against 
unemployment. 
    (2) Everyone, without any discrimination, 
has the right to equal pay for equal work. 
    (3) Everyone who works has the right to just 
and favourable remuneration ensuring for 
himself and his family an existence worthy of 
human dignity, and supplemented, if 
necessary, by other means of social protection. 
    (4) Everyone has the right to form and to 
join trade unions for the protection of his 
interests. 
Article 24. 
    Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, 
including reasonable limitation of working 
hours and periodic holidays with pay. 
Article 25. 
    (1) Everyone has the right to a standard of 
living adequate for the health and well-being 
of himself and of his family, including food, 
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clothing, housing and medical care and 
necessary social services, and the right to 
security in the event of unemployment, 
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or 
other lack of livelihood in circumstances 
beyond his control. 
    (2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled 
to special care and assistance. All children, 
whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy 
the same social protection. 
Article 26. 
    (1) Everyone has the right to education. 
Education shall be free, at least in the 
elementary and fundamental stages. 
Elementary education shall be compulsory. 
Technical and professional education shall be 
made generally available and higher education 
shall be equally accessible to all on the basis 
of merit. 
    (2) Education shall be directed to the full 
development of the human personality and to 
the strengthening of respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote 
understanding, tolerance and friendship among 
all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall 
further the activities of the United Nations for 
the maintenance of peace. 
    (3) Parents have a prior right to choose the 
kind of education that shall be given to their 
children. 
Article 27. 
    (1) Everyone has the right freely to 
participate in the cultural life of the 
community, to enjoy the arts and to share in 
scientific advancement and its benefits. 
    (2) Everyone has the right to the protection 
of the moral and material interests resulting 
from any scientific, literary or artistic 
production of which he is the author. 
Article 28. 
    Everyone is entitled to a social and 
international order in which the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be 
fully realized. 
Article 29. 
    (1) Everyone has duties to the community in 
which alone the free and full development of 
his personality is possible. 
    (2) In the exercise of his rights and 
freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to 
such limitations as are determined by law 
solely for the purpose of securing due 
recognition and respect for the rights and 
freedoms of others and of meeting the just 
requirements of morality, public order and the 
general welfare in a democratic society. 
    (3) These rights and freedoms may in no 
case be exercised contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations. 
Article 30. 
    Nothing in this Declaration may be 
interpreted as implying for any State, group or 
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person any right to engage in any activity or to 
perform any act aimed at the destruction of 
any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein. 
Source: The Canadian Museum for Human 
Rights, available at 
http://museumforhumanrights.ca/exhibits/udhr
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Appendix Five 
 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
as amended by Protocol No. 11 
Rome, 4.XI.1950 
 
The text of the Convention had been amended 
according to the provisions of Protocol No. 3 
(ETS No. 45), which entered into force on 21 
September 1970, of Protocol No. 5  (ETS No. 
55),  which  entered  into  force  on  20 
December 1971  and  of  Protocol No. 8  (ETS  
No. 118),  which  entered  into  force  on  1 
January 1990, and comprised also the text of 
Protocol No. 2 (ETS No. 44) which, in 
accordance with Article 5, paragraph 3 thereof, 
had been an integral part of the Convention 
since its entry into force on 21 September 
1970. All provisions which had been amended 
or added by these Protocols are replaced by 
Protocol No. 11 (ETS No. 155), as from the 
date of its entry into force on 1 November 
1998. As from that date, Protocol No. 9 (ETS 
No. 140), which entered into force on 1 
October 1994, is repealed and Protocol No. 10 
(ETS no. 146) has lost its purpose. 
 
• The governments signatory hereto, being 
members of the Council of Europe, 
Considering the Universal Declaration of 
Human 
• Rights proclaimed by the General Assembly of 
the United Nations on 10th December 1948; 
• Considering that this Declaration aims at 
securing the universal and effective 
recognition and observance of the Rights 
therein declared; 
• Considering that the aim of the Council of 
Europe is the achievement of greater unity 
between its members and that one of the 
methods by which that aim is to be pursued is 
the maintenance and further realisation of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms; 
• Reaffirming their profound  belief in those  
fundamental freedoms which are the 
foundation of justice and peace in the world 
and are best maintained on the one hand by an 
effective political democracy and on the other 
by a common understanding and observance of 
the human rights upon which they depend; 
• Being resolved, as the governments of 
European countries which are like-minded and 
have a common heritage of political traditions, 
ideals, freedom and the rule of law, to take the 
first steps for the collective enforcement of 
certain of the rights stated in the Universal 
Declaration, 
 
Have agreed as follows: 
Article 11 – Obligation to respect human 
rights 
The  High  Contracting  Parties  shall  secure  
to  everyone  within  their jurisdiction the 
rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this 
Convention. 
 
Section I1  – Rights and freedoms 
Article 21 – Right to life 
1 Everyone's right to life shall be protected by 
law. No one shall be deprived of his life 
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intentionally save in the execution of a 
sentence of a court following his conviction of 
a crime for which this penalty is provided by 
law. 
2 Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as 
inflicted in contravention of this article when it 
results from the use of force which is no more 
than absolutely necessary: 
a in defence of any person from unlawful 
violence; 
b in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent 
the escape of a person lawfully detained; 
c in action lawfully taken for the purpose of 
quelling a riot or insurrection. 
 
Article 32   – Prohibition of torture 
No one shall be subjected to torture or to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. 
 
Article 41 – Prohibition of slavery and 
forced labour 
1 No one shall be held in slavery or servitude. 
2 No one shall be required to perform forced or 
compulsory labour. 
3 For the purpose of this article the term “forced 
or compulsory labour” shall not include: 
a any work required to be done in the ordinary 
course of detention imposed according to the 
provisions of Article 5 of this Convention or 
during conditional release from such 
detention; 
b any service of a military character or, in case 
of conscientious objectors in countries where 
they are recognised, service exacted instead of 
compulsory military service; 
c any service exacted in case of an emergency or 
calamity threatening the life or well-being of 
the community; 
d any work or service which forms part of 
normal civic 
obligations. 
 
Article 51  – Right to liberty and security 
1 Everyone has the right to liberty and 
security of person. No one shall be deprived of 
his liberty save in the following cases and in 
accordance with a procedure prescribed by 
law: 
a the lawful detention of a person after 
conviction by a competent court; 
b the lawful arrest or detention of a person for 
non-compliance with the lawful order of a 
court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any 
obligation prescribed by law; 
c the lawful arrest or detention of a person 
effected for the purpose of bringing him before 
the competent legal authority on reasonable 
suspicion of having committed an offence  or 
when  it is  reasonably considered necessary to 
prevent his committing an offence or fleeing 
after having done so; 
d the detention of a minor by lawful order for 
the purpose of educational supervision or his 
lawful detention for the purpose of bringing 
him before the competent legal authority; 
e the lawful detention of persons for the 
prevention of the spreading of infectious 
diseases, of persons of unsound mind, 
alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; 
2 the lawful arrest or detention of a person to 
prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry 
into the country or of a person against whom 
action is being taken with a view to 
deportation or extradition. 
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3 Everyone who is arrested shall be informed 
promptly, in a language which he understands, 
of the reasons for his 
arrest and of any charge against him. 
4 Everyone arrested or detained in accordance 
with the provisions of paragraph 1.c of this 
article shall be brought promptly before a 
judge or other officer authorised by law to 
exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to 
trial within a reasonable time or to release 
pending trial. Release may be conditioned by 
guarantees to appear for trial. 
5 Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by 
arrest or detention shall be entitled to take 
proceedings by which the lawfulness of his 
detention shall be decided speedily by a court 
and his release ordered if the detention is not 
lawful. 
6 Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or 
detention in 
contravention of the provisions of this article 
shall have an enforceable right to 
compensation. 
 
Article 63  – Right to a fair trial 
1 In the determination of his civil rights and 
obligations or of any criminal charge against 
him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public 
hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established 
by law. Judgment shall be pronounced 
publicly but the press and public may be 
excluded from all or part of the trial in the 
interests of morals, public order or national 
security in a democratic society, where the 
interests of juveniles or the protection of the 
private life of the parties so require, or to the 
extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the 
court in special circumstances where publicity 
would prejudice the interests of justice. 
2 Everyone charged with a criminal offence 
shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty 
according to law. 
3 Everyone charged with a criminal offence has 
the following 
minimum rights: 
a to be informed promptly, in a language which 
he understands and in detail, of the nature and 
cause of the accusation against him; 
b to have adequate time and facilities for the 
preparation of his defence; 
c to defend himself in person or through legal 
assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not 
sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to 
be given it free when the interests of justice so 
require; 
d to examine or have examined witnesses 
against him and to obtain the attendance and 
examination of witnesses on his behalf under 
the same conditions as witnesses against him; 
e to have the free assistance of an interpreter if 
he cannot 
understand or speak the language used in 
court. 
 
Article 74   – No punishment without law 
1 No one shall be held guilty of any criminal 
offence on account of any act or omission 
which did not constitute a criminal offence 
under national or international law at the time 
when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier 
penalty be imposed than the one that was 
applicable at the time the criminal offence was  
committed. 
2 This article shall not prejudice the trial and 
punishment of any person for any act or 
omission which, at the time when it was 
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committed, was criminal according to the 
general principles of law recognised by 
civilised nations. 
 
Article 81 – Right to respect for private and 
family life 
1 Everyone has the right to respect for his 
private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
2 There shall be no interference by a public 
authority with the exercise of this right except 
such as is in accordance with the law and is 
necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or 
the economic well-being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
Article 91  – Freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion 
1 Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion; this right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief and 
freedom, either alone or in community with 
others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief, in worship, teaching, 
practice and observance. 
2 Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs 
shall be subject only to such limitations as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of public 
safety, for the protection of public order, 
health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others. 
 
Article 101  – Freedom of expression 
1 Everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression. This right shall include freedom to 
hold opinions and to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by 
public authority and regardless of frontiers. 
This article shall not prevent States from 
requiring the licensing of broadcasting, 
television or cinema enterprises. 
2 The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries 
with it duties and responsibilities, may be 
subject to such formalities, conditions, 
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by 
law and are necessary in a democratic society, 
in the interests of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health 
or morals, for the protection of the reputation 
or rights of others, for preventing the 
disclosure of information received in 
confidence, or for maintaining the authority 
and impartiality of the judiciary. 
 
Article 115  – Freedom of assembly and 
association 
1 Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful 
assembly and to freedom of association with 
others, including the right to form and to join 
trade unions for the protection of his interests. 
2 No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise 
of these rights other than such as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national 
security or public safety, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health 
or morals or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. This article shall not 
prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on 
the exercise of these rights by members of the 
armed forces, of the police or of the 
administration of the State. 
Article 121 – Right to marry 
Men and women of marriageable age have the 
right to marry and to found a family, according 
to the national laws governing the exercise of 
this right. 
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Article 131  – Right to an effective remedy 
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set 
forth in this Convention are violated shall have 
an effective remedy before a national authority 
notwithstanding that the violation has been 
committed by persons acting in an official 
capacity. 
 
Article 141 – Prohibition of discrimination 
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set 
forth in this Convention shall be secured 
without discrimination on any ground such as 
sex, race, colour, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, 
birth or other status. 
 
Article 151 – Derogation in time of 
emergency 
1 In time of war or other public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation any High 
Contracting Party may take measures 
derogating from its obligations under this 
Convention to the extent strictly required by 
the exigencies of the situation, provided that 
such measures are not inconsistent with its 
other obligations under international law. 
2 No derogation from Article 2, except in 
respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of 
war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 
shall be made under this provision. 
3 Any High Contracting Party availing itself of 
this right of derogation shall keep the 
Secretary General of the Council of Europe 
fully informed of the measures which it has 
taken and the reasons therefor. It shall also 
inform the Secretary General of the Council of 
Europe when such measures have ceased to 
operate and the provisions of the Convention 
are again being fully executed. 
 
Article 161  – Restrictions on political 
activity of aliens 
Nothing in Articles 10, 11 and 14 shall be 
regarded as preventing the High Contracting 
Parties from imposing restrictions on the 
political activity of aliens. 
 
Article 176  – Prohibition of abuse of rights 
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted 
as implying for any State, group or person any 
right to engage in any activity or perform any 
act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights 
and freedoms set forth herein or at their 
limitation to a greater extent than is provided 
for in the Convention. 
 
Article 181 – Limitation on use of 
restrictions on rights 
The restrictions permitted under this 
Convention to the said rights and freedoms 
shall not be applied for any purpose other than 
those for which they have been prescribed 
 
Section II7   – European Court of Human 
Rights 
 
Article 19 – Establishment of the Court 
To ensure the observance of the engagements 
undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in 
the Convention and the Protocols thereto, there 
shall be set up a European Court of Human 
Rights, hereinafter referred to as "the Court". It 
shall function on a permanent basis. 
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Article 20 – Number of judges 
The Court shall consist of a number of judges 
equal to that of the High Contracting Parties. 
 
Article 21 – Criteria for office 
1 The judges shall be of high moral character 
and must either possess the qualifications 
required for appointment to high judicial office 
or be jurisconsults of recognised competence. 
2 The judges shall sit on the Court in their 
individual capacity. 
3 During their term of office the judges shall not 
engage in any activity which is incompatible 
with their independence, impartiality or with 
the demands of a full-time office; all questions 
arising from the application of this paragraph 
shall be decided by the Court. 
 
Article 22 – Election of judges 
1 The judges shall be elected by the 
Parliamentary Assembly with respect to each 
High Contracting Party by a majority of votes 
cast from a list of three candidates nominated 
by the High Contracting Party. 
2 The same procedure shall be followed to 
complete the Court 
in the event of the accession of new High 
Contracting Parties and in filling casual 
vacancies. 
 
Article 23 – Terms of office 
1 The judges shall be elected for a period of six 
years. They may be re-elected. However, the 
terms of office of one-half of the judges 
elected at the first election shall expire at the 
end of three years. 
2 The judges whose terms of office are to expire 
at the end of 
the initial period of three years shall be chosen 
by lot by the Secretary General of the Council 
of Europe immediately after their  election. 
3 In order to ensure that, as far as possible, the 
terms of office of one-half of the judges are 
renewed every three years, the Parliamentary 
Assembly may decide, before proceeding to 
any subsequent election, that the term or terms 
of office of one or more judges to be elected 
shall be for a period other than six years but 
not more than nine and not less than three 
years. 
4 In cases where more than one term of office is 
involved and where the Parliamentary 
Assembly applies the preceding paragraph, the 
allocation of the terms of office shall be 
effected by a drawing of lots by the Secretary 
General of the Council of Europe immediately 
after the election. 
5 A judge elected to replace a judge whose term 
of office has 
not expired shall hold office for the remainder 
of his predecessor's term. 
6 The terms of office of judges shall expire 
when they reach the 
age of 70. 
7 The judges shall hold office until replaced. 
They shall, however, continue to deal with 
such cases as they already have under 
consideration. 
 
Article 24 – Dismissal 
No judge may be dismissed from his office 
unless the other judges decide by a majority of 
two-thirds that he has ceased to fulfil the 
required conditions. 
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Article 25 – Registry and legal secretaries 
The Court shall have a registry, the functions 
and organisation of which shall be laid down 
in the rules of the Court. The Court shall be 
assisted by legal  secretaries. 
 
Article 26 – Plenary Court 
The plenary Court shall 
a elect its President and one or two Vice-
Presidents for a period of three years; they 
may be re-elected; 
b set up Chambers, constituted for a fixed period 
of time; 
c elect the Presidents of the Chambers of the 
Court; they may be re-elected; 
d adopt the rules of the Court, and 
e elect  the  Registrar  and  one  or  more  
Deputy Registrars. 
 
Article 27 – Committees, Chambers and 
Grand Chamber 
1 To consider cases brought before it, the Court 
shall sit in committees of three judges, in 
Chambers of seven judges and in a Grand 
Chamber of seventeen judges. The Court's 
Chambers shall set up committees for a fixed 
period of time. 
2 There shall sit as an ex officio member of the 
Chamber and 
the Grand Chamber the judge elected in 
respect of the State Party concerned or, if there 
is none or if he is unable to sit, a person of its 
choice who shall sit in the capacity of judge. 
3 The Grand Chamber shall also include the 
President of the Court, the Vice-Presidents, the 
Presidents of the Chambers and other judges 
chosen in accordance with the rules of the 
Court. When a case is referred to the Grand 
Chamber under Article 43, no judge from the 
Chamber which rendered the judgment shall 
sit in the Grand Chamber, with the exception 
of the President of the Chamber and the judge 
who sat in respect of the State Party 
concerned. 
 
Article 28 – Declarations of inadmissibility 
by committees 
A committee may, by a unanimous vote, 
declare inadmissible or strike out of its list of 
cases an application submitted under Article 
34 where such a decision can be taken without 
further examination. The decision shall be 
final. 
 
Article 29 – Decisions by Chambers on 
admissibility and merits 
1 If no decision is taken under Article 28, a 
Chamber shall decide on the admissibility and 
merits of individual applications submitted 
under Article 34. 
2 A Chamber shall decide on the admissibility 
and merits of inter- State applications 
submitted under Article 33. 
3 The decision on admissibility shall be taken 
separately unless 
the Court, in exceptional cases, decides 
otherwise. 
 
Article 30 – Relinquishment of jurisdiction 
to the Grand Chamber Where a case 
pending before a Chamber raises a serious 
question affecting the interpretation of the 
Convention or the protocols thereto, or 
where the resolution of a question before 
the Chamber might have a result 
inconsistent with a judgment previously 
delivered by the Court, the Chamber may, 
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at any time before it has rendered its 
judgment, relinquish jurisdiction in favour 
of the Grand Chamber, unless one of the 
parties to the case objects. 
 
Article 31 – Powers of the Grand Chamber 
The Grand Chamber shall 
1 a   determine applications submitted 
either under Article 33 or Article 34 when a 
Chamber has relinquished jurisdiction under 
Article 30 or when the case has been referred 
to it under Article 43; and 
b consider requests for advisory 
opinions submitted under Article 47. 
 
Article 32 – Jurisdiction of the Court 
1 The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all 
matters concerning the interpretation and 
application of the Convention and the 
protocols thereto which are referred to it as 
provided in Articles 33, 34 and 47. 
2 In the event of dispute as to whether the Court 
has jurisdiction, the Court shall decide. 
 
Article 33 – Inter-State cases 
Any High Contracting Party may refer to the 
Court any alleged breach of the provisions of 
the Convention and the protocols thereto by 
another High Contracting Party. 
 
Article 34 – Individual applications 
The Court may receive applications from any 
person, non-governmental organisation or 
group of individuals claiming to be the victim 
of a violation by one of the High Contracting 
Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention 
or the protocols thereto. The High Contracting 
Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the 
effective exercise of this right. 
 
Article 35 – Admissibility criteria 
1 The Court may only deal with the matter after 
all domestic remedies have been exhausted, 
according to the generally recognised rules of 
international law, and within a period of six 
months from the date on which the final 
decision was taken. 
2 The Court shall not deal with any application 
submitted under 
Article 34 that 
a is anonymous; or 
b is substantially the same as a matter that has 
already been examined by the Court or has 
already been submitted to another procedure of 
international investigation or settlement and 
contains no relevant new information. 
3 The Court shall declare inadmissible any 
individual application submitted under Article 
34 which it considers incompatible with the 
provisions of the Convention or the protocols 
thereto, manifestly ill-founded, or an abuse of 
the right of application. 
4 The Court shall reject any application which it 
considers 
inadmissible under this Article. It may do so at 
any stage of the proceedings. 
 
Article 36 – Third party intervention 
1 In all cases before a Chamber or the Grand 
Chamber, a High Contracting Party one of 
whose nationals is an applicant shall have the 
right to submit written comments and to take 
part in hearings. 
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2 The President of the Court may, in the interest 
of the proper 
administration of justice, invite any High 
Contracting Party which is not a party to the 
proceedings or any person concerned who is 
not the applicant to submit written comments 
or take part in hearings. 
 
Article 37 – Striking out applications 
1 The Court may at any stage of the proceedings 
decide to strike an application out of its list of 
cases where the circumstances lead to the 
conclusion that 
a the applicant does not intend to pursue his 
application; or 
b the matter has been resolved; or 
c for any other reason established by the Court, 
it is no longer justified to continue the 
examination of the application. However, the 
Court shall continue the examination of the 
application if respect for human rights as 
defined in the Convention and the protocols 
thereto so requires. 
2 The Court may decide to restore an application 
to its list of cases if it considers that the 
circumstances justify such a course. 
 
Article 38  – Examination of the case and 
friendly settlement proceedings 
1 If the Court declares the application 
admissible, it shall 
a pursue the examination of the case, together 
with the representatives of the parties, and if 
need be, undertake an investigation, for the 
effective conduct of which the States 
concerned shall furnish all necessary facilities; 
b place itself at the disposal of the parties 
concerned with a view to securing a friendly 
settlement of the matter on the basis of respect 
for human rights as defined in the Convention 
and the protocols thereto. 
2 Proceedings conducted under paragraph 1.b 
shall be confidential. 
 
Article 39 – Finding of a friendly settlement 
If a friendly settlement is effected, the Court 
shall strike the case out of its list by means of 
a decision which shall be confined to a brief 
statement of the facts and of the solution 
reached. 
 
Article 40 – Public hearings and access to 
documents 
1 Hearings shall be in public unless the Court in 
exceptional circumstances decides otherwise. 
2 Documents deposited with the Registrar shall 
be accessible to the public unless the President 
of the Court decides otherwise. 
 
Article 41 – Just satisfaction 
If the Court finds that there has been a 
violation of the Convention or the protocols 
thereto, and if the internal law of the High 
Contracting Party concerned allows only 
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, 
if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the 
injured party. 
 
Article 42 – Judgments of Chambers 
Judgments of Chambers shall become final in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 44, 
paragraph 2. 
 
Article 43 – Referral to the Grand Chamber 
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1 Within a period of three months from the date 
of the judgment of the Chamber, any party to 
the case may, in exceptional cases, request that 
the case be referred to the Grand Chamber. 
2 A panel of five judges of the Grand Chamber 
shall accept the request if the case raises a 
serious question affecting the interpretation or 
application of the Convention or the protocols 
thereto, or a serious issue of general 
importance. 
3 If the panel accepts the request, the Grand 
Chamber shall decide the case by means of a 
judgment. 
 
Article 44 – Final judgments 
1 The judgment of the Grand Chamber shall be 
final. 
2 The judgment of a Chamber shall become final 
a when the parties declare that they will not 
request that the case be referred to the Grand 
Chamber; or 
b three months after the date of the judgment, if 
reference of the case to the Grand Chamber 
has not been requested; or 
c when the panel of the Grand Chamber rejects 
the request to refer under Article 43. 
3 The final judgment shall be published. 
 
Article 45 – Reasons for judgments and 
decisions 
1 Reasons shall be given for judgments as well 
as for decisions declaring applications 
admissible or inadmissible. 
2 If a judgment does not represent, in whole or 
in part, the unanimous opinion of the judges, 
any judge shall be entitled to deliver a separate 
opinion. 
 
Article 46 – Binding force and execution of 
judgments 
1 The High Contracting Parties undertake to 
abide by the final judgment of the Court in any 
case to which they are parties. 
2 The final judgment of the Court shall be 
transmitted to the 
Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise 
its execution. 
 
Article 47 – Advisory opinions 
1 The Court may, at the request of the 
Committee of Ministers, give advisory 
opinions on legal questions concerning the 
interpretation of the Convention and the 
protocols thereto. 
2 Such opinions shall not deal with any question 
relating to the content or scope of the rights or 
freedoms defined in Section I of the 
Convention and the protocols thereto, or with 
any other question which the Court or the 
Committee of Ministers might have to 
consider in consequence of any such 
proceedings as could be instituted in 
accordance with the Convention. 
3 Decisions of the Committee of Ministers to 
request an advisory opinion of  the  Court  
shall  require  a  majority  vote of the 
representatives entitled to sit on the 
Committee. 
 
Article 48 – Advisory jurisdiction of the 
Court 
The Court shall decide whether a request for 
an advisory opinion submitted by the 
Committee of Ministers is within its 
competence as defined in Article 47. 
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Article 49 – Reasons for advisory opinions 
1 Reasons shall be given for advisory opinions 
of the Court. 
2 If the advisory opinion does not represent, in 
whole or in part, the unanimous opinion of the 
judges, any judge shall be entitled to deliver a 
separate opinion. 
3 Advisory opinions of the Court shall be 
communicated to the 
Committee of Ministers. 
 
Article 50 – Expenditure on the Court 
The expenditure on the Court shall be borne by 
the Council of Europe. 
 
Article 51 – Privileges and immunities of 
judges 
The judges shall be entitled, during the 
exercise of their functions, to the privileges 
and immunities provided for in Article 40 of 
the Statute of the Council of Europe and in the 
agreements made there under. 
 
Section III8 ,9  – Miscellaneous provisions 
 
Article 521  – Inquiries by the Secretary 
General 
On receipt of a request from the Secretary 
General of the Council of Europe any High 
Contracting Party shall furnish an explanation 
of the manner in which its internal law ensures 
the effective implementation of any of the 
provisions of the Convention. 
 
Article 531  – Safeguard for existing human 
rights 
Nothing in this Convention shall be construed 
as limiting or derogating from any of the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms which 
may be ensured under the laws of any High 
Contracting Party or under any other 
agreement to which it is a Party. 
 
Article 541 – Powers of the Committee of 
Ministers 
Nothing in this Convention shall prejudice the 
powers conferred on the Committee of 
Ministers by the Statute of the Council of 
Europe. 
 
Article 551 – Exclusion of other means of 
dispute settlement 
The High Contracting Parties agree that, 
except by special agreement, they will not 
avail themselves of treaties, conventions or 
declarations in force between them for the 
purpose of submitting, by way of petition, a 
dispute arising out of the interpretation or 
application of this Convention to a means of 
settlement other than those provided for in this 
Convention. 
 
Article 5610   – Territorial application 
11 
1 Any State may at the time of its ratification or 
at any time 
thereafter declare by notification addressed to 
the Secretary General of the Council of Europe 
that the present Convention shall, subject to 
paragraph 4 of this Article, extend to all or any 
of the territories for whose international 
relations it is responsible. 
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2 The Convention shall extend to the territory or 
territories named in the notification as from 
the thirtieth day after the receipt of this 
notification by the Secretary General of the 
Council of Europe. 
3 The provisions of this Convention shall be 
applied in such 
territories with due regard, however, to local 
requirements. 
2 
4 Any State which has made a declaration in 
accordance with 
paragraph 1 of this article may at any time 
thereafter declare on behalf of one or more of 
the territories to which the declaration relates 
that it accepts the competence of the Court to 
receive applications from individuals, non-
governmental organisations or groups of 
individuals as provided by Article 34 of the 
Convention. 
 
Article 571 – Reservations 
1 Any State may, when signing this Convention 
or when depositing its instrument of 
ratification, make a reservation in respect of 
any particular provision of the Convention to 
the extent that any law then in force in its 
territory is not in conformity with the 
provision. Reservations of a general character 
shall not be permitted under this article. 
2 Any reservation made under this article shall 
contain a brief statement of the law concerned. 
 
Article 581  – Denunciation 
1 A High Contracting Party may denounce the 
present Convention only after the expiry of 
five years from the date on which it became a 
party to it and after six months' notice 
contained in a notification addressed to the 
Secretary General of the Council of Europe, 
who shall inform the other High Contracting 
Parties. 
2 Such a denunciation shall not have the effect 
of releasing the 
High Contracting Party concerned from its 
obligations under this Convention in respect of 
any act which, being capable of constituting a 
violation of such obligations, may have been 
performed by it before the date at which the 
denunciation became effective. 
3 Any High Contracting Party which shall cease 
to be a member 
of the Council of Europe shall cease to be a 
Party to this Convention under the same 
conditions. 
12 
4 The Convention may be denounced in 
accordance with the 
provisions of the preceding paragraphs in 
respect of any territory to which it has been 
declared to extend under the terms of Article 
56. 
 
Article 5913   – Signature and ratification 
1 This Convention shall be open to the signature 
of the members of the Council of Europe. It 
shall be ratified. Ratifications shall be 
deposited with the Secretary General of the 
Council of Europe. 
2 The present Convention shall come into force 
after the deposit of ten instruments of 
ratification. 
3 As regards any signatory ratifying 
subsequently, the Convention 
shall come into force at the date of the deposit 
of its instrument of ratification. 
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4 The Secretary General of the Council of 
Europe shall notify 
all the members of the Council of Europe of 
the entry into force of the Convention, the 
names of the High Contracting Parties who 
have ratified it, and the deposit of all 
instruments of ratification which may be 
effected subsequently. 
 
Done at Rome this 4th day of November 1950, 
in English and French, both texts being equally 
authentic, in a single copy which shall remain 
deposited in the archives of the Council of 
Europe. The Secretary General shall transmit 
certified copies to each of the signatories. 
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Appendix Six 
 
CONSTITUTION 
(FUNDAMENTAL LAW) 
OF  
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 
Adopted at the Seventh (Special) Session of 
the Supreme Soviet of the USSR 
Ninth Convocation 
On October 7, 1977  
 
II. THEAND THE INDIVIDUAL  
Chapter 6: CITIZENSHIP OF THE USSR / EQUALITY OF CITIZENS' RIGHTS 
Article 33. Uniform federal citizenship is 
established for the USSR. Every citizen of 
a Union Republic is a citizen of the USSR.  
The grounds and procedure for acquiring 
or forfeiting Soviet citizenship are defined 
by the Law on Citizenship of the USSR.  
When abroad, citizens of the USSR enjoy 
the protection and assistance of the Soviet 
state.  
Article 34. Citizens of the USSR are equal 
before the law, without distinction of 
origin, social or property status, race or 
nationality, sex, education, language, 
attitude to religion, type and nature of 
occupation, domicile, or other status.  
The equal rights of citizens of the USSR 
are guaranteed in all fields of economic, 
political, social, and cultural life.  
Article 35. Women and men have equal 
rights in the USSR.  
Exercise of these rights is ensured by 
according women equal access with men 
to education and vocational and 
professional training, equal opportunities 
in employment, remuneration, and 
promotion, and in social and political, and 
cultural activity, and by special labour and 
health protection measures for women; by 
providing conditions enabling mothers to 
work; by legal protection, and material and 
moral support for mothers and children, 
including paid leaves and other benefits for 
expectant mothers and mothers, and 
gradual reduction of working time for 
mothers with small children.  
Article 36. Citizens of the USSR of 
different races and nationalities have equal 
rights.  
Exercise of these rights is ensured by a 
policy of all-round development and 
drawing together of all the nations and 
nationalities of the USSR, by educating 
citizens in the spirit of Soviet patriotism 
and socialist internationalism, and by the 
possibility to use their native language and 
the languages of other peoples in the 
USSR.  
Any direct or indirect limitation of the 
rights of citizens or establishment of direct 
 237 
 
or indirect privileges on grounds of race or 
nationality, and any advocacy of racial or 
national exclusiveness, hostility, or 
contempt, are punishable by law.  
Article 37. Citizens of other countries and 
stateless persons in the USSR are 
guaranteed the rights and freedoms 
provided by law, including the right to 
apply to a court and other state bodies for 
the protection of their personal, property, 
family, and other rights.  
Citizens of other countries and stateless 
persons, when in the USSR, are obliged to 
respect the Constitution of the USSR and 
observe Soviet laws.  
Article 38. The USSR grants the right of 
asylum to foreigners persecuted for 
defending the interests of the working 
people and the cause of peace, or for 
participation in the revolutionary and 
national-liberation movement, or for 
progressive social and political, scientific, 
or other creative activity.  
 
Chapter 7: THE BASIC RIGHTS, FREEDOMS, AND DUTIES OF CITIZENS OF 
THE USSR 
Article 39. Citizens of the USSR enjoy in 
full the social, economic, political and 
personal rights and freedoms proclaimed 
and guaranteed by the Constitution of the 
USSR and by Soviet laws. The socialist 
system ensures enlargement of the rights 
and freedoms of citizens and continuous 
improvement of their living standards as 
social, economic, and cultural 
development programmes are fulfilled.  
Enjoyment by citizens of their rights and 
freedoms must not be to the detriment of 
the interests of society or the state, or 
infringe the rights of other citizens.  
Article 40. Citizens of the USSR have the 
right to work (that is, to guaranteed 
employment and pay in accordance wit the 
quantity and quality of their work, and not 
below the state-established minimum), 
including the right to choose their trade or 
profession, type of job and work in 
accordance with their inclinations, 
abilities, training and education, with due 
account of the needs of society.  
This right is ensured by the socialist 
economic system, steady growth of the 
productive forces, free vocational and 
professional training, improvement of 
skills, training in new trades or 
professions, and development of the 
systems of vocational guidance and job 
placement.  
Article 41. Citizens of the USSR have the 
right to rest and leisure.  
This right is ensured by the establishment 
of a working week not exceeding 41 hours, 
for workers and other employees, a shorter 
working day in a number of trades and 
industries, and shorter hours for night 
work; by the provision of paid annual 
holidays, weekly days of rest, extension of 
the network of cultural, educational, and 
health-building institutions, and the 
development on a mass scale of sport, 
physical culture, and camping and tourism; 
by the provision of neighborhood 
recreational facilities, and of other 
opportunities for rational use of free time.  
 
The length of collective farmers' working 
and leisure time is established by their 
collective farms.  
Article 42. Citizens of the USSR have the 
right to health protection.  
 238 
 
This right is ensured by free, qualified 
medical care provided by state health 
institutions; by extension of the network of 
therapeutic and health-building 
institutions; by the development and 
improvement of safety and hygiene in 
industry; by carrying out broad 
prophylactic measures; by measures to 
improve the environment; by special care 
for the health of the rising generation, 
including prohibition of child labour, 
excluding the work done by children as 
part of the school curriculum; and by 
developing research to prevent and reduce 
the incidence of disease and ensure 
citizens a long and active life.  
Article 43. Citizens of the USSR have the 
right to maintenance in old age, in 
sickness, and in the event of complete or 
partial disability or loss of the 
breadwinner.  
The right is guaranteed by social insurance 
of workers and other employees and 
collective farmers; by allowances for 
temporary disability; by the provision by 
the state or by collective farms of 
retirement pensions, disability pensions, 
and pensions for loss of the breadwinner; 
by providing employment for the partially 
disabled; by care for the elderly and the 
disabled; and by other forms of social 
security.  
Article 44. Citizens of the USSR have the 
rights to housing.  
This right is ensured by the development 
and upkeep of state and socially-owned 
housing; by assistance for co-operative and 
individual house building; by fair 
distribution, under public control, of the 
housing that becomes available through 
fulfilment of the programme of building 
well-appointed dwellings, and by low rents 
and low charges for utility services. 
Citizens of the USSR shall take good care 
of the housing allocated to them.  
Article 45. Citizens of the USSR have the 
right to education.  
This right is ensured by free provision of 
all forms of education, by the institution of 
universal, compulsory secondary 
education, and broad development of 
vocational, specialised secondary, and 
higher education, in which instruction is 
oriented toward practical activity and 
production; by the development of 
extramural, correspondence and evening 
courses, by the provision of state 
scholarships and grants and privileges for 
students; by the free issue of school 
textbooks; by the opportunity to attend a 
school where teaching is in the native 
language; and by the provision of facilities 
for self-education.  
Article 46. Citizens of the USSR have the 
right to enjoy cultural benefits.  
This rights is ensured by broad access to 
the cultural treasures of their own land and 
of the world that are preserved in state and 
other public collections; by the 
development and fair distribution of 
cultural and educational institutions 
throughout the country; by developing 
television and radio broadcasting and the 
publishing of books, newspapers and 
periodicals, and by extending the free 
library service; and by expanding cultural 
exchanges with other countries.  
Article 47. Citizens of the USSR, in 
accordance with the aims of building 
communism, are guaranteed freedom of 
scientific, technical, and artistic work. This 
freedom is ensured by broadening 
scientific research, encouraging invention 
and innovation, and developing literature 
and the arts. THe state provides the 
necessary material conditions for this and 
support for voluntary societies and unions 
of workers in the arts, organises 
introduction of inventions and innovations 
in production and other spheres of activity.  
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The rights of authors, inventors and 
innovators are protected by the state.  
Article 48. Citizens of the USSR have the 
right to take part in the management and 
administration of state and public affairs 
and in the discussion and adoption of laws 
and measures of All-Union and local 
significance.  
This right is ensured by the opportunity to 
vote and to be elected to Soviets of 
People's Deputies and other elective state 
bodies, to take part in nationwide 
discussions and referendums, in people's 
control, in the work of state bodies, public 
organisations, and local community 
groups, and in meetings at places of work 
or residence.  
Article 49. Every citizen of the USSR has 
the right to submit proposals to state 
bodies and public organisations for 
improving their activity, and to criticise 
shortcomings in their work.  
Officials are obliged, within established 
time-limits, to examine citizens' proposals 
and requests, to reply to them, and to take 
appropriate action.  
 
Persecution for criticism is prohibited. 
Persons guilty of such persecution shall be 
called to account.  
Article 50. In accordance with the 
interests of the people and in order to 
strengthen and develop the socialist 
system, citizens of the USSR are 
guaranteed freedom of speech, of the 
press, and of assembly, meetings, street 
processions and demonstrations.  
Exercise of these political freedoms is 
ensured by putting public buildings, streets 
and squares at the disposal of the working 
people and their organisations, by broad 
dissemination of information, and by the 
opportunity to use the press, television, 
and radio.  
Article 51. In accordance with the aims of 
building communism, citizens of the 
USSR have the right to associate in public 
organisations that promote their political 
activity and initiative and satisfaction of 
their various interests.  
Public organisations are guaranteed 
conditions for successfully performing the 
functions defined in their rules.  
Article 52. Citizens of the USSR are 
guaranteed freedom of conscience, that is, 
the right to profess or not to profess any 
religion, and to conduct religious worship 
or atheistic propaganda. Incitement of 
hostility or hatred on religious grounds is 
prohibited.  
In the USSR, the church is separated from 
the state, and the school from the church.  
Article 53. The family enjoys the 
protection of the state.  
Marriage is based on the free consent of 
the woman and the man; the spouses are 
completely equal in their family relations.  
 
The state helps the family by providing 
and developing a broad system of 
childcare institutions, by organising and 
improving communal services and public 
catering, by paying grants on the birth of a 
child, by providing children's allowances 
and benefits for large families, and other 
forms of family allowances and assistance.  
Article 54. Citizens of the USSR are 
guaranteed inviolability of the person. No 
one may be arrested except by a court 
decision or on the warrant of a procurator.  
Article 55. Citizens of the USSR are 
guaranteed inviolability of the home. No 
one may, without lawful grounds, enter a 
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home against the will of those residing in 
it.  
Article 56. The privacy of citizens, and of 
their correspondence, telephone 
conversations, and telegraphic 
communications is protected by law.  
Article 57. Respect for the individual and 
protection of the rights and freedoms of 
citizens are the duty of all state bodies, 
public organisations, and officials.  
Citizens of the USSR have the right to 
protection by the courts against 
encroachments on their honour and 
reputation, life and health, and personal 
freedom and property.  
Article 58. Citizens of the USSR have the 
right to lodge a complaint against the 
actions of officials, state bodies and public 
bodies. Complaints shall be examined 
according to the procedure and within the 
time-limit established by law.  
Actions by officials that contravene the 
law or exceed their powers, and infringe 
the rights of citizens, may be appealed 
against in a court in the manner prescribed 
by law.  
 
Citizens of the USSR have the right to 
compensation for damage resulting from 
unlawful actions by state organisations and 
public organisations, or by officials in the 
performance of their duties.  
Article 59. Citizens' exercise of their 
rights and freedoms is inseparable from the 
performance of their duties and 
obligations.  
Citizens of the USSR are obliged to 
observe the Constitution of the USSR and 
Soviet laws, comply with the standards of 
socialist conduct, and uphold the honour 
and dignity of Soviet citizenship.  
Article 60. It is the duty of, and matter of 
honour for, every able-bodied citizen of 
the USSR to work conscientiously in his 
chosen, socially useful occupation, and 
strictly to observe labour discipline. 
Evasion of socially useful work is 
incompatible with the principles of 
socialist society.  
Article 61. Citizens of the USSR are 
obliged to preserve and protect socialist 
property. It is the duty of a citizen of the 
USSR to combat misappropriation and 
squandering of state and socially-owned 
property and to make thrifty use of the 
people's wealth.  
Persons encroaching in any way on 
socialist property shall be punished 
according to the law.  
Article 62. Citizens of the USSR are 
obliged to safeguard the interests of the 
Soviet state, and to enhance its power and 
prestige.  
Defence of the Socialist Motherland is the 
sacred duty of every citizen of the USSR. 
Betrayal of the Motherland is the gravest 
of crimes against the people.  
Article 63. Military service in the ranks of 
the Armed Forces of the USSR is an 
honorable duty of Soviet citizens.  
Article 64. It is the duty of every citizen of 
the USSR to respect the national dignity of 
other citizens, and to strengthen friendship 
of the nations and nationalities of the 
multinational Soviet state.  
Article 65. A citizen of the USSR is 
obliged to respect the rights and lawful 
interests of other persons, to be 
uncompromising toward anti-social 
behaviour, and to help maintain public 
order.  
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Article 66. Citizens of the USSR are 
obliged to concern themselves with the 
upbringing of children, to train them for 
socially useful work, and to raise them as 
worthy members of socialist society. 
Children are obliged to care for their 
parents and help them.  
Article 67. Citizens of the USSR are 
obliged to protect nature and conserve its 
riches.  
Article 68. Concern for the preservation of 
historical monuments and other cultural 
values is a duty and obligation of citizens 
of the USSR.  
Article 69. It is the internationalist duty of 
citizens of the USSR to promote friendship 
and co-operation with peoples of other 
lands and help maintain and strengthen 
world peace.  
 
Source: Bucknell University, 
http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russia
n/const/77cons02.html#chap07
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Appendix Seven 
 
Constitution of the Russian Federation (1993) 
 
Chapter 2. Rights and Freedoms of Man and Citizen 
 
Article 17 
1. In the Russian Federation 
recognition and guarantees shall be 
provided for the rights and freedoms of 
man and citizen according to the 
universally recognized principles and 
norms of international law and according 
to the present Constitution. 
2. Fundamental human rights and 
freedoms are inalienable and shall be 
enjoyed by everyone since the day of birth. 
3. The exercise of the rights and 
freedoms of man and citizen shall not 
violate the rights and freedoms of other 
people. 
Article 18 
The rights and freedoms of man and 
citizen shall be directly operative. They 
determine the essence, meaning and 
implementation of laws, the activities of 
the legislative and executive authorities, 
local self-government and shall be ensured 
by the administration of justice. 
Article 19 
1. All people shall be equal before the 
law and court. 
2. The State shall guarantee the 
equality of rights and freedoms of man and 
citizen, regardless of sex, race, nationality, 
language, origin, property and official 
status, place of residence, religion, 
convictions, membership of public 
associations, and also of other 
circumstances. All forms of limitations of 
human rights on social, racial, national, 
linguistic or religious grounds shall be 
banned. 
3. Man and woman shall enjoy equal 
rights and freedoms and have equal 
possibilities to exercise them. 
Article 20 
1. Everyone shall have the right to 
life. 
2. Capital punishment until its 
complete elimination may be envisaged by 
a federal law as an exclusive penalty for 
especially grave crimes against life, and 
the accused shall be granted the right to 
have his case examined by jurytrial. 
Article 21 
1. Human dignity shall be protected 
by the State. Nothing may serve as a basis 
for its derogation. 
2. No one shall be subject to torture, 
violence or other severe or humiliating 
treatment or punishment. No one may be 
subject to medical, scientific and other 
experiments without voluntary consent. 
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Article 22 
1. Everyone shall have the right to 
freedom and personal immunity. 
2. Arrest, detention and remanding in 
custody shall be allowed only by court 
decision. Without the court's decision a 
person may be detained for a term more 
than 48 hours. 
Article 23 
1. Everyone shall have the right to the 
inviolability of private life, personal and 
family secrets, the protection of honour 
and good name. 
2. Everyone shall have the right to 
privacy of correspondence, of telephone 
conversations, postal, telegraph and other 
messages. Limitations of this right shall be 
allowed only by court decision. 
Article 24 
1. The collection, keeping, use and 
dissemination of information about the 
private life of a person shall not be allowed 
without his or her consent. 
2. The bodies of state authority and 
local self-government, their officials shall 
ensure for everyone the possibility of 
acquainting with the documents and 
materials directly affecting his or her rights 
and freedoms, unless otherwise provided 
for by law. 
Article 25 
The home shall be inviolable. No one 
shall have the right to get into a house 
against the will of those living there, 
except for the cases established by a 
federal law or by court decision. 
Article 26 
1. Everyone shall have the right to 
determine and indicate his nationality. No 
one may be forced to determine and 
indicate his or her nationality. 
2. Everyone shall have the right to use 
his or her native language, to a free choice 
of the language of communication, 
upbringing, education and creative work. 
Article 27 
1. Every who legally stays in the 
territory of the Russian Federation shall 
have the right to free travel, choice of 
place of stay or residence. 
2. Everyone may freely leave the 
Russian Federation. Citizens of the 
Russian Federation shall have the right to 
freely return to the Russian Federation. 
Article 28 
Everyone shall be guaranteed the 
freedom of conscience, the freedom of 
religion, including the right to profess 
individually or together with other any 
religion or to profess no religion at all, to 
freely choose, possess and disseminate 
religious and other views and act 
according to them. 
Article 29 
1. Everyone shall be guaranteed the 
freedom of ideas and speech. 
2. The propaganda or agitation 
instigating social, racial, national or 
religious hatred and strife shall not be 
allowed. The propaganda of social, racial, 
national, religious or linguistic supremacy 
shall be banned. 
3. No one may be forced to express 
his views and convictions or to reject 
them. 
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4. Everyone shall have the right to 
freely look for, receive, transmit, produce 
and distribute information by any legal 
way. The list of data comprising state 
secrets shall be determined by a federal 
law. 
5. The freedom of mass 
communication shall be guaranteed. 
Censorship shall be banned. 
Article 30 
1. Everyone shall have the right to 
association, including the right to create 
trade unions for the protection of his or her 
interests. The freedom of activity of public 
association shall be guaranteed. 
2. No one may be compelled to join 
any association and remain in it. 
Article 31 
Citizens of the Russian Federation 
shall have the right to assemble peacefully, 
without weapons, hold rallies, meetings 
and demonstrations, marches and pickets. 
Article 32 
1. Citizens of the Russian Federation 
shall have the right to participate in 
managing state affairs both directly and 
through their representatives. 
2. Citizens of the Russian Federation 
shall have the right to elect and be elected 
to state bodies of power and local self-
government bodies, and also to participate 
in referenda. 
3. Deprived of the right to elect and 
be elected shall be citizens recognized by 
court as legally unfit, as well as citizens 
kept in places of confinement by a court 
sentence. 
4. Citizens of the Russian Federation 
shall enjoy equal access to the state 
service. 
5. Citizens of the expenditures shall 
have the right to participate in 
administering justice. 
Article 33 
Citizens of the Russian Federation 
shall have the right to address personally, 
as well as to submit individual and 
collective appeals to state organs and local 
self-government bodies. 
Article 34 
1. Everyone shall have the right to a 
free use of his abilities and property for 
entrepreneurial and economic activities not 
prohibited by law. 
2. The economic activity aimed at 
monopolization and unfair competition 
shall not be allowed. 
Article 35 
1. The right of private property shall 
be protected by law. 
2. Everyone shall have the right to 
have property, possess, use and dispose of 
it both personally and jointly with other 
people. 
3. No one may be deprived of 
property otherwise than by a court 
decision. Forced confiscation of property 
for state needs may be carried out only on 
the proviso of preliminary and complete 
compensation. 
4. The right of inheritance shall be 
guaranteed. 
Article 36 
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1. Citizens and their associations shall 
have the right to possess land as private 
property. 
2. Possession, utilization and disposal 
of land and other natural resources shall be 
exercised by the owners freely, if it is not 
detrimental to the environment and does 
not violate the rights and lawful interests 
of other people. 
3. The terms and rules for the use of 
land shall be fixed by a federal law. 
Article 37 
1. Labour is free. Everyone shall have 
the right to freely use his labour 
capabilities, to choose the type of activity 
and profession. 
2. Forced labour shall be banned. 
3. Everyone shall have the right to 
labour conditions meeting the safety and 
hygienic requirements, for labour 
remuneration without any discrimination 
whatsoever and not lower than minimum 
wages and salaries established by the 
federal law, as well as the right to 
protection against unemployment. 
4. Recognition shall be given to the 
right to individual and collective labour 
disputes with the use of methods of their 
adjustment fixed by the federal law, 
including the right to strike. 
5. Everyone shall have the right to 
rest and license. Those working by labour 
contracts shall be guaranteed the fixed 
duration of the working time, days off and 
holidays, and the annual paid leave 
established by the federal law. 
Article 38 
1. Maternity and childhood, and the 
family shall be protected by the State. 
2. Care for children, their upbringing 
shall be equally the right and obligation of 
parents. 
3. Able-bodied children over 18 years 
of age shall take care of disabled parents. 
Article 39 
1. Everyone shall be guaranteed 
social security at the expense of the State 
in old age, in case of an illness, 
disableness, loss of the bread-winner, for 
upbringing of children and in other cases 
established by law. 
2. State pensions and social 
allowances shall be established by law. 
3. Promotion shall be given to 
voluntary social insurance and the creation 
of additional forms of social security and 
charity. 
Article 40 
1. Everyone shall have the right to a 
home. No one may be arbitrarily deprived 
of his or her home. 
2. The bodies of state authority and 
local self-government shall encourage 
housing construction and create conditions 
for exercising the right to a home. 
3. Low-income people and other 
persons mentioned in law and in need of a 
home shall receive it gratis or for 
reasonable payment from the state, 
municipal and other housing stocks 
according to the norms fixed by law. 
Article 41 
1. Everyone shall have the right to 
health protection and medical aid. Medical 
aid in state and municipal health 
establishments shall be rendered to 
individuals gratis, at the expense of the 
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corresponding budget, insurance 
contributions, and other proceeds. 
2. In the Russian Federation federal 
programmes of protecting and 
strengthening the health of the population 
shall be financed by the State; measures 
shall be adopted to develop state, 
municipal and private health services; 
activities shall be promoted which 
facilitate the strengthening of health, the 
development of physical culture and sport, 
ecological and sanitary-epidemiological 
well-being. 
3. The concealment by officials of the 
facts and circumstances posing a threat to 
the life and health of people shall entail 
responsibility according to the federal law. 
Article 42 
Everyone shall have the right to 
favourable environment, reliable 
information about its state and for a 
restitution of damage inflicted on his 
health and property by ecological 
transgressions. 
Article 43 
1. Everyone shall have the right to 
education. 
2. Guarantees shall be provided for 
general access to and free pre-school, 
secondary and high vocational education 
in state or municipal educational 
establishments and at enterprises. 
3. Everyone shall have the right to 
receive on a competitive basis a free 
higher education in a state or municipal 
educational establishment and at an 
enterprise. 
4. The basic general education shall 
be free of charge. Parents or persons in law 
parents shall enable their children to 
receive a basic general education. 
5. The Russian Federation shall 
establish federal state educational 
standards and support various forms of 
education and self-education. 
Article 44 
1. Everyone shall be guaranteed the 
freedom of literary, artistic, scientific, 
technical and other types of creative 
activity, and teaching. Intellectual property 
shall be protected by law. 
2. Everyone shall have the right to 
participate in cultural life and use cultural 
establishments and to an access to cultural 
values. 
3. Everyone shall be obliged to care 
for the preservation of cultural and 
historical heritage and protect monuments 
of history and culture. 
Article 45 
1. State protection of the rights and 
freedoms of man and citizen shall be 
guaranteed in the Russian Federation. 
2. Everyone shall be free to protect 
his rights and freedoms by all means not 
prohibited by law. 
Article 46 
1. Everyone shall be guaranteed 
judicial protection of his rights and 
freedoms. 
2. Decisions and actions (or inaction) 
of bodies of state authority and local self-
government, public associations and 
officials may be appealed against in court. 
3. Everyone shall have the right to 
appeal, according to international treaties 
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of the Russian Federation, to international 
bodies for the protection of human rights 
and freedoms, if all the existing internal 
state means of legal protection have been 
exhausted. 
Article 47 
1. No one may be deprived of the 
right to the consideration of his or her case 
in that court and by that judge in whose 
cognizance the given case is according to 
law. 
2. The accused of committing a crime 
shall have the right to the examination of 
his case by a court of jury in cases 
envisaged by the federal law. 
Article 48 
1. Everyone shall be guaranteed the 
right to qualified legal assistance. In cases 
envisaged by law the legal assistance shall 
be free. 
2. Any person detained, taken into 
custody, accused of committing a crime 
shall have the right to receive assistance of 
a lawyer (counsel for the defence) from the 
moment of detention, confinement in 
custody or facing charges accordingly. 
Article 49 
1. Everyone accused of committing a 
crime shall be considered innocent until 
his guilt is proved according to the rules 
fixed by the federal law and confirmed by 
the sentence of a court which has come 
into legal force. 
2. The accused shall not be obliged to 
prove his innocence. 
3. Unremovable doubts about the 
guilt of a person shall be interpreted in 
favour of the accused. 
Article 50 
1. No one may be convicted twice for 
one and the same crime. 
2. In administering justice it shall not 
be allowed to use evidence received by 
violating the federal law. 
3. Everyone convicted for a crime 
shall have the right to appeal against the 
judgement of a superior court according to 
the rules envisaged by the federal law, as 
well as to ask for pardon or a mitigation of 
punishment. 
Article 51 
1. No one shall be obliged to give 
incriminating evidence, husband or wife 
and close relatives the range of whom is 
determined by the federal law. 
2. The federal law may envisage other 
cases of absolution from the obligation to 
testify. 
Article 52 
The rights of victims of crimes and of 
abuse of office shall be protected by law. 
The State shall provide access to justice 
for them and a compensation for sustained 
damage. 
Article 53 
Everyone shall have the right for a 
state compensation for damages caused by 
unlawful actions (inaction) of bodies of 
state authority and their officials. 
Article 54 
1. A law introducing or aggravating 
responsibility shall not have retrospective 
effect. 
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2. No one may bear responsibility for 
the action which was not regarded as a 
crime when it was committed. If after 
violating law the responsibility for that is 
eliminated or mitigated, a new law shall be 
applied. 
Article 55 
1. The listing in the Constitution of 
the Russian Federation of the fundamental 
rights and freedoms shall not be 
interpreted as a rejection or derogation of 
other universally recognized human rights 
and freedoms. 
2. In the Russian Federation no laws 
shall be adopted cancelling or derogating 
human rights and freedoms. 
3. The rights and freedoms of man 
and citizen may be limited by the federal 
law only to such an extent to which it is 
necessary for the protection of the 
fundamental principles of the 
constitutional system, morality, health, the 
rights and lawful interests of other people, 
for ensuring defence of the country and 
security of the State. 
Article 56 
1. In conditions of a state of 
emergency in order to ensure the safety of 
citizens and the protection of the 
constitutional system and in accordance 
with the federal constitutional law certain 
limitations may be placed on human rights 
and freedoms with the establishment of 
their framework and time period. 
2. A state of emergency may be 
introduced in the whole territory of the 
Russian Federation and in its certain parts 
in case there are circumstances and 
according to the rules fixed by the federal 
constitutional law. 
3. The rights and freedoms envisaged 
in Articles 20, 21, 23 (the first part), 24, 
28, 34 (the first part), 40 (the first part), 
46-54 of the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation, shall not be liable to 
limitations. 
Article 57 
Everyone shall be obliged to pay the 
legally established taxes and dues. Laws 
introducing new taxes or deteriorating the 
position of taxpayers may not have 
retroactive effect. 
Article 58 
Everyone shall be obliged to preserve 
nature and the environment, carefully treat 
the natural wealth. 
Article 59 
1. Defence of the Fatherland shall be 
a duty and obligation of citizens of the 
Russian Federation. 
2. A citizen shall carry out military 
service according to the federal law. 
3. A citizen of the Russian Federation 
shall have the right to replace military 
service by alternative civilian service in 
case his convictions or religious belief 
contradict military service and also in 
other cases envisaged by the federal law. 
Article 60 
A citizen of the Russian Federation 
may exercise his or her rights and duties in 
full from the age of 18. 
Article 61 
1. A citizen of the Russian Federation 
may not be deported from Russia or 
extradited to another State. 
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2. The Russian Federation shall 
guarantee to its citizens protection and 
patronage abroad. 
Article 62 
1. A citizen of the Russian Federation 
may have the citizenship of a foreign State 
(dual citizenship) according to the federal 
law or an international agreement of the 
Russian Federation. 
2. The possession of a foreign 
citizenship by a citizen of the Russian 
Federation shall not derogate his rights and 
freedoms and shall not free him from the 
obligations stipulated by the Russian 
citizenship, unless otherwise provided for 
by federal law or an international 
agreement of the Russian Federation. 
3. Foreign nationals and stateless 
persons shall enjoy in the Russian 
Federation the rights and bear the 
obligations of citizens of the Russian 
Federation, except for cases envisaged by 
the federal law or the international 
agreement of the Russian Federation. 
Article 63 
1. The Russian Federation shall grant 
political asylum to foreign nationals and 
stateless persons according to the 
universally recognized norms of 
international law. 
2. In the Russian Federation it shall 
not be allowed to extradite to other States 
those people who are persecuted for 
political convictions, as well as for actions 
(or inaction) not recognized as a crime in 
the Russian Federation. The extradition of 
people accused of a crime, and also the 
handover of convicts for serving sentences 
in other States shall be carried out on the 
basis of the federal law or the international 
agreement of the Russian Federation. 
Article 64 
The provisions of the present chapter 
comprise the basis of the legal status of the 
individual in the Russian Federation and 
may not be changed otherwise then 
according to the rules introduced by the 
present Constitution. 
Source: The Constitution of the Russian 
Federation,  
http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-
03.htm  
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Appendix Eight 
 
 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (with the Amendments 
and Additions of December 30, 2008) 
 
 
We, the multinational people of the Russian Federation, united by a common fate in our land, 
establishing human rights and freedoms, civil peace and accord, preserving the historically 
established unity of the state, proceeding from the universally recognised principles of 
equality and self-determination of  peoples, revering the memory of ancestors who have 
conveyed to us love and respect of the Fatherland, belief in good and justice, reviving the 
sovereign statehood of Russia and asserting the firmness of its democratic basis, striving to 
ensure the well-being and prosperity of Russia, proceeding from the responsibility for our 
Fatherland before present and future generations, recognising ourselves as part of the world 
community, adopt the CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. 
 
 
Chapter 1. The Fundamentals of the 
Constitutional System 
 
Article 7 
  
1. The Russian Federation is a social 
State whose policy is aimed at creating 
conditions for a worthy life and the 
unhindered development of man. 
  
2. In the Russian Federation the 
labour and health of people shall be 
protected, guaranteed minimum wages and 
salaries shall be established, state support 
ensured for the family, maternity, paternity 
and childhood, for disabled persons and 
the elderly, a system of social services 
developed, state pensions, allowances and 
other social security guarantees shall be 
established. 
  
Chapter 2. Rights and Freedoms of Man 
and Citizen 
  
Article 17 
  
1. In the Russian Federation 
recognition and guarantees shall be 
provided for the rights and freedoms of 
man and citizen according to the 
universally recognised principles and 
norms of international law and according 
to the present Constitution. 
  
2. Fundamental human rights and 
freedoms are inalienable and shall be 
enjoyed by everyone from the day of birth. 
  
3. The exercise of the rights and 
freedoms of man and citizen shall not 
violate the rights and freedoms of other 
people. 
  
Article 18 
 
The rights and freedoms of man and 
citizen shall operate directly. They 
determine the essence, meaning and 
implementation of laws, the activities of 
the legislative and executive authorities, 
local self-government and shall be ensured 
by the administration of justice. 
  
Article 19 
  
1. All people shall be equal before the 
law and courts. 
  
2. The State shall guarantee the 
equality of rights and freedoms of man and 
citizen, regardless of sex, race, nationality, 
language, origin, property and official 
status, place of residence, religion, 
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convictions, membership of public 
associations, and also of other 
circumstances. All forms of limitations of 
human rights on social, racial, national, 
linguistic or religious grounds shall be 
banned. 
  
3. Men and women shall enjoy equal 
rights and freedoms and have equal 
possibilities to exercise them. 
  
Article 20 
  
1. Everyone shall have the right to 
life. 
  
2. Capital punishment until its 
complete abolition may be envisaged by a 
federal law only as a penalty for especially 
grave crimes against life, and the accused 
shall be granted the right to have his case 
examined by a jury. 
  
Article 21 
  
1. Human dignity shall be protected 
by the State. Nothing may serve as a basis 
for its derogation. 
  
2. No one shall be subject to torture, 
violence or other cruel or humiliating 
treatment or punishment. No one may be 
subject to medical, scientific and other 
experiments without voluntary consent. 
  
Article 22 
  
1. Everyone shall have the right to 
freedom and personal immunity. 
  
2. Arrest, detention and remanding in 
custody shall be allowed only by court 
decision. Without the court's decision a 
person may not be detained for a term of 
more than 48 hours. 
  
Article 23 
  
1. Everyone shall have the right to the 
inviolability of private life, personal and 
family secrets, the protection of one's 
honour and good name. 
  
2. Everyone shall have the right to 
privacy of correspondence, of telephone 
conversations, postal, telegraph and other 
messages. Limitations of this right shall be 
allowed only by court decision. 
  
 Article 29 
  
1. Everyone shall be guaranteed the 
freedom of ideas and speech. 
  
2. Propaganda or agitation instigating 
social, racial, national or religious hatred 
and strife shall not be allowed. The 
propaganda of social, racial, national, 
religious or linguistic supremacy shall be 
banned. 
  
3. No one may be forced to express 
his views and convictions or to reject 
them. 
  
4. Everyone shall have the right to 
freely look for, receive, transmit, produce 
and distribute information by any legal 
means. The list of data comprising state 
secrets shall be determined by a federal 
law. 
  
5. The freedom of mass 
communication shall be guaranteed. 
Censorship shall be banned. 
  
Article 30 
  
1. Everyone shall have the right to 
association, including the right to create 
trade unions for the protection of his or her 
interests. The freedom of activity of public 
association shall be guaranteed. 
  
2. No one may be compelled to join 
any association and remain in it. 
  
 Article 31 
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Citizens of the Russian Federation 
shall have the right to assemble peacefully, 
without weapons, hold rallies, meetings 
and demonstrations, marches and pickets. 
  
Article 33 
 
Citizens of the Russian Federation 
shall have the right to address personally, 
as well as to submit individual and 
collective appeals to state bodies and local 
self-government bodies. 
  
 Article 37 
  
1. Labour is free. Everyone shall have 
the right to freely use his labour 
capabilities, to choose the type of activity 
and profession. 
  
2. Forced labour shall be banned. 
  
3. Everyone shall have the right to 
labour conditions meeting the safety and 
hygiene requirements, to labour 
remuneration without any discrimination 
whatsoever and to wages and salaries not 
lower than the minimum established by 
federal law, as well as the right to 
protection against unemployment. 
  
4. Recognition shall be given to the 
right to individual and collective labour 
disputes with the use of methods for their 
resolution established by federal law, 
including the right to strike. 
  
5. Everyone shall have the right to 
rest and leisure. Those working under 
labour contracts shall be guaranteed a 
fixed duration of working time, days off 
and holidays, and annual paid leave 
established by federal law. 
  
Article 38 
  
1. Maternity and childhood, and the 
family shall be protected by the State. 
  
2. Care for children and their 
upbringing shall be equally the right and 
obligation of parents. 
  
3. Able-bodied children over 18 years 
of age shall take care of disabled parents. 
  
Article 39 
  
1. Everyone shall be guaranteed 
social security at the expense of the State 
in old age, in case of illness, disability, 
loss of the bread-winner, for bringing up 
children and in other cases established by 
law. 
  
2. State pensions and social 
allowances shall be established by law. 
  
3. Promotion shall be given to 
voluntary social insurance and the creation 
of additional forms of social security and 
charity. 
  
Article 40 
  
1. Everyone shall have the right to a 
home. No one may be arbitrarily deprived 
of his or her home. 
  
2. The bodies of state authority and 
local self-government shall encourage 
housing construction and create conditions 
for exercising the right to a home. 
  
3. People on low-incomes and other 
persons mentioned in law and in need of a 
home shall receive it gratis or for 
reasonable payment from the state, 
municipal and other housing stocks 
according to the norms established by law. 
  
Article 41 
  
1. Everyone shall have the right to 
health protection and medical aid. Medical 
aid in state and municipal health 
establishments shall be rendered to 
individuals gratis, at the expense of the 
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corresponding budget, insurance 
contributions and other proceeds. 
  
2. In the Russian Federation federal 
programmes for protecting and improving 
the health of the population shall be 
financed by the State; measures shall be 
adopted to develop state, municipal and 
private health services; activities shall be 
promoted which facilitate the improvement 
of health, the development of physical 
culture and sport, ecological and sanitary-
epidemiological well-being. 
  
3. The concealment by officials of 
facts and circumstances posing a threat to 
the life and health of people shall entail 
responsibility according to federal law. 
  
Article 43 
  
1. Everyone shall have the right to 
education. 
  
2. Guarantees shall be provided for 
general access to and free pre-school, 
secondary and higher vocational education 
in state or municipal educational 
establishments and at enterprises. 
  
3. Everyone shall have the right to 
receive on a competitive basis a free 
higher education in a state or municipal 
educational establishment and at an 
enterprise. 
  
4. The basic general education shall 
be free of charge. Parents or those acting 
as such shall enable their children to 
receive a basic general education. 
  
5. The Russian Federation shall 
establish federal state educational 
standards and support various forms of 
education and self-education. 
 
 
  
Source: Website of the Constitution of the 
Russian Federation, available at 
http://constitution.garant.ru/english/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
